The Project Gutenberg eBook of Second Treatise Of Government, by John Locke (2024)

PREFACE

Reader, thou hast here the beginning and end of a discourse concerninggovernment; what fate has otherwise disposed of the papers that should havefilled up the middle, and were more than all the rest, it is not worth while totell thee. These, which remain, I hope are sufficient to establish the throneof our great restorer, our present King William; to make good his title, in theconsent of the people, which being the only one of all lawful governments, hehas more fully and clearly, than any prince in Christendom; and to justify tothe world the people of England, whose love of their just and natural rights,with their resolution to preserve them, saved the nation when it was on thevery brink of slavery and ruin. If these papers have that evidence, I flattermyself is to be found in them, there will be no great miss of those which arelost, and my reader may be satisfied without them: for I imagine, I shall haveneither the time, nor inclination to repeat my pains, and fill up the wantingpart of my answer, by tracing Sir Robert again, through all the windings andobscurities, which are to be met with in the several branches of his wonderfulsystem. The king, and body of the nation, have since so thoroughly confuted hisHypothesis, that I suppose no body hereafter will have either the confidence toappear against our common safety, and be again an advocate for slavery; or theweakness to be deceived with contradictions dressed up in a popular stile, andwell-turned periods: for if any one will be at the pains, himself, in thoseparts, which are here untouched, to strip Sir Robert’s discourses of theflourish of doubtful expressions, and endeavour to reduce his words to direct,positive, intelligible propositions, and then compare them one with another, hewill quickly be satisfied, there was never so much glib nonsense put togetherin well-sounding English. If he think it not worth while to examine his worksall thro’, let him make an experiment in that part, where he treats ofusurpation; and let him try, whether he can, with all his skill, make SirRobert intelligible, and consistent with himself, or common sense. I should notspeak so plainly of a gentleman, long since past answering, had not the pulpit,of late years, publicly owned his doctrine, and made it the current divinity ofthe times. It is necessary those men, who taking on them to be teachers, haveso dangerously misled others, should be openly shewed of what authority thistheir Patriarch is, whom they have so blindly followed, that so they may eitherretract what upon so ill grounds they have vented, and cannot be maintained; orelse justify those principles which they preached up for gospel; though theyhad no better an author than an English courtier: for I should not have writagainst Sir Robert, or taken the pains to shew his mistakes, inconsistencies,and want of (what he so much boasts of, and pretends wholly to build on)scripture-proofs, were there not men amongst us, who, by crying up his books,and espousing his doctrine, save me from the reproach of writing against a deadadversary. They have been so zealous in this point, that, if I have done himany wrong, I cannot hope they should spare me. I wish, where they have done thetruth and the public wrong, they would be as ready to redress it, and allow itsjust weight to this reflection, viz. that there cannot be done a greatermischief to prince and people, than the propagating wrong notions concerninggovernment; that so at last all times might not have reason to complain of theDrum Ecclesiastic. If any one, concerned really for truth, undertake theconfutation of my Hypothesis, I promise him either to recant my mistake, uponfair conviction; or to answer his difficulties. But he must remember twothings.

First, That cavilling here and there, at some expression, or little incident ofmy discourse, is not an answer to my book.

Secondly, That I shall not take railing for arguments, nor think either ofthese worth my notice, though I shall always look on myself as bound to givesatisfaction to any one, who shall appear to be conscientiously scrupulous inthe point, and shall shew any just grounds for his scruples.

I have nothing more, but to advertise the reader, that Observations stands forObservations on Hobbs, Milton, &c. and that a bare quotation of pagesalways means pages of his Patriarcha, Edition 1680.

CHAPTER. I.

AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL, EXTENT AND END OF CIVILGOVERNMENT

Sect. 1. It having been shewn in the foregoing discourse,

(1). That Adam had not, either by natural right of fatherhood, or bypositive donation from God, any such authority over his children, or dominionover the world, as is pretended:

(2). That if he had, his heirs, yet, had no right to it:

(3). That if his heirs had, there being no law of nature nor positivelaw of God that determines which is the right heir in all cases that may arise,the right of succession, and consequently of bearing rule, could not have beencertainly determined:

(4). That if even that had been determined, yet the knowledge of whichis the eldest line of Adam’s posterity, being so long since utterly lost,that in the races of mankind and families of the world, there remains not toone above another, the least pretence to be the eldest house, and to have theright of inheritance:

All these premises having, as I think, been clearly made out, it is impossiblethat the rulers now on earth should make any benefit, or derive any the leastshadow of authority from that, which is held to be the fountain of all power,Adam’s private dominion and paternal jurisdiction; so that he that willnot give just occasion to think that all government in the world is the productonly of force and violence, and that men live together by no other rules butthat of beasts, where the strongest carries it, and so lay a foundation forperpetual disorder and mischief, tumult, sedition and rebellion, (things thatthe followers of that hypothesis so loudly cry out against) must of necessityfind out another rise of government, another original of political power, andanother way of designing and knowing the persons that have it, than what SirRobert Filmer hath taught us.

Sect. 2. To this purpose, I think it may not be amiss, to set down what I taketo be political power; that the power of a MAGISTRATE over a subject may bedistinguished from that of a FATHER over his children, a MASTER over hisservant, a HUSBAND over his wife, and a LORD over his slave. All which distinctpowers happening sometimes together in the same man, if he be considered underthese different relations, it may help us to distinguish these powers one fromwealth, a father of a family, and a captain of a galley.

Sect. 3. POLITICAL POWER, then, I take to be a RIGHT of making laws withpenalties of death, and consequently all less penalties, for the regulating andpreserving of property, and of employing the force of the community, in theexecution of such laws, and in the defence of the commonwealth from foreigninjury; and all this only for the public good.

CHAPTER. II.

OF THE STATE OF NATURE.

Sect. 4. TO understand political power right, and derive it from its original,we must consider, what state all men are naturally in, and that is, a state ofperfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions andpersons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, withoutasking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man.

A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal,no one having more than another; there being nothing more evident, than thatcreatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the sameadvantages of nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be equalone amongst another without subordination or subjection, unless the lord andmaster of them all should, by any manifest declaration of his will, set oneabove another, and confer on him, by an evident and clear appointment, anundoubted right to dominion and sovereignty.

Sect. 5. This equality of men by nature, the judicious Hooker looks upon as soevident in itself, and beyond all question, that he makes it the foundation ofthat obligation to mutual love amongst men, on which he builds the duties theyowe one another, and from whence he derives the great maxims of justice andcharity. His words are,

The like natural inducement hath brought men to know that it is no less theirduty, to love others than themselves; for seeing those things which are equal,must needs all have one measure; if I cannot but wish to receive good, even asmuch at every man’s hands, as any man can wish unto his own soul, howshould I look to have any part of my desire herein satisfied, unless myself becareful to satisfy the like desire, which is undoubtedly in other men, being ofone and the same nature? To have any thing offered them repugnant to thisdesire, must needs in all respects grieve them as much as me; so that if I doharm, I must look to suffer, there being no reason that others should shewgreater measure of love to me, than they have by me shewed unto them: my desiretherefore to be loved of my equals in nature as much as possible may be,imposeth upon me a natural duty of bearing to them-ward fully the likeaffection; from which relation of equality between ourselves and them that areas ourselves, what several rules and canons natural reason hath drawn, fordirection of life, no man is ignorant, Eccl. Pol. Lib. 1.

Sect. 6. But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state oflicence: though man in that state have an uncontroulable liberty to dispose ofhis person or possessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy himself, or somuch as any creature in his possession, but where some nobler use than its barepreservation calls for it. The state of nature has a law of nature to governit, which obliges every one: and reason, which is that law, teaches allmankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no oneought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions: for menbeing all the workmanship of one omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker; all theservants of one sovereign master, sent into the world by his order, and abouthis business; they are his property, whose workmanship they are, made to lastduring his, not one another’s pleasure: and being furnished with likefaculties, sharing all in one community of nature, there cannot be supposed anysuch subordination among us, that may authorize us to destroy one another, asif we were made for one another’s uses, as the inferior ranks ofcreatures are for our’s. Every one, as he is bound to preserve himself,and not to quit his station wilfully, so by the like reason, when his ownpreservation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preservethe rest of mankind, and may not, unless it be to do justice on an offender,take away, or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of the life,the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another.

Sect. 7. And that all men may be restrained from invading others rights, andfrom doing hurt to one another, and the law of nature be observed, whichwilleth the peace and preservation of all mankind, the execution of the law ofnature is, in that state, put into every man’s hands, whereby every onehas a right to punish the transgressors of that law to such a degree, as mayhinder its violation: for the law of nature would, as all other laws thatconcern men in this world be in vain, if there were no body that in the stateof nature had a power to execute that law, and thereby preserve the innocentand restrain offenders. And if any one in the state of nature may punishanother for any evil he has done, every one may do so: for in that state ofperfect equality, where naturally there is no superiority or jurisdiction ofone over another, what any may do in prosecution of that law, every one mustneeds have a right to do.

Sect. 8. And thus, in the state of nature, one man comes by a power overanother; but yet no absolute or arbitrary power, to use a criminal, when he hasgot him in his hands, according to the passionate heats, or boundlessextravagancy of his own will; but only to retribute to him, so far as calmreason and conscience dictate, what is proportionate to his transgression,which is so much as may serve for reparation and restraint: for these two arethe only reasons, why one man may lawfully do harm to another, which is that wecall punishment. In transgressing the law of nature, the offender declareshimself to live by another rule than that of reason and common equity, which isthat measure God has set to the actions of men, for their mutual security; andso he becomes dangerous to mankind, the tye, which is to secure them frominjury and violence, being slighted and broken by him. Which being a trespassagainst the whole species, and the peace and safety of it, provided for by thelaw of nature, every man upon this score, by the right he hath to preservemankind in general, may restrain, or where it is necessary, destroy thingsnoxious to them, and so may bring such evil on any one, who hath transgressedthat law, as may make him repent the doing of it, and thereby deter him, and byhis example others, from doing the like mischief. And in the case, and uponthis ground, EVERY MAN HATH A RIGHT TO PUNISH THE OFFENDER, AND BE EXECUTIONEROF THE LAW OF NATURE.

Sect. 9. I doubt not but this will seem a very strange doctrine to some men:but before they condemn it, I desire them to resolve me, by what right anyprince or state can put to death, or punish an alien, for any crime he commitsin their country. It is certain their laws, by virtue of any sanction theyreceive from the promulgated will of the legislative, reach not a stranger:they speak not to him, nor, if they did, is he bound to hearken to them. Thelegislative authority, by which they are in force over the subjects of thatcommonwealth, hath no power over him. Those who have the supreme power ofmaking laws in England, France or Holland, are to an Indian, but like the restof the world, men without authority: and therefore, if by the law of natureevery man hath not a power to punish offences against it, as he soberly judgesthe case to require, I see not how the magistrates of any community can punishan alien of another country; since, in reference to him, they can have no morepower than what every man naturally may have over another.

Sect, 10. Besides the crime which consists in violating the law, and varyingfrom the right rule of reason, whereby a man so far becomes degenerate, anddeclares himself to quit the principles of human nature, and to be a noxiouscreature, there is commonly injury done to some person or other, and some otherman receives damage by his transgression: in which case he who hath receivedany damage, has, besides the right of punishment common to him with other men,a particular right to seek reparation from him that has done it: and any otherperson, who finds it just, may also join with him that is injured, and assisthim in recovering from the offender so much as may make satisfaction for theharm he has suffered.

Sect. 11. From these two distinct rights, the one of punishing the crime forrestraint, and preventing the like offence, which right of punishing is inevery body; the other of taking reparation, which belongs only to the injuredparty, comes it to pass that the magistrate, who by being magistrate hath thecommon right of punishing put into his hands, can often, where the public gooddemands not the execution of the law, remit the punishment of criminal offencesby his own authority, but yet cannot remit the satisfaction due to any privateman for the damage he has received. That, he who has suffered the damage has aright to demand in his own name, and he alone can remit: the damnified personhas this power of appropriating to himself the goods or service of theoffender, by right of self-preservation, as every man has a power to punish thecrime, to prevent its being committed again, by the right he has of preservingall mankind, and doing all reasonable things he can in order to that end: andthus it is, that every man, in the state of nature, has a power to kill amurderer, both to deter others from doing the like injury, which no reparationcan compensate, by the example of the punishment that attends it from everybody, and also to secure men from the attempts of a criminal, who havingrenounced reason, the common rule and measure God hath given to mankind, hath,by the unjust violence and slaughter he hath committed upon one, declared waragainst all mankind, and therefore may be destroyed as a lion or a tyger, oneof those wild savage beasts, with whom men can have no society nor security:and upon this is grounded that great law of nature, Whoso sheddeth man’sblood, by man shall his blood be shed. And Cain was so fully convinced, thatevery one had a right to destroy such a criminal, that after the murder of hisbrother, he cries out, Every one that findeth me, shall slay me; so plain wasit writ in the hearts of all mankind.

Sect. 12. By the same reason may a man in the state of nature punish the lesserbreaches of that law. It will perhaps be demanded, with death? I answer, eachtransgression may be punished to that degree, and with so much severity, aswill suffice to make it an ill bargain to the offender, give him cause torepent, and terrify others from doing the like. Every offence, that can becommitted in the state of nature, may in the state of nature be also punishedequally, and as far forth as it may, in a commonwealth: for though it would bebesides my present purpose, to enter here into the particulars of the law ofnature, or its measures of punishment; yet, it is certain there is such a law,and that too, as intelligible and plain to a rational creature, and a studierof that law, as the positive laws of commonwealths; nay, possibly plainer; asmuch as reason is easier to be understood, than the fancies and intricatecontrivances of men, following contrary and hidden interests put into words;for so truly are a great part of the municipal laws of countries, which areonly so far right, as they are founded on the law of nature, by which they areto be regulated and interpreted.

Sect. 13. To this strange doctrine, viz. That in the state of nature every onehas the executive power of the law of nature, I doubt not but it will beobjected, that it is unreasonable for men to be judges in their own cases, thatself-love will make men partial to themselves and their friends: and on theother side, that ill nature, passion and revenge will carry them too far inpunishing others; and hence nothing but confusion and disorder will follow, andthat therefore God hath certainly appointed government to restrain thepartiality and violence of men. I easily grant, that civil government is theproper remedy for the inconveniencies of the state of nature, which mustcertainly be great, where men may be judges in their own case, since it is easyto be imagined, that he who was so unjust as to do his brother an injury, willscarce be so just as to condemn himself for it: but I shall desire those whomake this objection, to remember, that absolute monarchs are but men; and ifgovernment is to be the remedy of those evils, which necessarily follow frommen’s being judges in their own cases, and the state of nature istherefore not to be endured, I desire to know what kind of government that is,and how much better it is than the state of nature, where one man, commanding amultitude, has the liberty to be judge in his own case, and may do to all hissubjects whatever he pleases, without the least liberty to any one to questionor controul those who execute his pleasure? and in whatsoever he doth, whetherled by reason, mistake or passion, must be submitted to? much better it is inthe state of nature, wherein men are not bound to submit to the unjust will ofanother: and if he that judges, judges amiss in his own, or any other case, heis answerable for it to the rest of mankind.

Sect. 14. It is often asked as a mighty objection, where are, or ever werethere any men in such a state of nature? To which it may suffice as an answerat present, that since all princes and rulers of independent governments allthrough the world, are in a state of nature, it is plain the world never was,nor ever will be, without numbers of men in that state. I have named allgovernors of independent communities, whether they are, or are not, in leaguewith others: for it is not every compact that puts an end to the state ofnature between men, but only this one of agreeing together mutually to enterinto one community, and make one body politic; other promises, and compacts,men may make one with another, and yet still be in the state of nature. Thepromises and bargains for truck, &c. between the two men in the desertisland, mentioned by Garcilasso de la Vega, in his history of Peru; or betweena Swiss and an Indian, in the woods of America, are binding to them, thoughthey are perfectly in a state of nature, in reference to one another: for truthand keeping of faith belongs to men, as men, and not as members of society.

Sect. 15. To those that say, there were never any men in the state of nature, Iwill not only oppose the authority of the judicious Hooker, Eccl. Pol. lib. i.sect. 10, where he says,

The laws which have been hitherto mentioned, i.e. the laws of nature, do bindmen absolutely, even as they are men, although they have never any settledfellowship, never any solemn agreement amongst themselves what to do, or not todo: but forasmuch as we are not by ourselves sufficient to furnish ourselveswith competent store of things, needful for such a life as our nature dothdesire, a life fit for the dignity of man; therefore to supply those defectsand imperfections which are in us, as living single and solely by ourselves, weare naturally induced to seek communion and fellowship with others: this wasthe cause of men’s uniting themselves at first in politic societies.

But I moreover affirm, that all men are naturally in that state, and remain so,till by their own consents they make themselves members of some politicsociety; and I doubt not in the sequel of this discourse, to make it veryclear.

CHAPTER. III.

OF THE STATE OF WAR.

Sect. 16. THE state of war is a state of enmity and destruction: and thereforedeclaring by word or action, not a passionate and hasty, but a sedate settleddesign upon another man’s life, puts him in a state of war with himagainst whom he has declared such an intention, and so has exposed his life tothe other’s power to be taken away by him, or any one that joins with himin his defence, and espouses his quarrel; it being reasonable and just, Ishould have a right to destroy that which threatens me with destruction: for,by the fundamental law of nature, man being to be preserved as much aspossible, when all cannot be preserved, the safety of the innocent is to bepreferred: and one may destroy a man who makes war upon him, or has discoveredan enmity to his being, for the same reason that he may kill a wolf or a lion;because such men are not under the ties of the commonlaw of reason, have noother rule, but that of force and violence, and so may be treated as beasts ofprey, those dangerous and noxious creatures, that will be sure to destroy himwhenever he falls into their power.

Sect. 17. And hence it is, that he who attempts to get another man into hisabsolute power, does thereby put himself into a state of war with him; it beingto be understood as a declaration of a design upon his life: for I have reasonto conclude, that he who would get me into his power without my consent, woulduse me as he pleased when he had got me there, and destroy me too when he had afancy to it; for no body can desire to have me in his absolute power, unless itbe to compel me by force to that which is against the right of my freedom, i.e.make me a slave. To be free from such force is the only security of mypreservation; and reason bids me look on him, as an enemy to my preservation,who would take away that freedom which is the fence to it; so that he who makesan attempt to enslave me, thereby puts himself into a state of war with me. Hethat, in the state of nature, would take away the freedom that belongs to anyone in that state, must necessarily be supposed to have a design to take awayevery thing else, that freedom being the foundation of all the rest; as hethat, in the state of society, would take away the freedom belonging to thoseof that society or commonwealth, must be supposed to design to take away fromthem every thing else, and so be looked on as in a state of war.

Sect. 18. This makes it lawful for a man to kill a thief, who has not in theleast hurt him, nor declared any design upon his life, any farther than, by theuse of force, so to get him in his power, as to take away his money, or what hepleases, from him; because using force, where he has no right, to get me intohis power, let his pretence be what it will, I have no reason to suppose, thathe, who would take away my liberty, would not, when he had me in his power,take away every thing else. And therefore it is lawful for me to treat him asone who has put himself into a state of war with me, i.e. kill him if I can;for to that hazard does he justly expose himself, whoever introduces a state ofwar, and is aggressor in it.

Sect. 19. And here we have the plain difference between the state of nature andthe state of war, which however some men have confounded, are as far distant,as a state of peace, good will, mutual assistance and preservation, and a stateof enmity, malice, violence and mutual destruction, are one from another. Menliving together according to reason, without a common superior on earth, withauthority to judge between them, is properly the state of nature. But force, ora declared design of force, upon the person of another, where there is nocommon superior on earth to appeal to for relief, is the state of war: and itis the want of such an appeal gives a man the right of war even against anaggressor, tho’ he be in society and a fellow subject. Thus a thief, whomI cannot harm, but by appeal to the law, for having stolen all that I am worth,I may kill, when he sets on me to rob me but of my horse or coat; because thelaw, which was made for my preservation, where it cannot interpose to secure mylife from present force, which, if lost, is capable of no reparation, permitsme my own defence, and the right of war, a liberty to kill the aggressor,because the aggressor allows not time to appeal to our common judge, nor thedecision of the law, for remedy in a case where the mischief may beirreparable. Want of a common judge with authority, puts all men in a state ofnature: force without right, upon a man’s person, makes a state of war,both where there is, and is not, a common judge.

Sect. 20. But when the actual force is over, the state of war ceases betweenthose that are in society, and are equally on both sides subjected to the fairdetermination of the law; because then there lies open the remedy of appeal forthe past injury, and to prevent future harm: but where no such appeal is, as inthe state of nature, for want of positive laws, and judges with authority toappeal to, the state of war once begun, continues, with a right to the innocentparty to destroy the other whenever he can, until the aggressor offers peace,and desires reconciliation on such terms as may repair any wrongs he hasalready done, and secure the innocent for the future; nay, where an appeal tothe law, and constituted judges, lies open, but the remedy is denied by amanifest perverting of justice, and a barefaced wresting of the laws to protector indemnify the violence or injuries of some men, or party of men, there it ishard to imagine any thing but a state of war: for wherever violence is used,and injury done, though by hands appointed to administer justice, it is stillviolence and injury, however coloured with the name, pretences, or forms oflaw, the end whereof being to protect and redress the innocent, by an unbiassedapplication of it, to all who are under it; wherever that is not bona fidedone, war is made upon the sufferers, who having no appeal on earth to rightthem, they are left to the only remedy in such cases, an appeal to heaven.

Sect. 21. To avoid this state of war (wherein there is no appeal but to heaven,and wherein every the least difference is apt to end, where there is noauthority to decide between the contenders) is one great reason of men’sputting themselves into society, and quitting the state of nature: for wherethere is an authority, a power on earth, from which relief can be had byappeal, there the continuance of the state of war is excluded, and thecontroversy is decided by that power. Had there been any such court, anysuperior jurisdiction on earth, to determine the right between Jephtha and theAmmonites, they had never come to a state of war: but we see he was forced toappeal to heaven. The Lord the Judge (says he) be judge this day between thechildren of Israel and the children of Ammon, Judg. xi. 27. and thenprosecuting, and relying on his appeal, he leads out his army to battle: andtherefore in such controversies, where the question is put, who shall be judge?It cannot be meant, who shall decide the controversy; every one knows whatJephtha here tells us, that the Lord the Judge shall judge. Where there is nojudge on earth, the appeal lies to God in heaven. That question then cannotmean, who shall judge, whether another hath put himself in a state of war withme, and whether I may, as Jephtha did, appeal to heaven in it? of that I myselfcan only be judge in my own conscience, as I will answer it, at the great day,to the supreme judge of all men.

CHAPTER. IV.

OF SLAVERY.

Sect. 22. THE natural liberty of man is to be free from any superior power onearth, and not to be under the will or legislative authority of man, but tohave only the law of nature for his rule. The liberty of man, in society, is tobe under no other legislative power, but that established, by consent, in thecommonwealth; nor under the dominion of any will, or restraint of any law, butwhat that legislative shall enact, according to the trust put in it. Freedomthen is not what Sir Robert Filmer tells us, Observations, A. 55. a liberty forevery one to do what he lists, to live as he pleases, and not to be tied by anylaws: but freedom of men under government is, to have a standing rule to liveby, common to every one of that society, and made by the legislative powererected in it; a liberty to follow my own will in all things, where the ruleprescribes not; and not to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown,arbitrary will of another man: as freedom of nature is, to be under no otherrestraint but the law of nature.

Sect. 23. This freedom from absolute, arbitrary power, is so necessary to, andclosely joined with a man’s preservation, that he cannot part with it,but by what forfeits his preservation and life together: for a man, not havingthe power of his own life, cannot, by compact, or his own consent, enslavehimself to any one, nor put himself under the absolute, arbitrary power ofanother, to take away his life, when he pleases. No body can give more powerthan he has himself; and he that cannot take away his own life, cannot giveanother power over it. Indeed, having by his fault forfeited his own life, bysome act that deserves death; he, to whom he has forfeited it, may (when he hashim in his power) delay to take it, and make use of him to his own service, andhe does him no injury by it: for, whenever he finds the hardship of his slaveryoutweigh the value of his life, it is in his power, by resisting the will ofhis master, to draw on himself the death he desires.

Sect. 24. This is the perfect condition of slavery, which is nothing else, butthe state of war continued, between a lawful conqueror and a captive: for, ifonce compact enter between them, and make an agreement for a limited power onthe one side, and obedience on the other, the state of war and slavery ceases,as long as the compact endures: for, as has been said, no man can, byagreement, pass over to another that which he hath not in himself, a power overhis own life.

I confess, we find among the Jews, as well as other nations, that men did sellthemselves; but, it is plain, this was only to drudgery, not to slavery: for,it is evident, the person sold was not under an absolute, arbitrary, despoticalpower: for the master could not have power to kill him, at any time, whom, at acertain time, he was obliged to let go free out of his service; and the masterof such a servant was so far from having an arbitrary power over his life, thathe could not, at pleasure, so much as maim him, but the loss of an eye, ortooth, set him free, Exod. xxi.

CHAPTER. V.

OF PROPERTY.

Sect. 25. Whether we consider natural reason, which tells us, that men, beingonce born, have a right to their preservation, and consequently to meat anddrink, and such other things as nature affords for their subsistence: orrevelation, which gives us an account of those grants God made of the world toAdam, and to Noah, and his sons, it is very clear, that God, as king Davidsays, Psal. cxv. 16. has given the earth to the children of men; given it tomankind in common. But this being supposed, it seems to some a very greatdifficulty, how any one should ever come to have a property in any thing: Iwill not content myself to answer, that if it be difficult to make outproperty, upon a supposition that God gave the world to Adam, and his posterityin common, it is impossible that any man, but one universal monarch, shouldhave any property upon a supposition, that God gave the world to Adam, and hisheirs in succession, exclusive of all the rest of his posterity. But I shallendeavour to shew, how men might come to have a property in several parts ofthat which God gave to mankind in common, and that without any express compactof all the commoners.

Sect. 26. God, who hath given the world to men in common, hath also given themreason to make use of it to the best advantage of life, and convenience. Theearth, and all that is therein, is given to men for the support and comfort oftheir being. And tho’ all the fruits it naturally produces, and beasts itfeeds, belong to mankind in common, as they are produced by the spontaneoushand of nature; and no body has originally a private dominion, exclusive of therest of mankind, in any of them, as they are thus in their natural state: yetbeing given for the use of men, there must of necessity be a means toappropriate them some way or other, before they can be of any use, or at allbeneficial to any particular man. The fruit, or venison, which nourishes thewild Indian, who knows no enclosure, and is still a tenant in common, must behis, and so his, i.e. a part of him, that another can no longer have any rightto it, before it can do him any good for the support of his life.

Sect. 27. Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men,yet every man has a property in his own person: this no body has any right tobut himself. The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, areproperly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hathprovided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to itsomething that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by himremoved from the common state nature hath placed it in, it hath by this laboursomething annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other men: for thislabour being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he canhave a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough,and as good, left in common for others.

Sect. 28. He that is nourished by the acorns he picked up under an oak, or theapples he gathered from the trees in the wood, has certainly appropriated themto himself. No body can deny but the nourishment is his. I ask then, when didthey begin to be his? when he digested? or when he eat? or when he boiled? orwhen he brought them home? or when he picked them up? and it is plain, if thefirst gathering made them not his, nothing else could. That labour put adistinction between them and common: that added something to them more thannature, the common mother of all, had done; and so they became his privateright. And will any one say, he had no right to those acorns or apples, he thusappropriated, because he had not the consent of all mankind to make them his?Was it a robbery thus to assume to himself what belonged to all in common? Ifsuch a consent as that was necessary, man had starved, notwithstanding theplenty God had given him. We see in commons, which remain so by compact, thatit is the taking any part of what is common, and removing it out of the statenature leaves it in, which begins the property; without which the common is ofno use. And the taking of this or that part, does not depend on the expressconsent of all the commoners. Thus the grass my horse has bit; the turfs myservant has cut; and the ore I have digged in any place, where I have a rightto them in common with others, become my property, without the assignation orconsent of any body. The labour that was mine, removing them out of that commonstate they were in, hath fixed my property in them.

Sect. 29. By making an explicit consent of every commoner, necessary to anyone’s appropriating to himself any part of what is given in common,children or servants could not cut the meat, which their father or master hadprovided for them in common, without assigning to every one his peculiar part.Though the water running in the fountain be every one’s, yet who candoubt, but that in the pitcher is his only who drew it out? His labour hathtaken it out of the hands of nature, where it was common, and belonged equallyto all her children, and hath thereby appropriated it to himself.

Sect. 30. Thus this law of reason makes the deer that Indian’s who hathkilled it; it is allowed to be his goods, who hath bestowed his labour upon it,though before it was the common right of every one. And amongst those who arecounted the civilized part of mankind, who have made and multiplied positivelaws to determine property, this original law of nature, for the beginning ofproperty, in what was before common, still takes place; and by virtue thereof,what fish any one catches in the ocean, that great and still remaining commonof mankind; or what ambergrise any one takes up here, is by the labour thatremoves it out of that common state nature left it in, made his property, whotakes that pains about it. And even amongst us, the hare that any one ishunting, is thought his who pursues her during the chase: for being a beastthat is still looked upon as common, and no man’s private possession;whoever has employed so much labour about any of that kind, as to find andpursue her, has thereby removed her from the state of nature, wherein she wascommon, and hath begun a property.

Sect. 31. It will perhaps be objected to this, that if gathering the acorns, orother fruits of the earth, &c. makes a right to them, then any one mayingross as much as he will. To which I answer, Not so. The same law of nature,that does by this means give us property, does also bound that property too.God has given us all things richly, 1 Tim. vi. 12. is the voice of reasonconfirmed by inspiration. But how far has he given it us? To enjoy. As much asany one can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils, so much hemay by his labour fix a property in: whatever is beyond this, is more than hisshare, and belongs to others. Nothing was made by God for man to spoil ordestroy. And thus, considering the plenty of natural provisions there was along time in the world, and the few spenders; and to how small a part of thatprovision the industry of one man could extend itself, and ingross it to theprejudice of others; especially keeping within the bounds, set by reason, ofwhat might serve for his use; there could be then little room for quarrels orcontentions about property so established.

Sect. 32. But the chief matter of property being now not the fruits of theearth, and the beasts that subsist on it, but the earth itself; as that whichtakes in and carries with it all the rest; I think it is plain, that propertyin that too is acquired as the former. As much land as a man tills, plants,improves, cultivates, and can use the product of, so much is his property. Heby his labour does, as it were, inclose it from the common. Nor will itinvalidate his right, to say every body else has an equal title to it; andtherefore he cannot appropriate, he cannot inclose, without the consent of allhis fellow-commoners, all mankind. God, when he gave the world in common to allmankind, commanded man also to labour, and the penury of his condition requiredit of him. God and his reason commanded him to subdue the earth, i.e. improveit for the benefit of life, and therein lay out something upon it that was hisown, his labour. He that in obedience to this command of God, subdued, tilledand sowed any part of it, thereby annexed to it something that was hisproperty, which another had no title to, nor could without injury take fromhim.

Sect. 33. Nor was this appropriation of any parcel of land, by improving it,any prejudice to any other man, since there was still enough, and as good left;and more than the yet unprovided could use. So that, in effect, there was neverthe less left for others because of his enclosure for himself: for he thatleaves as much as another can make use of, does as good as take nothing at all.No body could think himself injured by the drinking of another man, though hetook a good draught, who had a whole river of the same water left him to quenchhis thirst: and the case of land and water, where there is enough of both, isperfectly the same.

Sect. 34. God gave the world to men in common; but since he gave it them fortheir benefit, and the greatest conveniencies of life they were capable to drawfrom it, it cannot be supposed he meant it should always remain common anduncultivated. He gave it to the use of the industrious and rational, (andlabour was to be his title to it;) not to the fancy or covetousness of thequarrelsome and contentious. He that had as good left for his improvement, aswas already taken up, needed not complain, ought not to meddle with what wasalready improved by another’s labour: if he did, it is plain he desiredthe benefit of another’s pains, which he had no right to, and not theground which God had given him in common with others to labour on, and whereofthere was as good left, as that already possessed, and more than he knew whatto do with, or his industry could reach to.

Sect. 35. It is true, in land that is common in England, or any other country,where there is plenty of people under government, who have money and commerce,no one can inclose or appropriate any part, without the consent of all hisfellow-commoners; because this is left common by compact, i.e. by the law ofthe land, which is not to be violated. And though it be common, in respect ofsome men, it is not so to all mankind; but is the joint property of thiscountry, or this parish. Besides, the remainder, after such enclosure, wouldnot be as good to the rest of the commoners, as the whole was when they couldall make use of the whole; whereas in the beginning and first peopling of thegreat common of the world, it was quite otherwise. The law man was under, wasrather for appropriating. God commanded, and his wants forced him to labour.That was his property which could not be taken from him where-ever he had fixedit. And hence subduing or cultivating the earth, and having dominion, we seeare joined together. The one gave title to the other. So that God, bycommanding to subdue, gave authority so far to appropriate: and the conditionof human life, which requires labour and materials to work on, necessarilyintroduces private possessions.

Sect. 36. The measure of property nature has well set by the extent ofmen’s labour and the conveniencies of life: no man’s labour couldsubdue, or appropriate all; nor could his enjoyment consume more than a smallpart; so that it was impossible for any man, this way, to intrench upon theright of another, or acquire to himself a property, to the prejudice of hisneighbour, who would still have room for as good, and as large a possession(after the other had taken out his) as before it was appropriated. This measuredid confine every man’s possession to a very moderate proportion, andsuch as he might appropriate to himself, without injury to any body, in thefirst ages of the world, when men were more in danger to be lost, by wanderingfrom their company, in the then vast wilderness of the earth, than to bestraitened for want of room to plant in. And the same measure may be allowedstill without prejudice to any body, as full as the world seems: for supposinga man, or family, in the state they were at first peopling of the world by thechildren of Adam, or Noah; let him plant in some inland, vacant places ofAmerica, we shall find that the possessions he could make himself, upon themeasures we have given, would not be very large, nor, even to this day,prejudice the rest of mankind, or give them reason to complain, or thinkthemselves injured by this man’s incroachment, though the race of menhave now spread themselves to all the corners of the world, and do infinitelyexceed the small number was at the beginning. Nay, the extent of ground is ofso little value, without labour, that I have heard it affirmed, that in Spainitself a man may be permitted to plough, sow and reap, without being disturbed,upon land he has no other title to, but only his making use of it. But, on thecontrary, the inhabitants think themselves beholden to him, who, by hisindustry on neglected, and consequently waste land, has increased the stock ofcorn, which they wanted. But be this as it will, which I lay no stress on; thisI dare boldly affirm, that the same rule of propriety, (viz.) that every manshould have as much as he could make use of, would hold still in the world,without straitening any body; since there is land enough in the world tosuffice double the inhabitants, had not the invention of money, and the tacitagreement of men to put a value on it, introduced (by consent) largerpossessions, and a right to them; which, how it has done, I shall by and byshew more at large.

Sect. 37. This is certain, that in the beginning, before the desire of havingmore than man needed had altered the intrinsic value of things, which dependsonly on their usefulness to the life of man; or had agreed, that a little pieceof yellow metal, which would keep without wasting or decay, should be worth agreat piece of flesh, or a whole heap of corn; though men had a right toappropriate, by their labour, each one of himself, as much of the things ofnature, as he could use: yet this could not be much, nor to the prejudice ofothers, where the same plenty was still left to those who would use the sameindustry. To which let me add, that he who appropriates land to himself by hislabour, does not lessen, but increase the common stock of mankind: for theprovisions serving to the support of human life, produced by one acre ofinclosed and cultivated land, are (to speak much within compass) ten times morethan those which are yielded by an acre of land of an equal richness lyingwaste in common. And therefore he that incloses land, and has a greater plentyof the conveniencies of life from ten acres, than he could have from an hundredleft to nature, may truly be said to give ninety acres to mankind: for hislabour now supplies him with provisions out of ten acres, which were but theproduct of an hundred lying in common. I have here rated the improved land verylow, in making its product but as ten to one, when it is much nearer an hundredto one: for I ask, whether in the wild woods and uncultivated waste of America,left to nature, without any improvement, tillage or husbandry, a thousand acresyield the needy and wretched inhabitants as many conveniencies of life, as tenacres of equally fertile land do in Devonshire, where they are well cultivated?

Before the appropriation of land, he who gathered as much of the wild fruit,killed, caught, or tamed, as many of the beasts, as he could; he that soimployed his pains about any of the spontaneous products of nature, as any wayto alter them from the state which nature put them in, by placing any of hislabour on them, did thereby acquire a propriety in them: but if they perished,in his possession, without their due use; if the fruits rotted, or the venisonputrified, before he could spend it, he offended against the common law ofnature, and was liable to be punished; he invaded his neighbour’s share,for he had no right, farther than his use called for any of them, and theymight serve to afford him conveniencies of life.

Sect. 38. The same measures governed the possession of land too: whatsoever hetilled and reaped, laid up and made use of, before it spoiled, that was hispeculiar right; whatsoever he enclosed, and could feed, and make use of, thecattle and product was also his. But if either the grass of his enclosurerotted on the ground, or the fruit of his planting perished without gathering,and laying up, this part of the earth, notwithstanding his enclosure, was stillto be looked on as waste, and might be the possession of any other. Thus, atthe beginning, Cain might take as much ground as he could till, and make it hisown land, and yet leave enough to Abel’s sheep to feed on; a few acreswould serve for both their possessions. But as families increased, and industryinlarged their stocks, their possessions inlarged with the need of them; butyet it was commonly without any fixed property in the ground they made use of,till they incorporated, settled themselves together, and built cities; andthen, by consent, they came in time, to set out the bounds of their distinctterritories, and agree on limits between them and their neighbours; and by lawswithin themselves, settled the properties of those of the same society: for wesee, that in that part of the world which was first inhabited, and thereforelike to be best peopled, even as low down as Abraham’s time, theywandered with their flocks, and their herds, which was their substance, freelyup and down; and this Abraham did, in a country where he was a stranger. Whenceit is plain, that at least a great part of the land lay in common; that theinhabitants valued it not, nor claimed property in any more than they made useof. But when there was not room enough in the same place, for their herds tofeed together, they by consent, as Abraham and Lot did, Gen. xiii. 5. separatedand inlarged their pasture, where it best liked them. And for the same reasonEsau went from his father, and his brother, and planted in mount Seir, Gen.xxxvi. 6.

Sect. 39. And thus, without supposing any private dominion, and property inAdam, over all the world, exclusive of all other men, which can no way beproved, nor any one’s property be made out from it; but supposing theworld given, as it was, to the children of men in common, we see how labourcould make men distinct titles to several parcels of it, for their privateuses; wherein there could be no doubt of right, no room for quarrel.

Sect. 40. Nor is it so strange, as perhaps before consideration it may appear,that the property of labour should be able to over-balance the community ofland: for it is labour indeed that puts the difference of value on every thing;and let any one consider what the difference is between an acre of land plantedwith tobacco or sugar, sown with wheat or barley, and an acre of the same landlying in common, without any husbandry upon it, and he will find, that theimprovement of labour makes the far greater part of the value. I think it willbe but a very modest computation to say, that of the products of the earthuseful to the life of man nine tenths are the effects of labour: nay, if wewill rightly estimate things as they come to our use, and cast up the severalexpences about them, what in them is purely owing to nature, and what tolabour, we shall find, that in most of them ninety-nine hundredths are whollyto be put on the account of labour.

Sect. 41. There cannot be a clearer demonstration of any thing, than severalnations of the Americans are of this, who are rich in land, and poor in all thecomforts of life; whom nature having furnished as liberally as any otherpeople, with the materials of plenty, i.e. a fruitful soil, apt to produce inabundance, what might serve for food, raiment, and delight; yet for want ofimproving it by labour, have not one hundredth part of the conveniencies weenjoy: and a king of a large and fruitful territory there, feeds, lodges, andis clad worse than a day-labourer in England.

Sect. 42. To make this a little clearer, let us but trace some of the ordinaryprovisions of life, through their several progresses, before they come to ouruse, and see how much they receive of their value from human industry. Bread,wine and cloth, are things of daily use, and great plenty; yet notwithstanding,acorns, water and leaves, or skins, must be our bread, drink and cloathing, didnot labour furnish us with these more useful commodities: for whatever bread ismore worth than acorns, wine than water, and cloth or silk, than leaves, skinsor moss, that is wholly owing to labour and industry; the one of these beingthe food and raiment which unassisted nature furnishes us with; the other,provisions which our industry and pains prepare for us, which how much theyexceed the other in value, when any one hath computed, he will then see howmuch labour makes the far greatest part of the value of things we enjoy in thisworld: and the ground which produces the materials, is scarce to be reckonedin, as any, or at most, but a very small part of it; so little, that evenamongst us, land that is left wholly to nature, that hath no improvement ofpasturage, tillage, or planting, is called, as indeed it is, waste; and weshall find the benefit of it amount to little more than nothing.

This shews how much numbers of men are to be preferred to largeness ofdominions; and that the increase of lands, and the right employing of them, isthe great art of government: and that prince, who shall be so wise and godlike,as by established laws of liberty to secure protection and encouragement to thehonest industry of mankind, against the oppression of power and narrowness ofparty, will quickly be too hard for his neighbours: but this by the by.

To return to the argument in hand.

Sect. 43. An acre of land, that bears here twenty bushels of wheat, and anotherin America, which, with the same husbandry, would do the like, are, withoutdoubt, of the same natural intrinsic value: but yet the benefit mankindreceives from the one in a year, is worth 5l. and from the other possibly notworth a penny, if all the profit an Indian received from it were to be valued,and sold here; at least, I may truly say, not one thousandth. It is labour thenwhich puts the greatest part of value upon land, without which it wouldscarcely be worth any thing: it is to that we owe the greatest part of all itsuseful products; for all that the straw, bran, bread, of that acre of wheat, ismore worth than the product of an acre of as good land, which lies waste, isall the effect of labour: for it is not barely the plough-man’s pains,the reaper’s and thresher’s toil, and the baker’s sweat, isto be counted into the bread we eat; the labour of those who broke the oxen,who digged and wrought the iron and stones, who felled and framed the timberemployed about the plough, mill, oven, or any other utensils, which are a vastnumber, requisite to this corn, from its being feed to be sown to its beingmade bread, must all be charged on the account of labour, and received as aneffect of that: nature and the earth furnished only the almost worthlessmaterials, as in themselves. It would be a strange catalogue of things, thatindustry provided and made use of, about every loaf of bread, before it came toour use, if we could trace them; iron, wood, leather, bark, timber, stone,bricks, coals, lime, cloth, dying drugs, pitch, tar, masts, ropes, and all thematerials made use of in the ship, that brought any of the commodities made useof by any of the workmen, to any part of the work; all which it would be almostimpossible, at least too long, to reckon up.

Sect. 44. From all which it is evident, that though the things of nature aregiven in common, yet man, by being master of himself, and proprietor of his ownperson, and the actions or labour of it, had still in himself the greatfoundation of property; and that, which made up the great part of what heapplied to the support or comfort of his being, when invention and arts hadimproved the conveniencies of life, was perfectly his own, and did not belongin common to others.

Sect. 45. Thus labour, in the beginning, gave a right of property, wherever anyone was pleased to employ it upon what was common, which remained a long whilethe far greater part, and is yet more than mankind makes use of. Men, at first,for the most part, contented themselves with what unassisted nature offered totheir necessities: and though afterwards, in some parts of the world, (wherethe increase of people and stock, with the use of money, had made land scarce,and so of some value) the several communities settled the bounds of theirdistinct territories, and by laws within themselves regulated the properties ofthe private men of their society, and so, by compact and agreement, settled theproperty which labour and industry began; and the leagues that have been madebetween several states and kingdoms, either expresly or tacitly disowning allclaim and right to the land in the others possession, have, by common consent,given up their pretences to their natural common right, which originally theyhad to those countries, and so have, by positive agreement, settled a propertyamongst themselves, in distinct parts and parcels of the earth; yet there arestill great tracts of ground to be found, which (the inhabitants thereof nothaving joined with the rest of mankind, in the consent of the use of theircommon money) lie waste, and are more than the people who dwell on it do, orcan make use of, and so still lie in common; tho’ this can scarce happenamongst that part of mankind that have consented to the use of money.

Sect. 46. The greatest part of things really useful to the life of man, andsuch as the necessity of subsisting made the first commoners of the world lookafter, as it doth the Americans now, are generally things of short duration;such as, if they are not consumed by use, will decay and perish of themselves:gold, silver and diamonds, are things that fancy or agreement hath put thevalue on, more than real use, and the necessary support of life. Now of thosegood things which nature hath provided in common, every one had a right (ashath been said) to as much as he could use, and property in all that he couldeffect with his labour; all that his industry could extend to, to alter fromthe state nature had put it in, was his. He that gathered a hundred bushels ofacorns or apples, had thereby a property in them, they were his goods as soonas gathered. He was only to look, that he used them before they spoiled, elsehe took more than his share, and robbed others. And indeed it was a foolishthing, as well as dishonest, to hoard up more than he could make use of. If hegave away a part to any body else, so that it perished not uselesly in hispossession, these he also made use of. And if he also bartered away plums, thatwould have rotted in a week, for nuts that would last good for his eating awhole year, he did no injury; he wasted not the common stock; destroyed no partof the portion of goods that belonged to others, so long as nothing perisheduselesly in his hands. Again, if he would give his nuts for a piece of metal,pleased with its colour; or exchange his sheep for shells, or wool for asparkling pebble or a diamond, and keep those by him all his life he invadednot the right of others, he might heap up as much of these durable things as hepleased; the exceeding of the bounds of his just property not lying in thelargeness of his possession, but the perishing of any thing uselesly in it.

Sect. 47. And thus came in the use of money, some lasting thing that men mightkeep without spoiling, and that by mutual consent men would take in exchangefor the truly useful, but perishable supports of life.

Sect. 48. And as different degrees of industry were apt to give men possessionsin different proportions, so this invention of money gave them the opportunityto continue and enlarge them: for supposing an island, separate from allpossible commerce with the rest of the world, wherein there were but an hundredfamilies, but there were sheep, horses and cows, with other useful animals,wholsome fruits, and land enough for corn for a hundred thousand times as many,but nothing in the island, either because of its commonness, or perishableness,fit to supply the place of money; what reason could any one have there toenlarge his possessions beyond the use of his family, and a plentiful supply toits consumption, either in what their own industry produced, or they couldbarter for like perishable, useful commodities, with others? Where there is notsome thing, both lasting and scarce, and so valuable to be hoarded up, theremen will not be apt to enlarge their possessions of land, were it never sorich, never so free for them to take: for I ask, what would a man value tenthousand, or an hundred thousand acres of excellent land, ready cultivated, andwell stocked too with cattle, in the middle of the inland parts of America,where he had no hopes of commerce with other parts of the world, to draw moneyto him by the sale of the product? It would not be worth the enclosing, and weshould see him give up again to the wild common of nature, whatever was morethan would supply the conveniencies of life to be had there for him and hisfamily.

Sect. 49. Thus in the beginning all the world was America, and more so thanthat is now; for no such thing as money was any where known. Find out somethingthat hath the use and value of money amongst his neighbours, you shall see thesame man will begin presently to enlarge his possessions.

Sect. 50. But since gold and silver, being little useful to the life of man inproportion to food, raiment, and carriage, has its value only from the consentof men, whereof labour yet makes, in great part, the measure, it is plain, thatmen have agreed to a disproportionate and unequal possession of the earth, theyhaving, by a tacit and voluntary consent, found out, a way how a man may fairlypossess more land than he himself can use the product of, by receiving inexchange for the overplus gold and silver, which may be hoarded up withoutinjury to any one; these metals not spoiling or decaying in the hands of thepossessor. This partage of things in an inequality of private possessions, menhave made practicable out of the bounds of society, and without compact, onlyby putting a value on gold and silver, and tacitly agreeing in the use ofmoney: for in governments, the laws regulate the right of property, and thepossession of land is determined by positive constitutions.

Sect. 51. And thus, I think, it is very easy to conceive, without anydifficulty, how labour could at first begin a title of property in the commonthings of nature, and how the spending it upon our uses bounded it. So thatthere could then be no reason of quarrelling about title, nor any doubt aboutthe largeness of possession it gave. Right and conveniency went together; foras a man had a right to all he could employ his labour upon, so he had notemptation to labour for more than he could make use of. This left no room forcontroversy about the title, nor for encroachment on the right of others; whatportion a man carved to himself, was easily seen; and it was useless, as wellas dishonest, to carve himself too much, or take more than he needed.

CHAPTER. VI.

OF PATERNAL POWER.

Sect. 52. IT may perhaps be censured as an impertinent criticism, in adiscourse of this nature, to find fault with words and names, that haveobtained in the world: and yet possibly it may not be amiss to offer new ones,when the old are apt to lead men into mistakes, as this of paternal powerprobably has done, which seems so to place the power of parents over theirchildren wholly in the father, as if the mother had no share in it; whereas, ifwe consult reason or revelation, we shall find, she hath an equal title. Thismay give one reason to ask, whether this might not be more properly calledparental power? for whatever obligation nature and the right of generation layson children, it must certainly bind them equal to both the concurrent causes ofit. And accordingly we see the positive law of God every where joins themtogether, without distinction, when it commands the obedience of children,Honour thy father and thy mother, Exod. xx. 12. Whosoever curseth his father orhis mother, Lev. xx. 9. Ye shall fear every man his mother and his father, Lev.xix. 3. Children, obey your parents, &c. Eph. vi. 1. is the stile of theOld and New Testament.

Sect. 53. Had but this one thing been well considered, without looking anydeeper into the matter, it might perhaps have kept men from running into thosegross mistakes, they have made, about this power of parents; which, however itmight, without any great harshness, bear the name of absolute dominion, andregal authority, when under the title of paternal power it seemed appropriatedto the father, would yet have founded but oddly, and in the very name shewn theabsurdity, if this supposed absolute power over children had been calledparental; and thereby have discovered, that it belonged to the mother too: forit will but very ill serve the turn of those men, who contend so much for theabsolute power and authority of the fatherhood, as they call it, that themother should have any share in it; and it would have but ill supported themonarchy they contend for, when by the very name it appeared, that thatfundamental authority, from whence they would derive their government of asingle person only, was not placed in one, but two persons jointly. But to letthis of names pass.

Sect. 54. Though I have said above, Chap. II. That all men by nature are equal,I cannot be supposed to understand all sorts of equality: age or virtue maygive men a just precedency: excellency of parts and merit may place othersabove the common level: birth may subject some, and alliance or benefitsothers, to pay an observance to those to whom nature, gratitude, or otherrespects, may have made it due: and yet all this consists with the equality,which all men are in, in respect of jurisdiction or dominion one over another;which was the equality I there spoke of, as proper to the business in hand,being that equal right, that every man hath, to his natural freedom, withoutbeing subjected to the will or authority of any other man.

Sect. 55. Children, I confess, are not born in this full state of equality,though they are born to it. Their parents have a sort of rule and jurisdictionover them, when they come into the world, and for some time after; but it isbut a temporary one. The bonds of this subjection are like the swaddlingclothes they are wrapt up in, and supported by, in the weakness of theirinfancy: age and reason as they grow up, loosen them, till at length they dropquite off, and leave a man at his own free disposal.

Sect. 56. Adam was created a perfect man, his body and mind in full possessionof their strength and reason, and so was capable, from the first instant of hisbeing to provide for his own support and preservation, and govern his actionsaccording to the dictates of the law of reason which God had implanted in him.From him the world is peopled with his descendants, who are all born infants,weak and helpless, without knowledge or understanding: but to supply thedefects of this imperfect state, till the improvement of growth and age hathremoved them, Adam and Eve, and after them all parents were, by the law ofnature, under an obligation to preserve, nourish, and educate the children theyhad begotten; not as their own workmanship, but the workmanship of their ownmaker, the Almighty, to whom they were to be accountable for them.

Sect. 57. The law, that was to govern Adam, was the same that was to govern allhis posterity, the law of reason. But his offspring having another way ofentrance into the world, different from him, by a natural birth, that producedthem ignorant and without the use of reason, they were not presently under thatlaw; for no body can be under a law, which is not promulgated to him; and thislaw being promulgated or made known by reason only, he that is not come to theuse of his reason, cannot be said to be under this law; and Adam’schildren, being not presently as soon as born under this law of reason, werenot presently free: for law, in its true notion, is not so much the limitationas the direction of a free and intelligent agent to his proper interest, andprescribes no farther than is for the general good of those under that law:could they be happier without it, the law, as an useless thing, would of itselfvanish; and that ill deserves the name of confinement which hedges us in onlyfrom bogs and precipices. So that, however it may be mistaken, the end of lawis not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge freedom: for in allthe states of created beings capable of laws, where there is no law, there isno freedom: for liberty is, to be free from restraint and violence from others;which cannot be, where there is no law: but freedom is not, as we are told, aliberty for every man to do what he lists: (for who could be free, when everyother man’s humour might domineer over him?) but a liberty to dispose,and order as he lists, his person, actions, possessions, and his wholeproperty, within the allowance of those laws under which he is, and therein notto be subject to the arbitrary will of another, but freely follow his own.

Sect. 58. The power, then, that parents have over their children, arises fromthat duty which is incumbent on them, to take care of their off-spring, duringthe imperfect state of childhood. To inform the mind, and govern the actions oftheir yet ignorant nonage, till reason shall take its place, and ease them ofthat trouble, is what the children want, and the parents are bound to: for Godhaving given man an understanding to direct his actions, has allowed him afreedom of will, and liberty of acting, as properly belonging thereunto, withinthe bounds of that law he is under. But whilst he is in an estate, wherein hehas not understanding of his own to direct his will, he is not to have any willof his own to follow: he that understands for him, must will for him too; hemust prescribe to his will, and regulate his actions; but when he comes to theestate that made his father a freeman, the son is a freeman too.

Sect. 59. This holds in all the laws a man is under, whether natural or civil.Is a man under the law of nature? What made him free of that law? what gave hima free disposing of his property, according to his own will, within the compassof that law? I answer, a state of maturity wherein he might be supposed capableto know that law, that so he might keep his actions within the bounds of it.When he has acquired that state, he is presumed to know how far that law is tobe his guide, and how far he may make use of his freedom, and so comes to haveit; till then, some body else must guide him, who is presumed to know how farthe law allows a liberty. If such a state of reason, such an age of discretionmade him free, the same shall make his son free too. Is a man under the law ofEngland? What made him free of that law? that is, to have the liberty todispose of his actions and possessions according to his own will, within thepermission of that law? A capacity of knowing that law; which is supposed bythat law, at the age of one and twenty years, and in some cases sooner. If thismade the father free, it shall make the son free too. Till then we see the lawallows the son to have no will, but he is to be guided by the will of hisfather or guardian, who is to understand for him. And if the father die, andfail to substitute a deputy in his trust; if he hath not provided a tutor, togovern his son, during his minority, during his want of understanding, the lawtakes care to do it; some other must govern him, and be a will to him, till hehath attained to a state of freedom, and his understanding be fit to take thegovernment of his will. But after that, the father and son are equally free asmuch as tutor and pupil after nonage; equally subjects of the same lawtogether, without any dominion left in the father over the life, liberty, orestate of his son, whether they be only in the state and under the law ofnature, or under the positive laws of an established government.

Sect. 60. But if, through defects that may happen out of the ordinary course ofnature, any one comes not to such a degree of reason, wherein he might besupposed capable of knowing the law, and so living within the rules of it, heis never capable of being a free man, he is never let loose to the disposure ofhis own will (because he knows no bounds to it, has not understanding, itsproper guide) but is continued under the tuition and government of others, allthe time his own understanding is uncapable of that charge. And so lunatics andideots are never set free from the government of their parents;

children, who are not as yet come unto those years whereat they may have; andinnocents which are excluded by a natural defect from ever having; thirdly,madmen, which for the present cannot possibly have the use of right reason toguide themselves, have for their guide, the reason that guideth other men whichare tutors over them, to seek and procure their good for them,

says Hooker, Eccl. Pol. lib. i. sec. 7. All which seems no more than that duty,which God and nature has laid on man, as well as other creatures, to preservetheir offspring, till they can be able to shift for themselves, and will scarceamount to an instance or proof of parents regal authority.

Sect. 61. Thus we are born free, as we are born rational; not that we haveactually the exercise of either: age, that brings one, brings with it the othertoo. And thus we see how natural freedom and subjection to parents may consisttogether, and are both founded on the same principle. A child is free by hisfather’s title, by his father’s understanding, which is to governhim till he hath it of his own. The freedom of a man at years of discretion,and the subjection of a child to his parents, whilst yet short of that age, areso consistent, and so distinguishable, that the most blinded contenders formonarchy, by right of fatherhood, cannot miss this difference; the mostobstinate cannot but allow their consistency: for were their doctrine all true,were the right heir of Adam now known, and by that title settled a monarch inhis throne, invested with all the absolute unlimited power Sir Robert Filmertalks of; if he should die as soon as his heir were born, must not the child,notwithstanding he were never so free, never so much sovereign, be insubjection to his mother and nurse, to tutors and governors, till age andeducation brought him reason and ability to govern himself and others? Thenecessities of his life, the health of his body, and the information of hismind, would require him to be directed by the will of others, and not his own;and yet will any one think, that this restraint and subjection wereinconsistent with, or spoiled him of that liberty or sovereignty he had a rightto, or gave away his empire to those who had the government of his nonage? Thisgovernment over him only prepared him the better and sooner for it. If any bodyshould ask me, when my son is of age to be free? I shall answer, just when hismonarch is of age to govern. But at what time, says the judicious Hooker, Eccl.Pol. l. i. sect. 6. a man may be said to have attained so far forth the use ofreason, as sufficeth to make him capable of those laws whereby he is then boundto guide his actions: this is a great deal more easy for sense to discern, thanfor any one by skill and learning to determine.

Sect. 62. Common-wealths themselves take notice of, and allow, that there is atime when men are to begin to act like free men, and therefore till that timerequire not oaths of fealty, or allegiance, or other public owning of, orsubmission to the government of their countries.

Sect. 63. The freedom then of man, and liberty of acting according to his ownwill, is grounded on his having reason, which is able to instruct him in thatlaw he is to govern himself by, and make him know how far he is left to thefreedom of his own will. To turn him loose to an unrestrained liberty, beforehe has reason to guide him, is not the allowing him the privilege of his natureto be free; but to thrust him out amongst brutes, and abandon him to a state aswretched, and as much beneath that of a man, as their’s. This is thatwhich puts the authority into the parents hands to govern the minority of theirchildren. God hath made it their business to employ this care on theiroffspring, and hath placed in them suitable inclinations of tenderness andconcern to temper this power, to apply it, as his wisdom designed it, to thechildren’s good, as long as they should need to be under it.

Sect. 64. But what reason can hence advance this care of the parents due totheir off-spring into an absolute arbitrary dominion of the father, whose powerreaches no farther, than by such a discipline, as he finds most effectual, togive such strength and health to their bodies, such vigour and rectitude totheir minds, as may best fit his children to be most useful to themselves andothers; and, if it be necessary to his condition, to make them work, when theyare able, for their own subsistence. But in this power the mother too has hershare with the father.

Sect. 65. Nay, this power so little belongs to the father by any peculiar rightof nature, but only as he is guardian of his children, that when he quits hiscare of them, he loses his power over them, which goes along with theirnourishment and education, to which it is inseparably annexed; and it belongsas much to the foster-father of an exposed child, as to the natural father ofanother. So little power does the bare act of begetting give a man over hisissue; if all his care ends there, and this be all the title he hath to thename and authority of a father. And what will become of this paternal power inthat part of the world, where one woman hath more than one husband at a time?or in those parts of America, where, when the husband and wife part, whichhappens frequently, the children are all left to the mother, follow her, andare wholly under her care and provision? If the father die whilst the childrenare young, do they not naturally every where owe the same obedience to theirmother, during their minority, as to their father were he alive? and will anyone say, that the mother hath a legislative power over her children? that shecan make standing rules, which shall be of perpetual obligation, by which theyought to regulate all the concerns of their property, and bound their libertyall the course of their lives? or can she inforce the observation of them withcapital punishments? for this is the proper power of the magistrate, of whichthe father hath not so much as the shadow. His command over his children is buttemporary, and reaches not their life or property: it is but a help to theweakness and imperfection of their nonage, a discipline necessary to theireducation: and though a father may dispose of his own possessions as hepleases, when his children are out of danger of perishing for want, yet hispower extends not to the lives or goods, which either their own industry, oranother’s bounty has made their’s; nor to their liberty neither,when they are once arrived to the infranchisement of the years of discretion.The father’s empire then ceases, and he can from thence forwards no moredispose of the liberty of his son, than that of any other man: and it must befar from an absolute or perpetual jurisdiction, from which a man may withdrawhimself, having license from divine authority to leave father and mother, andcleave to his wife.

Sect. 66. But though there be a time when a child comes to be as free fromsubjection to the will and command of his father, as the father himself is freefrom subjection to the will of any body else, and they are each under no otherrestraint, but that which is common to them both, whether it be the law ofnature, or municipal law of their country; yet this freedom exempts not a sonfrom that honour which he ought, by the law of God and nature, to pay hisparents. God having made the parents instruments in his great design ofcontinuing the race of mankind, and the occasions of life to their children; ashe hath laid on them an obligation to nourish, preserve, and bring up theiroffspring; so he has laid on the children a perpetual obligation of honouringtheir parents, which containing in it an inward esteem and reverence to beshewn by all outward expressions, ties up the child from any thing that mayever injure or affront, disturb or endanger, the happiness or life of thosefrom whom he received his; and engages him in all actions of defence, relief,assistance and comfort of those, by whose means he entered into being, and hasbeen made capable of any enjoyments of life: from this obligation no state, nofreedom can absolve children. But this is very far from giving parents a powerof command over their children, or an authority to make laws and dispose asthey please of their lives or liberties. It is one thing to owe honour,respect, gratitude and assistance; another to require an absolute obedience andsubmission. The honour due to parents, a monarch in his throne owes his mother;and yet this lessens not his authority, nor subjects him to her government.

Sect. 67. The subjection of a minor places in the father a temporarygovernment, which terminates with the minority of the child: and the honour duefrom a child, places in the parents a perpetual right to respect, reverence,support and compliance too, more or less, as the father’s care, cost, andkindness in his education, has been more or less. This ends not with minority,but holds in all parts and conditions of a man’s life. The want ofdistinguishing these two powers, viz. that which the father hath in the rightof tuition, during minority, and the right of honour all his life, may perhapshave caused a great part of the mistakes about this matter: for to speakproperly of them, the first of these is rather the privilege of children, andduty of parents, than any prerogative of paternal power. The nourishment andeducation of their children is a charge so incumbent on parents for theirchildren’s good, that nothing can absolve them from taking care of it:and though the power of commanding and chastising them go along with it, yetGod hath woven into the principles of human nature such a tenderness for theiroff-spring, that there is little fear that parents should use their power withtoo much rigour; the excess is seldom on the severe side, the strong byass ofnature drawing the other way. And therefore God almighty when he would expresshis gentle dealing with the Israelites, he tells them, that though he chastenedthem, he chastened them as a man chastens his son, Deut. viii. 5. i.e. withtenderness and affection, and kept them under no severer discipline than whatwas absolutely best for them, and had been less kindness to have slackened.This is that power to which children are commanded obedience, that the painsand care of their parents may not be increased, or ill rewarded.

Sect. 68. On the other side, honour and support, all that which gratituderequires to return for the benefits received by and from them, is theindispensable duty of the child, and the proper privilege of the parents. Thisis intended for the parents advantage, as the other is for the child’s;though education, the parents duty, seems to have most power, because theignorance and infirmities of childhood stand in need of restraint andcorrection; which is a visible exercise of rule, and a kind of dominion. Andthat duty which is comprehended in the word honour, requires less obedience,though the obligation be stronger on grown, than younger children: for who canthink the command, Children obey your parents, requires in a man, that haschildren of his own, the same submission to his father, as it does in his yetyoung children to him; and that by this precept he were bound to obey all hisfather’s commands, if, out of a conceit of authority, he should have theindiscretion to treat him still as a boy?

Sect. 69. The first part then of paternal power, or rather duty, which iseducation, belongs so to the father, that it terminates at a certain season;when the business of education is over, it ceases of itself, and is alsoalienable before: for a man may put the tuition of his son in other hands; andhe that has made his son an apprentice to another, has discharged him, duringthat time, of a great part of his obedience both to himself and to his mother.But all the duty of honour, the other part, remains never the less entire tothem; nothing can cancel that: it is so inseparable from them both, that thefather’s authority cannot dispossess the mother of this right, nor canany man discharge his son from honouring her that bore him. But both these arevery far from a power to make laws, and enforcing them with penalties, that mayreach estate, liberty, limbs and life. The power of commanding ends withnonage; and though, after that, honour and respect, support and defence, andwhatsoever gratitude can oblige a man to, for the highest benefits he isnaturally capable of, be always due from a son to his parents; yet all thisputs no scepter into the father’s hand, no sovereign power of commanding.He has no dominion over his son’s property, or actions; nor any right,that his will should prescribe to his son’s in all things; however it maybecome his son in many things, not very inconvenient to him and his family, topay a deference to it.

Sect. 70. A man may owe honour and respect to an ancient, or wise man; defenceto his child or friend; relief and support to the distressed; and gratitude toa benefactor, to such a degree, that all he has, all he can do, cannotsufficiently pay it: but all these give no authority, no right to any one, ofmaking laws over him from whom they are owing. And it is plain, all this is duenot only to the bare title of father; not only because, as has been said, it isowing to the mother too; but because these obligations to parents, and thedegrees of what is required of children, may be varied by the different careand kindness, trouble and expence, which is often employed upon one child morethan another.

Sect. 71. This shews the reason how it comes to pass, that parents insocieties, where they themselves are subjects, retain a power over theirchildren, and have as much right to their subjection, as those who are in thestate of nature. Which could not possibly be, if all political power were onlypaternal, and that in truth they were one and the same thing: for then, allpaternal power being in the prince, the subject could naturally have none ofit. But these two powers, political and paternal, are so perfectly distinct andseparate; are built upon so different foundations, and given to so differentends, that every subject that is a father, has as much a paternal power overhis children, as the prince has over his: and every prince, that has parents,owes them as much filial duty and obedience, as the meanest of his subjects doto their’s; and can therefore contain not any part or degree of that kindof dominion, which a prince or magistrate has over his subject.

Sect. 72. Though the obligation on the parents to bring up their children, andthe obligation on children to honour their parents, contain all the power onthe one hand, and submission on the other, which are proper to this relation,yet there is another power ordinarily in the father, whereby he has a tie onthe obedience of his children; which tho’ it be common to him with othermen, yet the occasions of shewing it, almost constantly happening to fathers intheir private families, and the instances of it elsewhere being rare, and lesstaken notice of, it passes in the world for a part of paternal jurisdiction.And this is the power men generally have to bestow their estates on those whoplease them best; the possession of the father being the expectation andinheritance of the children, ordinarily in certain proportions, according tothe law and custom of each country; yet it is commonly in the father’spower to bestow it with a more sparing or liberal hand, according as thebehaviour of this or that child hath comported with his will and humour.

Sect. 73. This is no small tie on the obedience of children: and there beingalways annexed to the enjoyment of land, a submission to the government of thecountry, of which that land is a part; it has been commonly supposed, that afather could oblige his posterity to that government, of which he himself was asubject, and that his compact held them; whereas, it being only a necessarycondition annexed to the land, and the inheritance of an estate which is underthat government, reaches only those who will take it on that condition, and sois no natural tie or engagement, but a voluntary submission: for everyman’s children being by nature as free as himself, or any of hisancestors ever were, may, whilst they are in that freedom, choose what societythey will join themselves to, what commonwealth they will put themselves under.But if they will enjoy the inheritance of their ancestors, they must take it onthe same terms their ancestors had it, and submit to all the conditions annexedto such a possession. By this power indeed fathers oblige their children toobedience to themselves, even when they are past minority, and most commonlytoo subject them to this or that political power: but neither of these by anypeculiar right of fatherhood, but by the reward they have in their hands toinforce and recompence such a compliance; and is no more power than what aFrench man has over an English man, who by the hopes of an estate he will leavehim, will certainly have a strong tie on his obedience: and if, when it is lefthim, he will enjoy it, he must certainly take it upon the conditions annexed tothe possession of land in that country where it lies, whether it be France orEngland.

Sect. 74. To conclude then, tho’ the father’s power of commandingextends no farther than the minority of his children, and to a degree only fitfor the discipline and government of that age; and tho’ that honour andrespect, and all that which the Latins called piety, which they indispensablyowe to their parents all their life-time, and in all estates, with all thatsupport and defence is due to them, gives the father no power of governing,i.e. making laws and enacting penalties on his children; though by all this hehas no dominion over the property or actions of his son: yet it is obvious toconceive how easy it was, in the first ages of the world, and in places still,where the thinness of people gives families leave to separate into unpossessedquarters, and they have room to remove or plant themselves in yet vacanthabitations, for the father of the family to become the prince of it;* he hadbeen a ruler from the beginning of the infancy of his children: and sincewithout some government it would be hard for them to live together, it waslikeliest it should, by the express or tacit consent of the children when theywere grown up, be in the father, where it seemed without any change barely tocontinue; when indeed nothing more was required to it, than the permitting thefather to exercise alone, in his family, that executive power of the law ofnature, which every free man naturally hath, and by that permission resigningup to him a monarchical power, whilst they remained in it. But that this wasnot by any paternal right, but only by the consent of his children, is evidentfrom hence, that no body doubts, but if a stranger, whom chance or business hadbrought to his family, had there killed any of his children, or committed anyother fact, he might condemn and put him to death, or other-wise have punishedhim, as well as any of his children; which it was impossible he should do byvirtue of any paternal authority over one who was not his child, but by virtueof that executive power of the law of nature, which, as a man, he had a rightto: and he alone could punish him in his family, where the respect of hischildren had laid by the exercise of such a power, to give way to the dignityand authority they were willing should remain in him, above the rest of hisfamily.

(*It is no improbable opinion therefore, which the archphilosopher was of, thatthe chief person in every houshold was always, as it were, a king: so whennumbers of housholds joined themselves in civil societies together, kings werethe first kind of governors amongst them, which is also, as it seemeth, thereason why the name of fathers continued still in them, who, of fathers, weremade rulers; as also the ancient custom of governors to do as Melchizedec, andbeing kings, to exercise the office of priests, which fathers did at the first,grew perhaps by the same occasion. Howbeit, this is not the only kind ofregiment that has been received in the world. The inconveniences of one kindhave caused sundry others to be devised; so that in a word, all publicregiment, of what kind soever, seemeth evidently to have risen from thedeliberate advice, consultation and composition between men, judging itconvenient and behoveful; there being no impossibility in nature considered byitself, but that man might have lived without any public regiment,Hooker’s Eccl. Pol. lib. i. sect. 10.)

Sect. 75. Thus it was easy, and almost natural for children, by a tacit, andscarce avoidable consent, to make way for the father’s authority andgovernment. They had been accustomed in their childhood to follow hisdirection, and to refer their little differences to him, and when they weremen, who fitter to rule them? Their little properties, and less covetousness,seldom afforded greater controversies; and when any should arise, where couldthey have a fitter umpire than he, by whose care they had every one beensustained and brought up, and who had a tenderness for them all? It is nowonder that they made no distinction betwixt minority and full age; nor lookedafter one and twenty, or any other age that might make them the free disposersof themselves and fortunes, when they could have no desire to be out of theirpupilage: the government they had been under, during it, continued still to bemore their protection than restraint; and they could no where find a greatersecurity to their peace, liberties, and fortunes, than in the rule of a father.

Sect. 76. Thus the natural fathers of families, by an insensible change, becamethe politic monarchs of them too: and as they chanced to live long, and leaveable and worthy heirs, for several successions, or otherwise; so they laid thefoundations of hereditary, or elective kingdoms, under several constitutionsand manners, according as chance, contrivance, or occasions happened to mouldthem. But if princes have their titles in their fathers right, and it be asufficient proof of the natural right of fathers to political authority,because they commonly were those in whose hands we find, de facto, the exerciseof government: I say, if this argument be good, it will as strongly prove, thatall princes, nay princes only, ought to be priests, since it is as certain,that in the beginning, the father of the family was priest, as that he wasruler in his own houshold.

CHAPTER. VII.

OF POLITICAL OR CIVIL SOCIETY.

Sect. 77. GOD having made man such a creature, that in his own judgment, it wasnot good for him to be alone, put him under strong obligations of necessity,convenience, and inclination to drive him into society, as well as fitted himwith understanding and language to continue and enjoy it. The first society wasbetween man and wife, which gave beginning to that between parents andchildren; to which, in time, that between master and servant came to be added:and though all these might, and commonly did meet together, and make up but onefamily, wherein the master or mistress of it had some sort of rule proper to afamily; each of these, or all together, came short of political society, as weshall see, if we consider the different ends, ties, and bounds of each ofthese.

Sect. 78. Conjugal society is made by a voluntary compact between man andwoman; and tho’ it consist chiefly in such a communion and right in oneanother’s bodies as is necessary to its chief end, procreation; yet itdraws with it mutual support and assistance, and a communion of interests too,as necessary not only to unite their care and affection, but also necessary totheir common off-spring, who have a right to be nourished, and maintained bythem, till they are able to provide for themselves.

Sect. 79. For the end of conjunction, between male and female, being not barelyprocreation, but the continuation of the species; this conjunction betwixt maleand female ought to last, even after procreation, so long as is necessary tothe nourishment and support of the young ones, who are to be sustained by thosethat got them, till they are able to shift and provide for themselves. Thisrule, which the infinite wise maker hath set to the works of his hands, we findthe inferior creatures steadily obey. In those viviparous animals which feed ongrass, the conjunction between male and female lasts no longer than the veryact of copulation; because the teat of the dam being sufficient to nourish theyoung, till it be able to feed on grass, the male only begets, but concerns nothimself for the female or young, to whose sustenance he can contribute nothing.But in beasts of prey the conjunction lasts longer: because the dam not beingable well to subsist herself, and nourish her numerous off-spring by her ownprey alone, a more laborious, as well as more dangerous way of living, than byfeeding on grass, the assistance of the male is necessary to the maintenance oftheir common family, which cannot subsist till they are able to prey forthemselves, but by the joint care of male and female. The same is to beobserved in all birds, (except some domestic ones, where plenty of food excusesthe cock from feeding, and taking care of the young brood) whose young needingfood in the nest, the cock and hen continue mates, till the young are able touse their wing, and provide for themselves.

Sect. 80. And herein I think lies the chief, if not the only reason, why themale and female in mankind are tied to a longer conjunction than othercreatures, viz. because the female is capable of conceiving, and de facto iscommonly with child again, and brings forth too a new birth, long before theformer is out of a dependency for support on his parents help, and able toshift for himself, and has all the assistance is due to him from his parents:whereby the father, who is bound to take care for those he hath begot, is underan obligation to continue in conjugal society with the same woman longer thanother creatures, whose young being able to subsist of themselves, before thetime of procreation returns again, the conjugal bond dissolves of itself, andthey are at liberty, till Hymen at his usual anniversary season summons themagain to chuse new mates. Wherein one cannot but admire the wisdom of the greatCreator, who having given to man foresight, and an ability to lay up for thefuture, as well as to supply the present necessity, hath made it necessary,that society of man and wife should be more lasting, than of male and femaleamongst other creatures; that so their industry might be encouraged, and theirinterest better united, to make provision and lay up goods for their commonissue, which uncertain mixture, or easy and frequent solutions of conjugalsociety would mightily disturb.

Sect. 81. But tho’ these are ties upon mankind, which make the conjugalbonds more firm and lasting in man, than the other species of animals; yet itwould give one reason to enquire, why this compact, where procreation andeducation are secured, and inheritance taken care for, may not be madedeterminable, either by consent, or at a certain time, or upon certainconditions, as well as any other voluntary compacts, there being no necessityin the nature of the thing, nor to the ends of it, that it should always be forlife; I mean, to such as are under no restraint of any positive law, whichordains all such contracts to be perpetual.

Sect. 82. But the husband and wife, though they have but one common concern,yet having different understandings, will unavoidably sometimes have differentwills too; it therefore being necessary that the last determination, i. e. therule, should be placed somewhere; it naturally falls to the man’s share,as the abler and the stronger. But this reaching but to the things of theircommon interest and property, leaves the wife in the full and free possessionof what by contract is her peculiar right, and gives the husband no more powerover her life than she has over his; the power of the husband being so far fromthat of an absolute monarch, that the wife has in many cases a liberty toseparate from him, where natural right, or their contract allows it; whetherthat contract be made by themselves in the state of nature, or by the customsor laws of the country they live in; and the children upon such separation fallto the father or mother’s lot, as such contract does determine.

Sect. 83. For all the ends of marriage being to be obtained under politicgovernment, as well as in the state of nature, the civil magistrate doth notabridge the right or power of either naturally necessary to those ends, viz.procreation and mutual support and assistance whilst they are together; butonly decides any controversy that may arise between man and wife about them. Ifit were otherwise, and that absolute sovereignty and power of life and deathnaturally belonged to the husband, and were necessary to the society betweenman and wife, there could be no matrimony in any of those countries where thehusband is allowed no such absolute authority. But the ends of matrimonyrequiring no such power in the husband, the condition of conjugal society putit not in him, it being not at all necessary to that state. Conjugal societycould subsist and attain its ends without it; nay, community of goods, and thepower over them, mutual assistance and maintenance, and other things belongingto conjugal society, might be varied and regulated by that contract whichunites man and wife in that society, as far as may consist with procreation andthe bringing up of children till they could shift for themselves; nothing beingnecessary to any society, that is not necessary to the ends for which it ismade.

Sect. 84. The society betwixt parents and children, and the distinct rights andpowers belonging respectively to them, I have treated of so largely, in theforegoing chapter, that I shall not here need to say any thing of it. And Ithink it is plain, that it is far different from a politic society.

Sect. 85. Master and servant are names as old as history, but given to those offar different condition; for a freeman makes himself a servant to another, byselling him, for a certain time, the service he undertakes to do, in exchangefor wages he is to receive: and though this commonly puts him into the familyof his master, and under the ordinary discipline thereof; yet it gives themaster but a temporary power over him, and no greater than what is contained inthe contract between them. But there is another sort of servants, which by apeculiar name we call slaves, who being captives taken in a just war, are bythe right of nature subjected to the absolute dominion and arbitrary power oftheir masters. These men having, as I say, forfeited their lives, and with ittheir liberties, and lost their estates; and being in the state of slavery, notcapable of any property, cannot in that state be considered as any part ofcivil society; the chief end whereof is the preservation of property.

Sect. 86. Let us therefore consider a master of a family with all thesesubordinate relations of wife, children, servants, and slaves, united under thedomestic rule of a family; which, what resemblance soever it may have in itsorder, offices, and number too, with a little commonwealth, yet is very farfrom it, both in its constitution, power and end: or if it must be thought amonarchy, and the paterfamilias the absolute monarch in it, absolute monarchywill have but a very shattered and short power, when it is plain, by what hasbeen said before, that the master of the family has a very distinct anddifferently limited power, both as to time and extent, over those severalpersons that are in it; for excepting the slave (and the family is as much afamily, and his power as paterfamilias as great, whether there be any slaves inhis family or no) he has no legislative power of life and death over any ofthem, and none too but what a mistress of a family may have as well as he. Andhe certainly can have no absolute power over the whole family, who has but avery limited one over every individual in it. But how a family, or any othersociety of men, differ from that which is properly political society, we shallbest see, by considering wherein political society itself consists.

Sect. 87. Man being born, as has been proved, with a title to perfect freedom,and an uncontrouled enjoyment of all the rights and privileges of the law ofnature, equally with any other man, or number of men in the world, hath bynature a power, not only to preserve his property, that is, his life, libertyand estate, against the injuries and attempts of other men; but to judge of,and punish the breaches of that law in others, as he is persuaded the offencedeserves, even with death itself, in crimes where the heinousness of the fact,in his opinion, requires it. But because no political society can be, norsubsist, without having in itself the power to preserve the property, and inorder thereunto, punish the offences of all those of that society; there, andthere only is political society, where every one of the members hath quittedthis natural power, resigned it up into the hands of the community in all casesthat exclude him not from appealing for protection to the law established byit. And thus all private judgment of every particular member being excluded,the community comes to be umpire, by settled standing rules, indifferent, andthe same to all parties; and by men having authority from the community, forthe execution of those rules, decides all the differences that may happenbetween any members of that society concerning any matter of right; andpunishes those offences which any member hath committed against the society,with such penalties as the law has established: whereby it is easy to discern,who are, and who are not, in political society together. Those who are unitedinto one body, and have a common established law and judicature to appeal to,with authority to decide controversies between them, and punish offenders, arein civil society one with another: but those who have no such common appeal, Imean on earth, are still in the state of nature, each being, where there is noother, judge for himself, and executioner; which is, as I have before shewedit, the perfect state of nature.

Sect. 88. And thus the commonwealth comes by a power to set down whatpunishment shall belong to the several transgressions which they think worthyof it, committed amongst the members of that society, (which is the power ofmaking laws) as well as it has the power to punish any injury done unto any ofits members, by any one that is not of it, (which is the power of war andpeace;) and all this for the preservation of the property of all the members ofthat society, as far as is possible. But though every man who has entered intocivil society, and is become a member of any commonwealth, has thereby quittedhis power to punish offences, against the law of nature, in prosecution of hisown private judgment, yet with the judgment of offences, which he has given upto the legislative in all cases, where he can appeal to the magistrate, he hasgiven a right to the commonwealth to employ his force, for the execution of thejudgments of the commonwealth, whenever he shall be called to it; which indeedare his own judgments, they being made by himself, or his representative. Andherein we have the original of the legislative and executive power of civilsociety, which is to judge by standing laws, how far offences are to bepunished, when committed within the commonwealth; and also to determine, byoccasional judgments founded on the present circumstances of the fact, how farinjuries from without are to be vindicated; and in both these to employ all theforce of all the members, when there shall be need.

Sect. 89. Where-ever therefore any number of men are so united into onesociety, as to quit every one his executive power of the law of nature, and toresign it to the public, there and there only is a political, or civil society.And this is done, where-ever any number of men, in the state of nature, enterinto society to make one people, one body politic, under one supremegovernment; or else when any one joins himself to, and incorporates with anygovernment already made: for hereby he authorizes the society, or which is allone, the legislative thereof, to make laws for him, as the public good of thesociety shall require; to the execution whereof, his own assistance (as to hisown decrees) is due. And this puts men out of a state of nature into that of acommonwealth, by setting up a judge on earth, with authority to determine allthe controversies, and redress the injuries that may happen to any member ofthe commonwealth; which judge is the legislative, or magistrates appointed byit. And where-ever there are any number of men, however associated, that haveno such decisive power to appeal to, there they are still in the state ofnature.

Sect. 90. Hence it is evident, that absolute monarchy, which by some men iscounted the only government in the world, is indeed inconsistent with civilsociety, and so can be no form of civil-government at all: for the end of civilsociety, being to avoid, and remedy those inconveniencies of the state ofnature, which necessarily follow from every man’s being judge in his owncase, by setting up a known authority, to which every one of that society mayappeal upon any injury received, or controversy that may arise, and which everyone of the society ought to obey;* where-ever any persons are, who have notsuch an authority to appeal to, for the decision of any difference betweenthem, there those persons are still in the state of nature; and so is everyabsolute prince, in respect of those who are under his dominion.

(*The public power of all society is above every soul contained in the samesociety; and the principal use of that power is, to give laws unto all that areunder it, which laws in such cases we must obey, unless there be reason shewedwhich may necessarily inforce, that the law of reason, or of God, doth enjointhe contrary, Hook. Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 16.)

Sect. 91. For he being supposed to have all, both legislative and executivepower in himself alone, there is no judge to be found, no appeal lies open toany one, who may fairly, and indifferently, and with authority decide, and fromwhose decision relief and redress may be expected of any injury or inconviency,that may be suffered from the prince, or by his order: so that such a man,however intitled, Czar, or Grand Seignior, or how you please, is as much in thestate of nature, with all under his dominion, as he is with the rest ofmankind: for where-ever any two men are, who have no standing rule, and commonjudge to appeal to on earth, for the determination of controversies of rightbetwixt them, there they are still in the state of* nature, and under all theinconveniencies of it, with only this woful difference to the subject, orrather slave of an absolute prince: that whereas, in the ordinary state ofnature, he has a liberty to judge of his right, and according to the best ofhis power, to maintain it; now, whenever his property is invaded by the willand order of his monarch, he has not only no appeal, as those in society oughtto have, but as if he were degraded from the common state of rationalcreatures, is denied a liberty to judge of, or to defend his right; and so isexposed to all the misery and inconveniencies, that a man can fear from one,who being in the unrestrained state of nature, is yet corrupted with flattery,and armed with power.

(*To take away all such mutual grievances, injuries and wrongs, i.e. such asattend men in the state of nature, there was no way but only by growing intocomposition and agreement amongst themselves, by ordaining some kind ofgovemment public, and by yielding themselves subject thereunto, that unto whomthey granted authority to rule and govem, by them the peace, tranquillity andhappy estate of the rest might be procured. Men always knew that where forceand injury was offered, they might be defenders of themselves; they knew thathowever men may seek their own commodity, yet if this were done with injuryunto others, it was not to be suffered, but by all men, and all good means tobe withstood. Finally, they knew that no man might in reason take upon him todetermine his own right, and according to his own determination proceed inmaintenance thereof, in as much as every man is towards himself, and them whomhe greatly affects, partial; and therefore that strifes and troubles would beendless, except they gave their common consent, all to be ordered by some, whomthey should agree upon, without which consent there would be no reason that oneman should take upon him to be lord or judge over another, Hooker’s Eccl.Pol. l. i. sect. 10.)

Sect. 92. For he that thinks absolute power purifies men’s blood, andcorrects the baseness of human nature, need read but the history of this, orany other age, to be convinced of the contrary. He that would have beeninsolent and injurious in the woods of America, would not probably be muchbetter in a throne; where perhaps learning and religion shall be found out tojustify all that he shall do to his subjects, and the sword presently silenceall those that dare question it: for what the protection of absolute monarchyis, what kind of fathers of their countries it makes princes to be and to whata degree of happiness and security it carries civil society, where this sort ofgovernment is grown to perfection, he that will look into the late relation ofCeylon, may easily see.

Sect. 93. In absolute monarchies indeed, as well as other governments of theworld, the subjects have an appeal to the law, and judges to decide anycontroversies, and restrain any violence that may happen betwixt the subjectsthemselves, one amongst another. This every one thinks necessary, and believeshe deserves to be thought a declared enemy to society and mankind, who shouldgo about to take it away. But whether this be from a true love of mankind andsociety, and such a charity as we owe all one to another, there is reason todoubt: for this is no more than what every man, who loves his own power,profit, or greatness, may and naturally must do, keep those animals fromhurting, or destroying one another, who labour and drudge only for his pleasureand advantage; and so are taken care of, not out of any love the master has forthem, but love of himself, and the profit they bring him: for if it be asked,what security, what fence is there, in such a state, against the violence andoppression of this absolute ruler? the very question can scarce be borne. Theyare ready to tell you, that it deserves death only to ask after safety. Betwixtsubject and subject, they will grant, there must be measures, laws and judges,for their mutual peace and security: but as for the ruler, he ought to beabsolute, and is above all such circumstances; because he has power to do morehurt and wrong, it is right when he does it. To ask how you may be guarded fromharm, or injury, on that side where the strongest hand is to do it, ispresently the voice of faction and rebellion: as if when men quitting the stateof nature entered into society, they agreed that all of them but one, should beunder the restraint of laws, but that he should still retain all the liberty ofthe state of nature, increased with power, and made licentious by impunity.This is to think, that men are so foolish, that they take care to avoid whatmischiefs may be done them by pole-cats, or foxes; but are content, nay, thinkit safety, to be devoured by lions.

Sect. 94. But whatever flatterers may talk to amuse people’sunderstandings, it hinders not men from feeling; and when they perceive, thatany man, in what station soever, is out of the bounds of the civil societywhich they are of, and that they have no appeal on earth against any harm, theymay receive from him, they are apt to think themselves in the state of nature,in respect of him whom they find to be so; and to take care, as soon as theycan, to have that safety and security in civil society, for which it was firstinstituted, and for which only they entered into it. And therefore, thoughperhaps at first, (as shall be shewed more at large hereafter in the followingpart of this discourse) some one good and excellent man having got apre-eminency amongst the rest, had this deference paid to his goodness andvirtue, as to a kind of natural authority, that the chief rule, witharbitration of their differences, by a tacit consent devolved into his hands,without any other caution, but the assurance they had of his uprightness andwisdom; yet when time, giving authority, and (as some men would persuade us)sacredness of customs, which the negligent, and unforeseeing innocence of thefirst ages began, had brought in successors of another stamp, the peoplefinding their properties not secure under the government, as then it was,(whereas government has no other end but the preservation of* property) couldnever be safe nor at rest, nor think themselves in civil society, till thelegislature was placed in collective bodies of men, call them senate,parliament, or what you please. By which means every single person becamesubject, equally with other the meanest men, to those laws, which he himself,as part of the legislative, had established; nor could any one, by his ownauthority; avoid the force of the law, when once made; nor by any pretence ofsuperiority plead exemption, thereby to license his own, or the miscarriages ofany of his dependents.** No man in civil society can be exempted from the lawsof it: for if any man may do what he thinks fit, and there be no appeal onearth, for redress or security against any harm he shall do; I ask, whether hebe not perfectly still in the state of nature, and so can be no part or memberof that civil society; unless any one will say, the state of nature and civilsociety are one and the same thing, which I have never yet found any one sogreat a patron of anarchy as to affirm.

(*At the first, when some certain kind of regiment was once appointed, it maybe that nothing was then farther thought upon for the manner of goveming, butall permitted unto their wisdom and discretion, which were to rule, till byexperience they found this for all parts very inconvenient, so as the thingwhich they had devised for a remedy, did indeed but increase the sore, which itshould have cured. They saw, that to live by one man’s will, became thecause of all men’s misery. This constrained them to come unto laws,wherein all men might see their duty beforehand, and know the penalties oftransgressing them. Hooker’s Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 10.)

(**Civil law being the act of the whole body politic, doth therefore over-ruleeach several part of the same body. Hooker, ibid.)

CHAPTER. VIII.

OF THE BEGINNING OF POLITICAL SOCIETIES.

Sect. 95. MEN being, as has been said, by nature, all free, equal, andindependent, no one can be put out of this estate, and subjected to thepolitical power of another, without his own consent. The only way whereby anyone divests himself of his natural liberty, and puts on the bonds of civilsociety, is by agreeing with other men to join and unite into a community fortheir comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst another, in a secureenjoyment of their properties, and a greater security against any, that are notof it. This any number of men may do, because it injures not the freedom of therest; they are left as they were in the liberty of the state of nature. Whenany number of men have so consented to make one community or government, theyare thereby presently incorporated, and make one body politic, wherein themajority have a right to act and conclude the rest.

Sect. 96. For when any number of men have, by the consent of every individual,made a community, they have thereby made that community one body, with a powerto act as one body, which is only by the will and determination of themajority: for that which acts any community, being only the consent of theindividuals of it, and it being necessary to that which is one body to move oneway; it is necessary the body should move that way whither the greater forcecarries it, which is the consent of the majority: or else it is impossible itshould act or continue one body, one community, which the consent of everyindividual that united into it, agreed that it should; and so every one isbound by that consent to be concluded by the majority. And therefore we see,that in assemblies, impowered to act by positive laws, where no number is setby that positive law which impowers them, the act of the majority passes forthe act of the whole, and of course determines, as having, by the law of natureand reason, the power of the whole.

Sect. 97. And thus every man, by consenting with others to make one bodypolitic under one government, puts himself under an obligation, to every one ofthat society, to submit to the determination of the majority, and to beconcluded by it; or else this original compact, whereby he with othersincorporates into one society, would signify nothing, and be no compact, if hebe left free, and under no other ties than he was in before in the state ofnature. For what appearance would there be of any compact? what new engagementif he were no farther tied by any decrees of the society, than he himselfthought fit, and did actually consent to? This would be still as great aliberty, as he himself had before his compact, or any one else in the state ofnature hath, who may submit himself, and consent to any acts of it if he thinksfit.

Sect. 98. For if the consent of the majority shall not, in reason, be receivedas the act of the whole, and conclude every individual; nothing but the consentof every individual can make any thing to be the act of the whole: but such aconsent is next to impossible ever to be had, if we consider the infirmities ofhealth, and avocations of business, which in a number, though much less thanthat of a commonwealth, will necessarily keep many away from the publicassembly. To which if we add the variety of opinions, and contrariety ofinterests, which unavoidably happen in all collections of men, the coming intosociety upon such terms would be only like Cato’s coming into thetheatre, only to go out again. Such a constitution as this would make themighty Leviathan of a shorter duration, than the feeblest creatures, and notlet it outlast the day it was born in: which cannot be supposed, till we canthink, that rational creatures should desire and constitute societies only tobe dissolved: for where the majority cannot conclude the rest, there theycannot act as one body, and consequently will be immediately dissolved again.

Sect. 99. Whosoever therefore out of a state of nature unite into a community,must be understood to give up all the power, necessary to the ends for whichthey unite into society, to the majority of the community, unless they expreslyagreed in any number greater than the majority. And this is done by barelyagreeing to unite into one political society, which is all the compact that is,or needs be, between the individuals, that enter into, or make up acommonwealth. And thus that, which begins and actually constitutes anypolitical society, is nothing but the consent of any number of freemen capableof a majority to unite and incorporate into such a society. And this is that,and that only, which did, or could give beginning to any lawful government inthe world.

Sect. 100. To this I find two objections made. First, That there are noinstances to be found in story, of a company of men independent, and equal oneamongst another, that met together, and in this way began and set up agovernment.

Secondly, It is impossible of right, that men should do so, because all menbeing born under government, they are to submit to that, and are not at libertyto begin a new one.

Sect. 101. To the first there is this to answer, That it is not at all to bewondered, that history gives us but a very little account of men, that livedtogether in the state of nature. The inconveniences of that condition, and thelove and want of society, no sooner brought any number of them together, butthey presently united and incorporated, if they designed to continue together.And if we may not suppose men ever to have been in the state of nature, becausewe hear not much of them in such a state, we may as well suppose the armies ofSalmanasser or Xerxes were never children, because we hear little of them, tillthey were men, and imbodied in armies. Government is every where antecedent torecords, and letters seldom come in amongst a people till a long continuationof civil society has, by other more necessary arts, provided for their safety,ease, and plenty: and then they begin to look after the history of theirfounders, and search into their original, when they have outlived the memory ofit: for it is with commonwealths as with particular persons, they are commonlyignorant of their own births and infancies: and if they know any thing of theiroriginal, they are beholden for it, to the accidental records that others havekept of it. And those that we have, of the beginning of any polities in theworld, excepting that of the Jews, where God himself immediately interposed,and which favours not at all paternal dominion, are all either plain instancesof such a beginning as I have mentioned, or at least have manifest footsteps ofit.

Sect. 102. He must shew a strange inclination to deny evident matter of fact,when it agrees not with his hypothesis, who will not allow, that the beginningof Rome and Venice were by the uniting together of several men free andindependent one of another, amongst whom there was no natural superiority orsubjection. And if Josephus Acosta’s word may be taken, he tells us, thatin many parts of America there was no government at all.

There are great and apparent conjectures, says he, that these men, speaking ofthose of Peru, for a long time had neither kings nor commonwealths, but livedin troops, as they do this day in Florida, the Cheriquanas, those of Brazil,and many other nations, which have no certain kings, but as occasion isoffered, in peace or war, they choose their captains as they please, 1. i. c.25.

If it be said, that every man there was born subject to his father, or the headof his family; that the subjection due from a child to a father took not awayhis freedom of uniting into what political society he thought fit, has beenalready proved. But be that as it will, these men, it is evident, were actuallyfree; and whatever superiority some politicians now would place in any of them,they themselves claimed it not, but by consent were all equal, till by the sameconsent they set rulers over themselves. So that their politic societies allbegan from a voluntary union, and the mutual agreement of men freely acting inthe choice of their governors, and forms of government.

Sect. 103. And I hope those who went away from Sparta with Palantus, mentionedby Justin, 1. iii. c. 4. will be allowed to have been freemen independent oneof another, and to have set up a government over themselves, by their ownconsent. Thus I have given several examples, out of history, of people free andin the state of nature, that being met together incorporated and began acommonwealth. And if the want of such instances be an argument to prove thatgovernment were not, nor could not be so begun, I suppose the contenders forpaternal empire were better let it alone, than urge it against natural liberty:for if they can give so many instances, out of history, of governments begunupon paternal right, I think (though at best an argument from what has been, towhat should of right be, has no great force) one might, without any greatdanger, yield them the cause. But if I might advise them in the case, theywould do well not to search too much into the original of governments, as theyhave begun de facto, lest they should find, at the foundation of most of them,something very little favourable to the design they promote, and such a poweras they contend for.

Sect. 104. But to conclude, reason being plain on our side, that men arenaturally free, and the examples of history shewing, that the governments ofthe world, that were begun in peace, had their beginning laid on thatfoundation, and were made by the consent of the people; there can be littleroom for doubt, either where the right is, or what has been the opinion, orpractice of mankind, about the first erecting of governments.

Sect. 105. I will not deny, that if we look back as far as history will directus, towards the original of commonwealths, we shall generally find them underthe government and administration of one man. And I am also apt to believe,that where a family was numerous enough to subsist by itself, and continuedentire together, without mixing with others, as it often happens, where thereis much land, and few people, the government commonly began in the father: forthe father having, by the law of nature, the same power with every man else topunish, as he thought fit, any offences against that law, might thereby punishhis transgressing children, even when they were men, and out of their pupilage;and they were very likely to submit to his punishment, and all join with himagainst the offender, in their turns, giving him thereby power to execute hissentence against any transgression, and so in effect make him the law-maker,and governor over all that remained in conjunction with his family. He wasfittest to be trusted; paternal affection secured their property and interestunder his care; and the custom of obeying him, in their childhood, made iteasier to submit to him, rather than to any other. If therefore they must haveone to rule them, as government is hardly to be avoided amongst men that livetogether; who so likely to be the man as he that was their common father;unless negligence, cruelty, or any other defect of mind or body made him unfitfor it? But when either the father died, and left his next heir, for want ofage, wisdom, courage, or any other qualities, less fit for rule; or whereseveral families met, and consented to continue together; there, it is not tobe doubted, but they used their natural freedom, to set up him, whom theyjudged the ablest, and most likely, to rule well over them. Conformablehereunto we find the people of America, who (living out of the reach of theconquering swords, and spreading domination of the two great empires of Peruand Mexico) enjoyed their own natural freedom, though, caeteris paribus, theycommonly prefer the heir of their deceased king; yet if they find him any wayweak, or uncapable, they pass him by, and set up the stoutest and bravest manfor their ruler.

Sect. 106. Thus, though looking back as far as records give us any account ofpeopling the world, and the history of nations, we commonly find the governmentto be in one hand; yet it destroys not that which I affirm, viz. that thebeginning of politic society depends upon the consent of the individuals, tojoin into, and make one society; who, when they are thus incorporated, mightset up what form of government they thought fit. But this having given occasionto men to mistake, and think, that by nature government was monarchical, andbelonged to the father, it may not be amiss here to consider, why people in thebeginning generally pitched upon this form, which though perhaps thefather’s pre-eminency might, in the first institution of somecommonwealths, give a rise to, and place in the beginning, the power in onehand; yet it is plain that the reason, that continued the form of government ina single person, was not any regard, or respect to paternal authority; sinceall petty monarchies, that is, almost all monarchies, near their original, havebeen commonly, at least upon occasion, elective.

Sect. 107. First then, in the beginning of things, the father’sgovernment of the childhood of those sprung from him, having accustomed them tothe rule of one man, and taught them that where it was exercised with care andskill, with affection and love to those under it, it was sufficient to procureand preserve to men all the political happiness they sought for in society. Itwas no wonder that they should pitch upon, and naturally run into that form ofgovernment, which from their infancy they had been all accustomed to; andwhich, by experience, they had found both easy and safe. To which, if we add,that monarchy being simple, and most obvious to men, whom neither experiencehad instructed in forms of government, nor the ambition or insolence of empirehad taught to beware of the encroachments of prerogative, or the inconveniencesof absolute power, which monarchy in succession was apt to lay claim to, andbring upon them, it was not at all strange, that they should not much troublethemselves to think of methods of restraining any exorbitances of those to whomthey had given the authority over them, and of balancing the power ofgovernment, by placing several parts of it in different hands. They had neitherfelt the oppression of tyrannical dominion, nor did the fashion of the age, northeir possessions, or way of living, (which afforded little matter forcovetousness or ambition) give them any reason to apprehend or provide againstit; and therefore it is no wonder they put themselves into such a frame ofgovernment, as was not only, as I said, most obvious and simple, but also bestsuited to their present state and condition; which stood more in need ofdefence against foreign invasions and injuries, than of multiplicity of laws.The equality of a simple poor way of living, confining their desires within thenarrow bounds of each man’s small property, made few controversies, andso no need of many laws to decide them, or variety of officers to superintendthe process, or look after the execution of justice, where there were but fewtrespasses, and few offenders. Since then those, who like one another so wellas to join into society, cannot but be supposed to have some acquaintance andfriendship together, and some trust one in another; they could not but havegreater apprehensions of others, than of one another: and therefore their firstcare and thought cannot but be supposed to be, how to secure themselves againstforeign force. It was natural for them to put themselves under a frame ofgovernment which might best serve to that end, and chuse the wisest and bravestman to conduct them in their wars, and lead them out against their enemies, andin this chiefly be their ruler.

Sect. 108. Thus we see, that the kings of the Indians in America, which isstill a pattern of the first ages in Asia and Europe, whilst the inhabitantswere too few for the country, and want of people and money gave men notemptation to enlarge their possessions of land, or contest for wider extent ofground, are little more than generals of their armies; and though they commandabsolutely in war, yet at home and in time of peace they exercise very littledominion, and have but a very moderate sovereignty, the resolutions of peaceand war being ordinarily either in the people, or in a council. Tho’ thewar itself, which admits not of plurality of governors, naturally devolves thecommand into the king’s sole authority.

Sect. 109. And thus in Israel itself, the chief business of their judges, andfirst kings, seems to have been to be captains in war, and leaders of theirarmies; which (besides what is signified by going out and in before the people,which was, to march forth to war, and home again in the heads of their forces)appears plainly in the story of Jephtha. The Ammonites making war upon Israel,the Gileadites in fear send to Jephtha, a bastard of their family whom they hadcast off, and article with him, if he will assist them against the Ammonites,to make him their ruler; which they do in these words, And the people made himhead and captain over them, Judg. xi, 11. which was, as it seems, all one as tobe judge. And he judged Israel, judg. xii. 7. that is, was theircaptain-general six years. So when Jotham upbraids the Shechemites with theobligation they had to Gideon, who had been their judge and ruler, he tellsthem, He fought for you, and adventured his life far, and delivered you out ofthe hands of Midian, Judg. ix. 17. Nothing mentioned of him but what he did asa general: and indeed that is all is found in his history, or in any of therest of the judges. And Abimelech particularly is called king, though at mosthe was but their general. And when, being weary of the ill conduct ofSamuel’s sons, the children of Israel desired a king, like all thenations to judge them, and to go out before them, and to fight their battles,I. Sam viii. 20. God granting their desire, says to Samuel, I will send thee aman, and thou shalt anoint him to be captain over my people Israel, that he maysave my people out of the hands of the Philistines, ix. 16. As if the onlybusiness of a king had been to lead out their armies, and fight in theirdefence; and accordingly at his inauguration pouring a vial of oil upon him,declares to Saul, that the Lord had anointed him to be captain over hisinheritance, x. 1. And therefore those, who after Saul’s being solemnlychosen and saluted king by the tribes at Mispah, were unwilling to have himtheir king, made no other objection but this, How shall this man save us? v.27. as if they should have said, this man is unfit to be our king, not havingskill and conduct enough in war, to be able to defend us. And when God resolvedto transfer the government to David, it is in these words, But now thy kingdomshall not continue: the Lord hath sought him a man after his own heart, and theLord hath commanded him to be captain over his people, xiii. 14. As if thewhole kingly authority were nothing else but to be their general: and thereforethe tribes who had stuck to Saul’s family, and opposed David’sreign, when they came to Hebron with terms of submission to him, they tell him,amongst other arguments they had to submit to him as to their king, that he wasin effect their king in Saul’s time, and therefore they had no reason butto receive him as their king now. Also (say they) in time past, when Saul wasking over us, thou wast he that reddest out and broughtest in Israel, and theLord said unto thee, Thou shalt feed my people Israel, and thou shalt be acaptain over Israel.

Sect. 110. Thus, whether a family by degrees grew up into a commonwealth, andthe fatherly authority being continued on to the elder son, every one in histurn growing up under it, tacitly submitted to it, and the easiness andequality of it not offending any one, every one acquiesced, till time seemed tohave confirmed it, and settled a right of succession by prescription: orwhether several families, or the descendants of several families, whom chance,neighbourhood, or business brought together, uniting into society, the need ofa general, whose conduct might defend them against their enemies in war, andthe great confidence the innocence and sincerity of that poor but virtuous age,(such as are almost all those which begin governments, that ever come to lastin the world) gave men one of another, made the first beginners ofcommonwealths generally put the rule into one man’s hand, without anyother express limitation or restraint, but what the nature of the thing, andthe end of government required: which ever of those it was that at first putthe rule into the hands of a single person, certain it is no body was intrustedwith it but for the public good and safety, and to those ends, in the infanciesof commonwealths, those who had it commonly used it. And unless they had doneso, young societies could not have subsisted; without such nursing fatherstender and careful of the public weal, all governments would have sunk underthe weakness and infirmities of their infancy, and the prince and the peoplehad soon perished together.

Sect. 111. But though the golden age (before vain ambition, and amor sceleratushabendi, evil concupiscence, had corrupted men’s minds into a mistake oftrue power and honour) had more virtue, and consequently better governors, aswell as less vicious subjects, and there was then no stretching prerogative onthe one side, to oppress the people; nor consequently on the other, any disputeabout privilege, to lessen or restrain the power of the magistrate, and so nocontest betwixt rulers and people about governors or government: yet, whenambition and luxury in future ages* would retain and increase the power,without doing the business for which it was given; and aided by flattery,taught princes to have distinct and separate interests from their people, menfound it necessary to examine more carefully the original and rights ofgovernment; and to find out ways to restrain the exorbitances, and prevent theabuses of that power, which they having intrusted in another’s hands onlyfor their own good, they found was made use of to hurt them.

(*At first, when some certain kind of regiment was once approved, it may benothing was then farther thought upon for the manner of governing, but allpermitted unto their wisdom and discretion which were to rule, till byexperience they found this for all parts very inconvenient, so as the thingwhich they had devised for a remedy, did indeed but increase the sore which itshould have cured. They saw, that to live by one man’s will, became thecause of all men’s misery. This constrained them to come unto lawswherein all men might see their duty before hand, and know the penalties oftransgressing them. Hooker’s Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 10.)

Sect. 112. Thus we may see how probable it is, that people that were naturallyfree, and by their own consent either submitted to the government of theirfather, or united together out of different families to make a government,should generally put the rule into one man’s hands, and chuse to be underthe conduct of a single person, without so much as by express conditionslimiting or regulating his power, which they thought safe enough in his honestyand prudence; though they never dreamed of monarchy being lure Divino, which wenever heard of among mankind, till it was revealed to us by the divinity ofthis last age; nor ever allowed paternal power to have a right to dominion, orto be the foundation of all government. And thus much may suffice to shew, thatas far as we have any light from history, we have reason to conclude, that allpeaceful beginnings of government have been laid in the consent of the people.I say peaceful, because I shall have occasion in another place to speak ofconquest, which some esteem a way of beginning of governments.

The other objection I find urged against the beginning of polities, in the wayI have mentioned, is this, viz.

Sect. 113. That all men being born under government, some or other, it isimpossible any of them should ever be free, and at liberty to unite together,and begin a new one, or ever be able to erect a lawful government.

If this argument be good; I ask, how came so many lawful monarchies into theworld? for if any body, upon this supposition, can shew me any one man in anyage of the world free to begin a lawful monarchy, I will be bound to shew himten other free men at liberty, at the same time to unite and begin a newgovernment under a regal, or any other form; it being demonstration, that ifany one, born under the dominion of another, may be so free as to have a rightto command others in a new and distinct empire, every one that is born underthe dominion of another may be so free too, and may become a ruler, or subject,of a distinct separate government. And so by this their own principle, eitherall men, however born, are free, or else there is but one lawful prince, onelawful government in the world. And then they have nothing to do, but barely toshew us which that is; which when they have done, I doubt not but all mankindwill easily agree to pay obedience to him.

Sect. 114. Though it be a sufficient answer to their objection, to shew that itinvolves them in the same difficulties that it doth those they use it against;yet I shall endeavour to discover the weakness of this argument a littlefarther. All men, say they, are born under government, and therefore theycannot be at liberty to begin a new one. Every one is born a subject to hisfather, or his prince, and is therefore under the perpetual tie of subjectionand allegiance. It is plain mankind never owned nor considered any such naturalsubjection that they were born in, to one or to the other that tied them,without their own consents, to a subjection to them and their heirs.

Sect. 115. For there are no examples so frequent in history, both sacred andprofane, as those of men withdrawing themselves, and their obedience, from thejurisdiction they were born under, and the family or community they were bredup in, and setting up new governments in other places; from whence sprang allthat number of petty commonwealths in the beginning of ages, and which alwaysmultiplied, as long as there was room enough, till the stronger, or morefortunate, swallowed the weaker; and those great ones again breaking to pieces,dissolved into lesser dominions. All which are so many testimonies againstpaternal sovereignty, and plainly prove, that it was not the natural right ofthe father descending to his heirs, that made governments in the beginning,since it was impossible, upon that ground, there should have been so manylittle kingdoms; all must have been but only one universal monarchy, if men hadnot been at liberty to separate themselves from their families, and thegovernment, be it what it will, that was set up in it, and go and make distinctcommonwealths and other governments, as they thought fit.

Sect. 116. This has been the practice of the world from its first beginning tothis day; nor is it now any more hindrance to the freedom of mankind, that theyare born under constituted and ancient polities, that have established laws,and set forms of government, than if they were born in the woods, amongst theunconfined inhabitants, that run loose in them: for those, who would persuadeus, that by being born under any government, we are naturally subjects to it,and have no more any title or pretence to the freedom of the state of nature,have no other reason (bating that of paternal power, which we have alreadyanswered) to produce for it, but only, because our fathers or progenitorspassed away their natural liberty, and thereby bound up themselves and theirposterity to a perpetual subjection to the government, which they themselvessubmitted to. It is true, that whatever engagements or promises any one hasmade for himself, he is under the obligation of them, but cannot, by anycompact whatsoever, bind his children or posterity: for his son, when a man,being altogether as free as the father, any act of the father can no more giveaway the liberty of the son, than it can of any body else: he may indeed annexsuch conditions to the land, he enjoyed as a subject of any commonwealth, asmay oblige his son to be of that community, if he will enjoy those possessionswhich were his father’s; because that estate being his father’sproperty, he may dispose, or settle it, as he pleases.

Sect. 117. And this has generally given the occasion to mistake in this matter;because commonwealths not permitting any part of their dominions to bedismembered, nor to be enjoyed by any but those of their community, the soncannot ordinarily enjoy the possessions of his father, but under the same termshis father did, by becoming a member of the society; whereby he puts himselfpresently under the government he finds there established, as much as any othersubject of that commonwealth. And thus the consent of freemen, born undergovernment, which only makes them members of it, being given separately intheir turns, as each comes to be of age, and not in a multitude together;people take no notice of it, and thinking it not done at all, or not necessary,conclude they are naturally subjects as they are men.

Sect. 118. But, it is plain, governments themselves understand it otherwise;they claim no power over the son, because of that they had over the father; norlook on children as being their subjects, by their fathers being so. If asubject of England have a child, by an English woman in France, whose subjectis he? Not the king of England’s; for he must have leave to be admittedto the privileges of it: nor the king of France’s; for how then has hisfather a liberty to bring him away, and breed him as he pleases? and who everwas judged as a traytor or deserter, if he left, or warred against a country,for being barely born in it of parents that were aliens there? It is plainthen, by the practice of governments themselves, as well as by the law of rightreason, that a child is born a subject of no country or government. He is underhis father’s tuition and authority, till he comes to age of discretion;and then he is a freeman, at liberty what government he will put himself under,what body politic he will unite himself to: for if an Englishman’s son,born in France, be at liberty, and may do so, it is evident there is no tieupon him by his father’s being a subject of this kingdom; nor is he boundup by any compact of his ancestors. And why then hath not his son, by the samereason, the same liberty, though he be born any where else? Since the powerthat a father hath naturally over his children, is the same, where-ever they beborn, and the ties of natural obligations, are not bounded by the positivelimits of kingdoms and commonwealths.

Sect. 119. Every man being, as has been shewed, naturally free, and nothingbeing able to put him into subjection to any earthly power, but only his ownconsent; it is to be considered, what shall be understood to be a sufficientdeclaration of a man’s consent, to make him subject to the laws of anygovernment. There is a common distinction of an express and a tacit consent,which will concern our present case. No body doubts but an express consent, ofany man entering into any society, makes him a perfect member of that society,a subject of that government. The difficulty is, what ought to be looked uponas a tacit consent, and how far it binds, i.e. how far any one shall be lookedon to have consented, and thereby submitted to any government, where he hasmade no expressions of it at all. And to this I say, that every man, that hathany possessions, or enjoyment, of any part of the dominions of any government,doth thereby give his tacit consent, and is as far forth obliged to obedienceto the laws of that government, during such enjoyment, as any one under it;whether this his possession be of land, to him and his heirs for ever, or alodging only for a week; or whether it be barely travelling freely on thehighway; and in effect, it reaches as far as the very being of any one withinthe territories of that government.

Sect. 120. To understand this the better, it is fit to consider, that everyman, when he at first incorporates himself into any commonwealth, he, by hisuniting himself thereunto, annexed also, and submits to the community, thosepossessions, which he has, or shall acquire, that do not already belong to anyother government: for it would be a direct contradiction, for any one to enterinto society with others for the securing and regulating of property; and yetto suppose his land, whose property is to be regulated by the laws of thesociety, should be exempt from the jurisdiction of that government, to which hehimself, the proprietor of the land, is a subject. By the same act therefore,whereby any one unites his person, which was before free, to any commonwealth,by the same he unites his possessions, which were before free, to it also; andthey become, both of them, person and possession, subject to the government anddominion of that commonwealth, as long as it hath a being. Whoever therefore,from thenceforth, by inheritance, purchase, permission, or otherways, enjoysany part of the land, so annexed to, and under the government of thatcommonwealth, must take it with the condition it is under; that is, ofsubmitting to the government of the commonwealth, under whose jurisdiction itis, as far forth as any subject of it.

Sect. 121. But since the government has a direct jurisdiction only over theland, and reaches the possessor of it, (before he has actually incorporatedhimself in the society) only as he dwells upon, and enjoys that; the obligationany one is under, by virtue of such enjoyment, to submit to the government,begins and ends with the enjoyment; so that whenever the owner, who has givennothing but such a tacit consent to the government, will, by donation, sale, orotherwise, quit the said possession, he is at liberty to go and incorporatehimself into any other commonwealth; or to agree with others to begin a newone, in vacuis locis, in any part of the world, they can find free andunpossessed: whereas he, that has once, by actual agreement, and any expressdeclaration, given his consent to be of any commonwealth, is perpetually andindispensably obliged to be, and remain unalterably a subject to it, and cannever be again in the liberty of the state of nature; unless, by any calamity,the government he was under comes to be dissolved; or else by some public actcuts him off from being any longer a member of it.

Sect. 122. But submitting to the laws of any country, living quietly, andenjoying privileges and protection under them, makes not a man a member of thatsociety: this is only a local protection and homage due to and from all those,who, not being in a state of war, come within the territories belonging to anygovernment, to all parts whereof the force of its laws extends. But this nomore makes a man a member of that society, a perpetual subject of thatcommonwealth, than it would make a man a subject to another, in whose family hefound it convenient to abide for some time; though, whilst he continued in it,he were obliged to comply with the laws, and submit to the government he foundthere. And thus we see, that foreigners, by living all their lives underanother government, and enjoying the privileges and protection of it, thoughthey are bound, even in conscience, to submit to its administration, as farforth as any denison; yet do not thereby come to be subjects or members of thatcommonwealth. Nothing can make any man so, but his actually entering into it bypositive engagement, and express promise and compact. This is that, which Ithink, concerning the beginning of political societies, and that consent whichmakes any one a member of any commonwealth.

CHAPTER. IX.

OF THE ENDS OF POLITICAL SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT.

Sect. 123. IF man in the state of nature be so free, as has been said; if he beabsolute lord of his own person and possessions, equal to the greatest, andsubject to no body, why will he part with his freedom? why will he give up thisempire, and subject himself to the dominion and controul of any other power? Towhich it is obvious to answer, that though in the state of nature he hath sucha right, yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain, and constantly exposed tothe invasion of others: for all being kings as much as he, every man his equal,and the greater part no strict observers of equity and justice, the enjoymentof the property he has in this state is very unsafe, very unsecure. This makeshim willing to quit a condition, which, however free, is full of fears andcontinual dangers: and it is not without reason, that he seeks out, and iswilling to join in society with others, who are already united, or have a mindto unite, for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates,which I call by the general name, property.

Sect. 124. The great and chief end, therefore, of men’s uniting intocommonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation oftheir property. To which in the state of nature there are many things wanting.

First, There wants an established, settled, known law, received and allowed bycommon consent to be the standard of right and wrong, and the common measure todecide all controversies between them: for though the law of nature be plainand intelligible to all rational creatures; yet men being biassed by theirinterest, as well as ignorant for want of study of it, are not apt to allow ofit as a law binding to them in the application of it to their particular cases.

Sect. 125. Secondly, In the state of nature there wants a known and indifferentjudge, with authority to determine all differences according to the establishedlaw: for every one in that state being both judge and executioner of the law ofnature, men being partial to themselves, passion and revenge is very apt tocarry them too far, and with too much heat, in their own cases; as well asnegligence, and unconcernedness, to make them too remiss in other men’s.

Sect. 126. Thirdly, In the state of nature there often wants power to back andsupport the sentence when right, and to give it due execution, They who by anyinjustice offended, will seldom fail, where they are able, by force to makegood their injustice; such resistance many times makes the punishmentdangerous, and frequently destructive, to those who attempt it.

Sect. 127. Thus mankind, notwithstanding all the privileges of the state ofnature, being but in an ill condition, while they remain in it, are quicklydriven into society. Hence it comes to pass, that we seldom find any number ofmen live any time together in this state. The inconveniencies that they aretherein exposed to, by the irregular and uncertain exercise of the power everyman has of punishing the transgressions of others, make them take sanctuaryunder the established laws of government, and therein seek the preservation oftheir property. It is this makes them so willingly give up every one his singlepower of punishing, to be exercised by such alone, as shall be appointed to itamongst them; and by such rules as the community, or those authorized by themto that purpose, shall agree on. And in this we have the original right andrise of both the legislative and executive power, as well as of the governmentsand societies themselves.

Sect. 128. For in the state of nature, to omit the liberty he has of innocentdelights, a man has two powers.

The first is to do whatsoever he thinks fit for the preservation of himself,and others within the permission of the law of nature: by which law, common tothem all, he and all the rest of mankind are one community, make up onesociety, distinct from all other creatures. And were it not for the corruptionand vitiousness of degenerate men, there would be no need of any other; nonecessity that men should separate from this great and natural community, andby positive agreements combine into smaller and divided associations.

The other power a man has in the state of nature, is the power to punish thecrimes committed against that law. Both these he gives up, when he joins in aprivate, if I may so call it, or particular politic society, and incorporatesinto any commonwealth, separate from the rest of mankind.

Sect. 129. The first power, viz. of doing whatsoever he thought for thepreservation of himself, and the rest of mankind, he gives up to be regulatedby laws made by the society, so far forth as the preservation of himself, andthe rest of that society shall require; which laws of the society in manythings confine the liberty he had by the law of nature.

Sect. 130. Secondly, The power of punishing he wholly gives up, and engages hisnatural force, (which he might before employ in the execution of the law ofnature, by his own single authority, as he thought fit) to assist the executivepower of the society, as the law thereof shall require: for being now in a newstate, wherein he is to enjoy many conveniencies, from the labour, assistance,and society of others in the same community, as well as protection from itswhole strength; he is to part also with as much of his natural liberty, inproviding for himself, as the good, prosperity, and safety of the society shallrequire; which is not only necessary, but just, since the other members of thesociety do the like.

Sect. 131. But though men, when they enter into society, give up the equality,liberty, and executive power they had in the state of nature, into the hands ofthe society, to be so far disposed of by the legislative, as the good of thesociety shall require; yet it being only with an intention in every one thebetter to preserve himself, his liberty and property; (for no rational creaturecan be supposed to change his condition with an intention to be worse) thepower of the society, or legislative constituted by them, can never be supposedto extend farther, than the common good; but is obliged to secure everyone’s property, by providing against those three defects above mentioned,that made the state of nature so unsafe and uneasy. And so whoever has thelegislative or supreme power of any commonwealth, is bound to govern byestablished standing laws, promulgated and known to the people, and not byextemporary decrees; by indifferent and upright judges, who are to decidecontroversies by those laws; and to employ the force of the community at home,only in the execution of such laws, or abroad to prevent or redress foreigninjuries, and secure the community from inroads and invasion. And all this tobe directed to no other end, but the peace, safety, and public good of thepeople.

CHAPTER. X.

OF THE FORMS OF A COMMON-WEALTH.

Sect. 132. THE majority having, as has been shewed, upon men’s firstuniting into society, the whole power of the community naturally in them, mayemploy all that power in making laws for the community from time to time, andexecuting those laws by officers of their own appointing; and then the form ofthe government is a perfect democracy: or else may put the power of making lawsinto the hands of a few select men, and their heirs or successors; and then itis an oligarchy: or else into the hands of one man, and then it is a monarchy:if to him and his heirs, it is an hereditary monarchy: if to him only for life,but upon his death the power only of nominating a successor to return to them;an elective monarchy. And so accordingly of these the community may makecompounded and mixed forms of government, as they think good. And if thelegislative power be at first given by the majority to one or more persons onlyfor their lives, or any limited time, and then the supreme power to revert tothem again; when it is so reverted, the community may dispose of it again anewinto what hands they please, and so constitute a new form of government: forthe form of government depending upon the placing the supreme power, which isthe legislative, it being impossible to conceive that an inferior power shouldprescribe to a superior, or any but the supreme make laws, according as thepower of making laws is placed, such is the form of the commonwealth.

Sect. 133. By commonwealth, I must be understood all along to mean, not ademocracy, or any form of government, but any independent community, which theLatines signified by the word civitas, to which the word which best answers inour language, is commonwealth, and most properly expresses such a society ofmen, which community or city in English does not; for there may be subordinatecommunities in a government; and city amongst us has a quite different notionfrom commonwealth: and therefore, to avoid ambiguity, I crave leave to use theword commonwealth in that sense, in which I find it used by king James thefirst; and I take it to be its genuine signification; which if any bodydislike, I consent with him to change it for a better.

CHAPTER. XI.

OF THE EXTENT OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWER.

Sect. 134. THE great end of men’s entering into society, being theenjoyment of their properties in peace and safety, and the great instrument andmeans of that being the laws established in that society; the first andfundamental positive law of all commonwealths is the establishing of thelegislative power; as the first and fundamental natural law, which is to governeven the legislative itself, is the preservation of the society, and (as far aswill consist with the public good) of every person in it. This legislative isnot only the supreme power of the commonwealth, but sacred and unalterable inthe hands where the community have once placed it; nor can any edict of anybody else, in what form soever conceived, or by what power soever backed, havethe force and obligation of a law, which has not its sanction from thatlegislative which the public has chosen and appointed: for without this the lawcould not have that, which is absolutely necessary to its being a law,* theconsent of the society, over whom no body can have a power to make laws, but bytheir own consent, and by authority received from them; and therefore all theobedience, which by the most solemn ties any one can be obliged to pay,ultimately terminates in this supreme power, and is directed by those lawswhich it enacts: nor can any oaths to any foreign power whatsoever, or anydomestic subordinate power, discharge any member of the society from hisobedience to the legislative, acting pursuant to their trust; nor oblige him toany obedience contrary to the laws so enacted, or farther than they do allow;it being ridiculous to imagine one can be tied ultimately to obey any power inthe society, which is not the supreme.

(*The lawful power of making laws to command whole politic societies of men,belonging so properly unto the same intire societies, that for any prince orpotentate of what kind soever upon earth, to exercise the same of himself, andnot by express commission immediately and personally received from God, or elseby authority derived at the first from their consent, upon whose persons theyimpose laws, it is no better than mere tyranny. Laws they are not thereforewhich public approbation hath not made so. Hooker’s Eccl. Pol. l. i.sect. 10.

Of this point therefore we are to note, that such men naturally have no fulland perfect power to command whole politic multitudes of men, therefore utterlywithout our consent, we could in such sort be at no man’s commandmentliving. And to be commanded we do consent, when that society, whereof we be apart, hath at any time before consented, without revoking the same after by thelike universal agreement. Laws therefore human, of what kind so ever, areavailable by consent. Ibid.)

Sect. 135. Though the legislative, whether placed in one or more, whether it bealways in being, or only by intervals, though it be the supreme power in everycommonwealth; yet:

First, It is not, nor can possibly be absolutely arbitrary over the lives andfortunes of the people: for it being but the joint power of every member of thesociety given up to that person, or assembly, which is legislator; it can be nomore than those persons had in a state of nature before they entered intosociety, and gave up to the community: for no body can transfer to another morepower than he has in himself; and no body has an absolute arbitrary power overhimself, or over any other, to destroy his own life, or take away the life orproperty of another. A man, as has been proved, cannot subject himself to thearbitrary power of another; and having in the state of nature no arbitrarypower over the life, liberty, or possession of another, but only so much as thelaw of nature gave him for the preservation of himself, and the rest ofmankind; this is all he doth, or can give up to the commonwealth, and by it tothe legislative power, so that the legislative can have no more than this.Their power, in the utmost bounds of it, is limited to the public good of thesociety. It is a power, that hath no other end but preservation, and thereforecan never have a right to destroy, enslave, or designedly to impoverish thesubjects.* The obligations of the law of nature cease not in society, but onlyin many cases are drawn closer, and have by human laws known penalties annexedto them, to inforce their observation. Thus the law of nature stands as aneternal rule to all men, legislators as well as others. The rules that theymake for other men’s actions, must, as well as their own and othermen’s actions, be conformable to the law of nature, i.e. to the will ofGod, of which that is a declaration, and the fundamental law of nature beingthe preservation of mankind, no human sanction can be good, or valid againstit.

(*Two foundations there are which bear up public societies; the one a naturalinclination, whereby all men desire sociable life and fellowship; the other anorder, expresly or secretly agreed upon, touching the manner of their union inliving together: the latter is that which we call the law of a common-weal, thevery soul of a politic body, the parts whereof are by law animated, heldtogether, and set on work in such actions as the common good requireth. Lawspolitic, ordained for external order and regiment amongst men, are never framedas they should be, unless presuming the will of man to be inwardly obstinate,rebellious, and averse from all obedience to the sacred laws of his nature; ina word, unless presuming man to be, in regard of his depraved mind, littlebetter than a wild beast, they do accordingly provide, notwithstanding, so toframe his outward actions, that they be no hindrance unto the common good, forwhich societies are instituted. Unless they do this, they are not perfect.Hooker’s Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 10.)

Sect. 136. Secondly, The legislative, or supreme authority, cannot assume toits self a power to rule by extemporary arbitrary decrees, but is bound todispense justice, and decide the rights of the subject by promulgated standinglaws, and known authorized judges:* for the law of nature being unwritten, andso no where to be found but in the minds of men, they who through passion orinterest shall miscite, or misapply it, cannot so easily be convinced of theirmistake where there is no established judge: and so it serves not, as it ought,to determine the rights, and fence the properties of those that live under it,especially where every one is judge, interpreter, and executioner of it too,and that in his own case: and he that has right on his side, having ordinarilybut his own single strength, hath not force enough to defend himself frominjuries, or to punish delinquents. To avoid these inconveniences, whichdisorder men’s propperties in the state of nature, men unite intosocieties, that they may have the united strength of the whole society tosecure and defend their properties, and may have standing rules to bound it, bywhich every one may know what is his. To this end it is that men give up alltheir natural power to the society which they enter into, and the community putthe legislative power into such hands as they think fit, with this trust, thatthey shall be governed by declared laws, or else their peace, quiet, andproperty will still be at the same uncertainty, as it was in the state ofnature.

(*Human laws are measures in respect of men whose actions they must direct,howbeit such measures they are as have also their higher rules to be measuredby, which rules are two, the law of God, and the law of nature; so that lawshuman must be made according to the general laws of nature, and withoutcontradiction to any positive law of scripture, otherwise they are ill made.Hooker’s Eccl. Pol. l. iii. sect. 9.

To constrain men to any thing inconvenient doth seem unreasonable. Ibid. l. i.sect. 10.)

Sect. 137. Absolute arbitrary power, or governing without settled standinglaws, can neither of them consist with the ends of society and government,which men would not quit the freedom of the state of nature for, and tiethemselves up under, were it not to preserve their lives, liberties andfortunes, and by stated rules of right and property to secure their peace andquiet. It cannot be supposed that they should intend, had they a power so todo, to give to any one, or more, an absolute arbitrary power over their personsand estates, and put a force into the magistrate’s hand to execute hisunlimited will arbitrarily upon them. This were to put themselves into a worsecondition than the state of nature, wherein they had a liberty to defend theirright against the injuries of others, and were upon equal terms of force tomaintain it, whether invaded by a single man, or many in combination. Whereasby supposing they have given up themselves to the absolute arbitrary power andwill of a legislator, they have disarmed themselves, and armed him, to make aprey of them when he pleases; he being in a much worse condition, who isexposed to the arbitrary power of one man, who has the command of 100,000, thanhe that is exposed to the arbitrary power of 100,000 single men; no body beingsecure, that his will, who has such a command, is better than that of othermen, though his force be 100,000 times stronger. And therefore, whatever formthe commonwealth is under, the ruling power ought to govern by declared andreceived laws, and not by extemporary dictates and undetermined resolutions:for then mankind will be in a far worse condition than in the state of nature,if they shall have armed one, or a few men with the joint power of a multitude,to force them to obey at pleasure the exorbitant and unlimited decrees of theirsudden thoughts, or unrestrained, and till that moment unknown wills, withouthaving any measures set down which may guide and justify their actions: for allthe power the government has, being only for the good of the society, as itought not to be arbitrary and at pleasure, so it ought to be exercised byestablished and promulgated laws; that both the people may know their duty, andbe safe and secure within the limits of the law; and the rulers too kept withintheir bounds, and not be tempted, by the power they have in their hands, toemploy it to such purposes, and by such measures, as they would not have known,and own not willingly.

Sect. 138. Thirdly, The supreme power cannot take from any man any part of hisproperty without his own consent: for the preservation of property being theend of government, and that for which men enter into society, it necessarilysupposes and requires, that the people should have property, without which theymust be supposed to lose that, by entering into society, which was the end forwhich they entered into it; too gross an absurdity for any man to own. Mentherefore in society having property, they have such a right to the goods,which by the law of the community are their’s, that no body hath a rightto take their substance or any part of it from them, without their own consent:without this they have no property at all; for I have truly no property inthat, which another can by right take from me, when he pleases, against myconsent. Hence it is a mistake to think, that the supreme or legislative powerof any commonwealth, can do what it will, and dispose of the estates of thesubject arbitrarily, or take any part of them at pleasure. This is not much tobe feared in governments where the legislative consists, wholly or in part, inassemblies which are variable, whose members, upon the dissolution of theassembly, are subjects under the common laws of their country, equally with therest. But in governments, where the legislative is in one lasting assemblyalways in being, or in one man, as in absolute monarchies, there is dangerstill, that they will think themselves to have a distinct interest from therest of the community; and so will be apt to increase their own riches andpower, by taking what they think fit from the people: for a man’sproperty is not at all secure, tho’ there be good and equitable laws toset the bounds of it between him and his fellow subjects, if he who commandsthose subjects have power to take from any private man, what part he pleases ofhis property, and use and dispose of it as he thinks good.

Sect. 139. But government, into whatsoever hands it is put, being, as I havebefore shewed, intrusted with this condition, and for this end, that men mighthave and secure their properties; the prince, or senate, however it may havepower to make laws, for the regulating of property between the subjects oneamongst another, yet can never have a power to take to themselves the whole, orany part of the subjects property, without their own consent: for this would bein effect to leave them no property at all. And to let us see, that evenabsolute power, where it is necessary, is not arbitrary by being absolute, butis still limited by that reason, and confined to those ends, which required itin some cases to be absolute, we need look no farther than the common practiceof martial discipline: for the preservation of the army, and in it of the wholecommonwealth, requires an absolute obedience to the command of every superiorofficer, and it is justly death to disobey or dispute the most dangerous orunreasonable of them; but yet we see, that neither the serjeant, that couldcommand a soldier to march up to the mouth of a cannon, or stand in a breach,where he is almost sure to perish, can command that soldier to give him onepenny of his money; nor the general, that can condemn him to death fordeserting his post, or for not obeying the most desperate orders, can yet, withall his absolute power of life and death, dispose of one farthing of thatsoldier’s estate, or seize one jot of his goods; whom yet he can commandany thing, and hang for the least disobedience; because such a blind obedienceis necessary to that end, for which the commander has his power, viz. thepreservation of the rest; but the disposing of his goods has nothing to do withit.

Sect. 140. It is true, governments cannot be supported without great charge,and it is fit every one who enjoys his share of the protection, should pay outof his estate his proportion for the maintenance of it. But still it must bewith his own consent, i.e. the consent of the majority, giving it either bythemselves, or their representatives chosen by them: for if any one shall claima power to lay and levy taxes on the people, by his own authority, and withoutsuch consent of the people, he thereby invades the fundamental law of property,and subverts the end of government: for what property have I in that, whichanother may by right take, when he pleases, to himself?

Sect. 141. Fourthly, The legislative cannot transfer the power of making lawsto any other hands: for it being but a delegated power from the people, theywho have it cannot pass it over to others. The people alone can appoint theform of the commonwealth, which is by constituting the legislative, andappointing in whose hands that shall be. And when the people have said, We willsubmit to rules, and be governed by laws made by such men, and in such forms,no body else can say other men shall make laws for them; nor can the people bebound by any laws, but such as are enacted by those whom they have chosen, andauthorized to make laws for them. The power of the legislative, being derivedfrom the people by a positive voluntary grant and institution, can be no otherthan what that positive grant conveyed, which being only to make laws, and notto make legislators, the legislative can have no power to transfer theirauthority of making laws, and place it in other hands.

Sect. 142. These are the bounds which the trust, that is put in them by thesociety, and the law of God and nature, have set to the legislative power ofevery commonwealth, in all forms of government.

First, They are to govern by promulgated established laws, not to be varied inparticular cases, but to have one rule for rich and poor, for the favourite atcourt, and the country man at plough.

Secondly, These laws also ought to be designed for no other end ultimately, butthe good of the people.

Thirdly, They must not raise taxes on the property of the people, without theconsent of the people, given by themselves, or their deputies. And thisproperly concerns only such governments where the legislative is always inbeing, or at least where the people have not reserved any part of thelegislative to deputies, to be from time to time chosen by themselves.

Fourthly, The legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of makinglaws to any body else, or place it any where, but where the people have.

CHAPTER. XII.

OF THE LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE, AND FEDERATIVE POWER OF THECOMMON-WEALTH.

Sect. 143. THE legislative power is that, which has a right to direct how theforce of the commonwealth shall be employed for preserving the community andthe members of it. But because those laws which are constantly to be executed,and whose force is always to continue, may be made in a little time; thereforethere is no need, that the legislative should be always in being, not havingalways business to do. And because it may be too great a temptation to humanfrailty, apt to grasp at power, for the same persons, who have the power ofmaking laws, to have also in their hands the power to execute them, wherebythey may exempt themselves from obedience to the laws they make, and suit thelaw, both in its making, and execution, to their own private advantage, andthereby come to have a distinct interest from the rest of the community,contrary to the end of society and government: therefore in wellorderedcommonwealths, where the good of the whole is so considered, as it ought, thelegislative power is put into the hands of divers persons, who duly assembled,have by themselves, or jointly with others, a power to make laws, which whenthey have done, being separated again, they are themselves subject to the lawsthey have made; which is a new and near tie upon them, to take care, that theymake them for the public good.

Sect. 144. But because the laws, that are at once, and in a short time made,have a constant and lasting force, and need a perpetual execution, or anattendance thereunto; therefore it is necessary there should be a power alwaysin being, which should see to the execution of the laws that are made, andremain in force. And thus the legislative and executive power come often to beseparated.

Sect. 145. There is another power in every commonwealth, which one may callnatural, because it is that which answers to the power every man naturally hadbefore he entered into society: for though in a commonwealth the members of itare distinct persons still in reference to one another, and as such as governedby the laws of the society; yet in reference to the rest of mankind, they makeone body, which is, as every member of it before was, still in the state ofnature with the rest of mankind. Hence it is, that the controversies thathappen between any man of the society with those that are out of it, aremanaged by the public; and an injury done to a member of their body, engagesthe whole in the reparation of it. So that under this consideration, the wholecommunity is one body in the state of nature, in respect of all other states orpersons out of its community.

Sect. 146. This therefore contains the power of war and peace, leagues andalliances, and all the transactions, with all persons and communities withoutthe commonwealth, and may be called federative, if any one pleases. So thething be understood, I am indifferent as to the name.

Sect. 147. These two powers, executive and federative, though they be reallydistinct in themselves, yet one comprehending the execution of the municipallaws of the society within its self, upon all that are parts of it; the otherthe management of the security and interest of the public without, with allthose that it may receive benefit or damage from, yet they are always almostunited. And though this federative power in the well or ill management of it beof great moment to the commonwealth, yet it is much less capable to be directedby antecedent, standing, positive laws, than the executive; and so mustnecessarily be left to the prudence and wisdom of those, whose hands it is in,to be managed for the public good: for the laws that concern subjects oneamongst another, being to direct their actions, may well enough precede them.But what is to be done in reference to foreigners, depending much upon theiractions, and the variation of designs and interests, must be left in great partto the prudence of those, who have this power committed to them, to be managedby the best of their skill, for the advantage of the commonwealth.

Sect. 148. Though, as I said, the executive and federative power of everycommunity be really distinct in themselves, yet they are hardly to beseparated, and placed at the same time, in the hands of distinct persons: forboth of them requiring the force of the society for their exercise, it isalmost impracticable to place the force of the commonwealth in distinct, andnot subordinate hands; or that the executive and federative power should beplaced in persons, that might act separately, whereby the force of the publicwould be under different commands: which would be apt some time or other tocause disorder and ruin.

CHAPTER. XIII.

OF THE SUBORDINATION OF THE POWERS OF THE COMMON-WEALTH.

Sect. 149. THOUGH in a constituted commonwealth, standing upon its own basis,and acting according to its own nature, that is, acting for the preservation ofthe community, there can be but one supreme power, which is the legislative, towhich all the rest are and must be subordinate, yet the legislative being onlya fiduciary power to act for certain ends, there remains still in the people asupreme power to remove or alter the legislative, when they find thelegislative act contrary to the trust reposed in them: for all power given withtrust for the attaining an end, being limited by that end, whenever that end ismanifestly neglected, or opposed, the trust must necessarily be forfeited, andthe power devolve into the hands of those that gave it, who may place it anewwhere they shall think best for their safety and security. And thus thecommunity perpetually retains a supreme power of saving themselves from theattempts and designs of any body, even of their legislators, whenever theyshall be so foolish, or so wicked, as to lay and carry on designs against theliberties and properties of the subject: for no man or society of men, having apower to deliver up their preservation, or consequently the means of it, to theabsolute will and arbitrary dominion of another; when ever any one shall goabout to bring them into such a slavish condition, they will always have aright to preserve, what they have not a power to part with; and to ridthemselves of those, who invade this fundamental, sacred, and unalterable lawof self-preservation, for which they entered into society. And thus thecommunity may be said in this respect to be always the supreme power, but notas considered under any form of government, because this power of the peoplecan never take place till the government be dissolved.

Sect. 150. In all cases, whilst the government subsists, the legislative is thesupreme power: for what can give laws to another, must needs be superior tohim; and since the legislative is no otherwise legislative of the society, butby the right it has to make laws for all the parts, and for every member of thesociety, prescribing rules to their actions, and giving power of execution,where they are transgressed, the legislative must needs be the supreme, and allother powers, in any members or parts of the society, derived from andsubordinate to it.

Sect. 151. In some commonwealths, where the legislative is not always in being,and the executive is vested in a single person, who has also a share in thelegislative; there that single person in a very tolerable sense may also becalled supreme: not that he has in himself all the supreme power, which is thatof law-making; but because he has in him the supreme execution, from whom allinferior magistrates derive all their several subordinate powers, or at leastthe greatest part of them: having also no legislative superior to him, therebeing no law to be made without his consent, which cannot be expected shouldever subject him to the other part of the legislative, he is properly enough inthis sense supreme. But yet it is to be observed, that tho’ oaths ofallegiance and fealty are taken to him, it is not to him as supreme legislator,but as supreme executor of the law, made by a joint power of him with others;allegiance being nothing but an obedience according to law, which when heviolates, he has no right to obedience, nor can claim it otherwise than as thepublic person vested with the power of the law, and so is to be considered asthe image, phantom, or representative of the commonwealth, acted by the will ofthe society, declared in its laws; and thus he has no will, no power, but thatof the law. But when he quits this representation, this public will, and actsby his own private will, he degrades himself, and is but a single privateperson without power, and without will, that has any right to obedience; themembers owing no obedience but to the public will of the society.

Sect. 152. The executive power, placed any where but in a person that has alsoa share in the legislative, is visibly subordinate and accountable to it, andmay be at pleasure changed and displaced; so that it is not the supremeexecutive power, that is exempt from subordination, but the supreme executivepower vested in one, who having a share in the legislative, has no distinctsuperior legislative to be subordinate and accountable to, farther than hehimself shall join and consent; so that he is no more subordinate than hehimself shall think fit, which one may certainly conclude will be but verylittle. Of other ministerial and subordinate powers in a commonwealth, we neednot speak, they being so multiplied with infinite variety, in the differentcustoms and constitutions of distinct commonwealths, that it is impossible togive a particular account of them all. Only thus much, which is necessary toour present purpose, we may take notice of concerning them, that they have nomanner of authority, any of them, beyond what is by positive grant andcommission delegated to them, and are all of them accountable to some otherpower in the commonwealth.

Sect. 153. It is not necessary, no, nor so much as convenient, that thelegislative should be always in being; but absolutely necessary that theexecutive power should, because there is not always need of new laws to bemade, but always need of execution of the laws that are made. When thelegislative hath put the execution of the laws, they make, into other hands,they have a power still to resume it out of those hands, when they find cause,and to punish for any maladministration against the laws. The same holds alsoin regard of the federative power, that and the executive being bothministerial and subordinate to the legislative, which, as has been shewed, in aconstituted commonwealth is the supreme. The legislative also in this casebeing supposed to consist of several persons, (for if it be a single person, itcannot but be always in being, and so will, as supreme, naturally have thesupreme executive power, together with the legislative) may assemble, andexercise their legislature, at the times that either their originalconstitution, or their own adjournment, appoints, or when they please; ifneither of these hath appointed any time, or there be no other way prescribedto convoke them: for the supreme power being placed in them by the people, itis always in them, and they may exercise it when they please, unless by theiroriginal constitution they are limited to certain seasons, or by an act oftheir supreme power they have adjourned to a certain time; and when that timecomes, they have a right to assemble and act again.

Sect. 154. If the legislative, or any part of it, be made up of representativeschosen for that time by the people, which afterwards return into the ordinarystate of subjects, and have no share in the legislature but upon a new choice,this power of chusing must also be exercised by the people, either at certainappointed seasons, or else when they are summoned to it; and in this lattercase the power of convoking the legislative is ordinarily placed in theexecutive, and has one of these two limitations in respect of time: that eitherthe original constitution requires their assembling and acting at certainintervals, and then the executive power does nothing but ministerially issuedirections for their electing and assembling, according to due forms; or elseit is left to his prudence to call them by new elections, when the occasions orexigencies of the public require the amendment of old, or making of new laws,or the redress or prevention of any inconveniencies, that lie on, or threatenthe people.

Sect. 155. It may be demanded here, What if the executive power, beingpossessed of the force of the commonwealth, shall make use of that force tohinder the meeting and acting of the legislative, when the originalconstitution, or the public exigencies require it? I say, using force upon thepeople without authority, and contrary to the trust put in him that does so, isa state of war with the people, who have a right to reinstate their legislativein the exercise of their power: for having erected a legislative, with anintent they should exercise the power of making laws, either at certain settimes, or when there is need of it, when they are hindered by any force fromwhat is so necessary to the society, and wherein the safety and preservation ofthe people consists, the people have a right to remove it by force. In allstates and conditions, the true remedy of force without authority, is to opposeforce to it. The use of force without authority, always puts him that uses itinto a state of war, as the aggressor, and renders him liable to be treatedaccordingly.

Sect. 156. The power of assembling and dismissing the legislative, placed inthe executive, gives not the executive a superiority over it, but is afiduciary trust placed in him, for the safety of the people, in a case wherethe uncertainty and variableness of human affairs could not bear a steady fixedrule: for it not being possible, that the first framers of the governmentshould, by any foresight, be so much masters of future events, as to be able toprefix so just periods of return and duration to the assemblies of thelegislative, in all times to come, that might exactly answer all the exigenciesof the commonwealth; the best remedy could be found for this defect, was totrust this to the prudence of one who was always to be present, and whosebusiness it was to watch over the public good. Constant frequent meetings ofthe legislative, and long continuations of their assemblies, without necessaryoccasion, could not but be burdensome to the people, and must necessarily intime produce more dangerous inconveniencies, and yet the quick turn of affairsmight be sometimes such as to need their present help: any delay of theirconvening might endanger the public; and sometimes too their business might beso great, that the limited time of their sitting might be too short for theirwork, and rob the public of that benefit which could be had only from theirmature deliberation. What then could be done in this case to prevent thecommunity from being exposed some time or other to eminent hazard, on one sideor the other, by fixed intervals and periods, set to the meeting and acting ofthe legislative, but to intrust it to the prudence of some, who being present,and acquainted with the state of public affairs, might make use of thisprerogative for the public good? and where else could this be so well placed asin his hands, who was intrusted with the execution of the laws for the sameend? Thus supposing the regulation of times for the assembling and sitting ofthe legislative, not settled by the original constitution, it naturally fellinto the hands of the executive, not as an arbitrary power depending on hisgood pleasure, but with this trust always to have it exercised only for thepublic weal, as the occurrences of times and change of affairs might require.Whether settled periods of their convening, or a liberty left to the prince forconvoking the legislative, or perhaps a mixture of both, hath the leastinconvenience attending it, it is not my business here to inquire, but only toshew, that though the executive power may have the prerogative of convoking anddissolving such conventions of the legislative, yet it is not thereby superiorto it.

Sect. 157. Things of this world are in so constant a flux, that nothing remainslong in the same state. Thus people, riches, trade, power, change theirstations, flourishing mighty cities come to ruin, and prove in times neglecteddesolate corners, whilst other unfrequented places grow into populouscountries, filled with wealth and inhabitants. But things not always changingequally, and private interest often keeping up customs and privileges, when thereasons of them are ceased, it often comes to pass, that in governments, wherepart of the legislative consists of representatives chosen by the people, thatin tract of time this representation becomes very unequal and disproportionateto the reasons it was at first established upon. To what gross absurdities thefollowing of custom, when reason has left it, may lead, we may be satisfied,when we see the bare name of a town, of which there remains not so much as theruins, where scarce so much housing as a sheepcote, or more inhabitants than ashepherd is to be found, sends as many representatives to the grand assembly oflaw-makers, as a whole county numerous in people, and powerful in riches. Thisstrangers stand amazed at, and every one must confess needs a remedy;tho’ most think it hard to find one, because the constitution of thelegislative being the original and supreme act of the society, antecedent toall positive laws in it, and depending wholly on the people, no inferior powercan alter it. And therefore the people, when the legislative is onceconstituted, having, in such a government as we have been speaking of, no powerto act as long as the government stands; this inconvenience is thoughtincapable of a remedy.

Sect. 158. Salus populi suprema lex, is certainly so just and fundamental arule, that he, who sincerely follows it, cannot dangerously err. If thereforethe executive, who has the power of convoking the legislative, observing ratherthe true proportion, than fashion of representation, regulates, not by oldcustom, but true reason, the number of members, in all places that have a rightto be distinctly represented, which no part of the people however incorporatedcan pretend to, but in proportion to the assistance which it affords to thepublic, it cannot be judged to have set up a new legislative, but to haverestored the old and true one, and to have rectified the disorders whichsuccession of time had insensibly, as well as inevitably introduced: For itbeing the interest as well as intention of the people, to have a fair and equalrepresentative; whoever brings it nearest to that, is an undoubted friend to,and establisher of the government, and cannot miss the consent and approbationof the community; prerogative being nothing but a power, in the hands of theprince, to provide for the public good, in such cases, which depending uponunforeseen and uncertain occurrences, certain and unalterable laws could notsafely direct; whatsoever shall be done manifestly for the good of the people,and the establishing the government upon its true foundations, is, and alwayswill be, just prerogative, The power of erecting new corporations, andtherewith new representatives, carries with it a supposition, that in time themeasures of representation might vary, and those places have a just right to berepresented which before had none; and by the same reason, those cease to havea right, and be too inconsiderable for such a privilege, which before had it.’Tis not a change from the present state, which perhaps corruption ordecay has introduced, that makes an inroad upon the government, but thetendency of it to injure or oppress the people, and to set up one part orparty, with a distinction from, and an unequal subjection of the rest.Whatsoever cannot but be acknowledged to be of advantage to the society, andpeople in general, upon just and lasting measures, will always, when done,justify itself; and whenever the people shall chuse their representatives uponjust and undeniably equal measures, suitable to the original frame of thegovernment, it cannot be doubted to be the will and act of the society, whoeverpermitted or caused them so to do.

CHAPTER. XIV.

OF PREROGATIVE.

Sect. 159. WHERE the legislative and executive power are in distinct hands, (asthey are in all moderated monarchies, and well-framed governments) there thegood of the society requires, that several things should be left to thediscretion of him that has the executive power: for the legislators not beingable to foresee, and provide by laws, for all that may be useful to thecommunity, the executor of the laws having the power in his hands, has by thecommon law of nature a right to make use of it for the good of the society, inmany cases, where the municipal law has given no direction, till thelegislative can conveniently be assembled to provide for it. Many things thereare, which the law can by no means provide for; and those must necessarily beleft to the discretion of him that has the executive power in his hands, to beordered by him as the public good and advantage shall require: nay, it is fitthat the laws themselves should in some cases give way to the executive power,or rather to this fundamental law of nature and government, viz. That as muchas may be, all the members of the society are to be preserved: for since manyaccidents may happen, wherein a strict and rigid observation of the laws may doharm; (as not to pull down an innocent man’s house to stop the fire, whenthe next to it is burning) and a man may come sometimes within the reach of thelaw, which makes no distinction of persons, by an action that may deservereward and pardon; ’tis fit the ruler should have a power, in many cases,to mitigate the severity of the law, and pardon some offenders: for the end ofgovernment being the preservation of all, as much as may be, even the guiltyare to be spared, where it can prove no prejudice to the innocent.

Sect. 160. This power to act according to discretion, for the public good,without the prescription of the law, and sometimes even against it, is thatwhich is called prerogative: for since in some governments the lawmaking poweris not always in being, and is usually too numerous, and so too slow, for thedispatch requisite to execution; and because also it is impossible to foresee,and so by laws to provide for, all accidents and necessities that may concernthe public, or to make such laws as will do no harm, if they are executed withan inflexible rigour, on all occasions, and upon all persons that may come intheir way; therefore there is a latitude left to the executive power, to domany things of choice which the laws do not prescribe.

Sect. 161. This power, whilst employed for the benefit of the community, andsuitably to the trust and ends of the government, is undoubted prerogative, andnever is questioned: for the people are very seldom or never scrupulous or nicein the point; they are far from examining prerogative, whilst it is in anytolerable degree employed for the use it was meant, that is, for the good ofthe people, and not manifestly against it: but if there comes to be a questionbetween the executive power and the people, about a thing claimed as aprerogative; the tendency of the exercise of such prerogative to the good orhurt of the people, will easily decide that question.

Sect. 162. It is easy to conceive, that in the infancy of governments, whencommonwealths differed little from families in number of people, they differedfrom them too but little in number of laws: and the governors, being as thefathers of them, watching over them for their good, the government was almostall prerogative. A few established laws served the turn, and the discretion andcare of the ruler supplied the rest. But when mistake or flattery prevailedwith weak princes to make use of this power for private ends of their own, andnot for the public good, the people were fain by express laws to getprerogative determined in those points wherein they found disadvantage from it:and thus declared limitations of prerogative were by the people found necessaryin cases which they and their ancestors had left, in the utmost latitude, tothe wisdom of those princes who made no other but a right use of it, that is,for the good of their people.

Sect. 163. And therefore they have a very wrong notion of government, who say,that the people have encroached upon the prerogative, when they have got anypart of it to be defined by positive laws: for in so doing they have not pulledfrom the prince any thing that of right belonged to him, but only declared,that that power which they indefinitely left in his or his ancestors hands, tobe exercised for their good, was not a thing which they intended him when heused it otherwise: for the end of government being the good of the community,whatsoever alterations are made in it, tending to that end, cannot be anencroachment upon any body, since no body in government can have a righttending to any other end: and those only are encroachments which prejudice orhinder the public good. Those who say otherwise, speak as if the prince had adistinct and separate interest from the good of the community, and was not madefor it; the root and source from which spring almost all those evils anddisorders which happen in kingly governments. And indeed, if that be so, thepeople under his government are not a society of rational creatures, enteredinto a community for their mutual good; they are not such as have set rulersover themselves, to guard, and promote that good; but are to be looked on as anherd of inferior creatures under the dominion of a master, who keeps them andworks them for his own pleasure or profit. If men were so void of reason, andbrutish, as to enter into society upon such terms, prerogative might indeed be,what some men would have it, an arbitrary power to do things hurtful to thepeople.

Sect. 164. But since a rational creature cannot be supposed, when free, to puthimself into subjection to another, for his own harm; (though, where he finds agood and wise ruler, he may not perhaps think it either necessary or useful toset precise bounds to his power in all things) prerogative can be nothing butthe people’s permitting their rulers to do several things, of their ownfree choice, where the law was silent, and sometimes too against the directletter of the law, for the public good; and their acquiescing in it when sodone: for as a good prince, who is mindful of the trust put into his hands, andcareful of the good of his people, cannot have too much prerogative, that is,power to do good; so a weak and ill prince, who would claim that power whichhis predecessors exercised without the direction of the law, as a prerogativebelonging to him by right of his office, which he may exercise at his pleasure,to make or promote an interest distinct from that of the public, gives thepeople an occasion to claim their right, and limit that power, which, whilst itwas exercised for their good, they were content should be tacitly allowed.

Sect. 165. And therefore he that will look into the history of England, willfind, that prerogative was always largest in the hands of our wisest and bestprinces; because the people, observing the whole tendency of their actions tobe the public good, contested not what was done without law to that end: or, ifany human frailty or mistake (for princes are but men, made as others) appearedin some small declinations from that end; yet ’twas visible, the main oftheir conduct tended to nothing but the care of the public. The peopletherefore, finding reason to be satisfied with these princes, whenever theyacted without, or contrary to the letter of the law, acquiesced in what theydid, and, without the least complaint, let them inlarge their prerogative asthey pleased, judging rightly, that they did nothing herein to the prejudice oftheir laws, since they acted conformable to the foundation and end of all laws,the public good.

Sect. 166. Such god-like princes indeed had some title to arbitrary power bythat argument, that would prove absolute monarchy the best government, as thatwhich God himself governs the universe by; because such kings partake of hiswisdom and goodness. Upon this is founded that saying, That the reigns of goodprinces have been always most dangerous to the liberties of their people: forwhen their successors, managing the government with different thoughts, woulddraw the actions of those good rulers into precedent, and make them thestandard of their prerogative, as if what had been done only for the good ofthe people was a right in them to do, for the harm of the people, if they sopleased; it has often occasioned contest, and sometimes public disorders,before the people could recover their original right, and get that to bedeclared not to be prerogative, which truly was never so; since it isimpossible that any body in the society should ever have a right to do thepeople harm; though it be very possible, and reasonable, that the people shouldnot go about to set any bounds to the prerogative of those kings, or rulers,who themselves transgressed not the bounds of the public good: for prerogativeis nothing but the power of doing public good without a rule.

Sect. 167. The power of calling parliaments in England, as to precise time,place, and duration, is certainly a prerogative of the king, but still withthis trust, that it shall be made use of for the good of the nation, as theexigencies of the times, and variety of occasions, shall require: for it beingimpossible to foresee which should always be the fittest place for them toassemble in, and what the best season; the choice of these was left with theexecutive power, as might be most subservient to the public good, and best suitthe ends of parliaments.

Sect. 168. The old question will be asked in this matter of prerogative, Butwho shall be judge when this power is made a right use of one answer: betweenan executive power in being, with such a prerogative, and a legislative thatdepends upon his will for their convening, there can be no judge on earth; asthere can be none between the legislative and the people, should either theexecutive, or the legislative, when they have got the power in their hands,design, or go about to enslave or destroy them. The people have no other remedyin this, as in all other cases where they have no judge on earth, but to appealto heaven: for the rulers, in such attempts, exercising a power the peoplenever put into their hands, (who can never be supposed to consent that any bodyshould rule over them for their harm) do that which they have not a right todo. And where the body of the people, or any single man, is deprived of theirright, or is under the exercise of a power without right, and have no appeal onearth, then they have a liberty to appeal to heaven, whenever they judge thecause of sufficient moment. And therefore, though the people cannot be judge,so as to have, by the constitution of that society, any superior power, todetermine and give effective sentence in the case; yet they have, by a lawantecedent and paramount to all positive laws of men, reserved that ultimatedetermination to themselves which belongs to all mankind, where there lies noappeal on earth, viz. to judge, whether they have just cause to make theirappeal to heaven. And this judgment they cannot part with, it being out of aman’s power so to submit himself to another, as to give him a liberty todestroy him; God and nature never allowing a man so to abandon himself, as toneglect his own preservation: and since he cannot take away his own life,neither can he give another power to take it. Nor let any one think, this laysa perpetual foundation for disorder; for this operates not, till theinconveniency is so great, that the majority feel it, and are weary of it, andfind a necessity to have it amended. But this the executive power, or wiseprinces, never need come in the danger of: and it is the thing, of all others,they have most need to avoid, as of all others the most perilous.

CHAPTER. XV.

OF PATERNAL, POLITICAL, AND DESPOTICAL POWER, CONSIDERED TOGETHER.

Sect. 169. THOUGH I have had occasion to speak of these separately before, yetthe great mistakes of late about government, having, as I suppose, arisen fromconfounding these distinct powers one with another, it may not, perhaps, beamiss to consider them here together.

Sect. 170. First, then, Paternal or parental power is nothing but that whichparents have over their children, to govern them for the children’s good,till they come to the use of reason, or a state of knowledge, wherein they maybe supposed capable to understand that rule, whether it be the law of nature,or the municipal law of their country, they are to govern themselves by:capable, I say, to know it, as well as several others, who live as freemenunder that law. The affection and tenderness which God hath planted in thebreast of parents towards their children, makes it evident, that this is notintended to be a severe arbitrary government, but only for the help,instruction, and preservation of their offspring. But happen it as it will,there is, as I have proved, no reason why it should be thought to extend tolife and death, at any time, over their children, more than over any body else;neither can there be any pretence why this parental power should keep thechild, when grown to a man, in subjection to the will of his parents, anyfarther than having received life and education from his parents, obliges himto respect, honour, gratitude, assistance and support, all his life, to bothfather and mother. And thus, ’tis true, the paternal is a naturalgovernment, but not at all extending itself to the ends and jurisdictions ofthat which is political. The power of the father doth not reach at all to theproperty of the child, which is only in his own disposing.

Sect. 171. Secondly, Political power is that power, which every man having inthe state of nature, has given up into the hands of the society, and therein tothe governors, whom the society hath set over itself, with this express ortacit trust, that it shall be employed for their good, and the preservation oftheir property: now this power, which every man has in the state of nature, andwhich he parts with to the society in all such cases where the society cansecure him, is to use such means, for the preserving of his own property, as hethinks good, and nature allows him; and to punish the breach of the law ofnature in others, so as (according to the best of his reason) may most conduceto the preservation of himself, and the rest of mankind. So that the end andmeasure of this power, when in every man’s hands in the state of nature,being the preservation of all of his society, that is, all mankind in general,it can have no other end or measure, when in the hands of the magistrate, butto preserve the members of that society in their lives, liberties, andpossessions; and so cannot be an absolute, arbitrary power over their lives andfortunes, which are as much as possible to be preserved; but a power to makelaws, and annex such penalties to them, as may tend to the preservation of thewhole, by cutting off those parts, and those only, which are so corrupt, thatthey threaten the sound and healthy, without which no severity is lawful. Andthis power has its original only from compact and agreement, and the mutualconsent of those who make up the community.

Sect. 172. Thirdly, Despotical power is an absolute, arbitrary power one manhas over another, to take away his life, whenever he pleases. This is a power,which neither nature gives, for it has made no such distinction between one manand another; nor compact can convey: for man not having such an arbitrary powerover his own life, cannot give another man such a power over it; but it is theeffect only of forfeiture, which the aggressor makes of his own life, when heputs himself into the state of war with another: for having quitted reason,which God hath given to be the rule betwixt man and man, and the common bondwhereby human kind is united into one fellowship and society; and havingrenounced the way of peace which that teaches, and made use of the force ofwar, to compass his unjust ends upon another, where he has no right; and sorevolting from his own kind to that of beasts, by making force, which istheir’s, to be his rule of right, he renders himself liable to bedestroyed by the injured person, and the rest of mankind, that will join withhim in the execution of justice, as any other wild beast, or noxious brute,with whom mankind can have neither society nor security*. And thus captives,taken in a just and lawful war, and such only, are subject to a despoticalpower, which, as it arises not from compact, so neither is it capable of any,but is the state of war continued: for what compact can be made with a man thatis not master of his own life? what condition can he perform? and if he be onceallowed to be master of his own life, the despotical, arbitrary power of hismaster ceases. He that is master of himself, and his own life, has a right tooto the means of preserving it; so that as soon as compact enters, slaveryceases, and he so far quits his absolute power, and puts an end to the state ofwar, who enters into conditions with his captive.

(*Another copy corrected by Mr. Locke, has it thus, Noxious brute that isdestructive to their being.)

Sect. 173. Nature gives the first of these, viz. paternal power to parents forthe benefit of their children during their minority, to supply their want ofability, and understanding how to manage their property. (By property I must beunderstood here, as in other places, to mean that property which men have intheir persons as well as goods.) Voluntary agreement gives the second, viz.political power to governors for the benefit of their subjects, to secure themin the possession and use of their properties. And forfeiture gives the thirddespotical power to lords for their own benefit, over those who are stripped ofall property.

Sect. 174. He, that shall consider the distinct rise and extent, and thedifferent ends of these several powers, will plainly see, that paternal powercomes as far short of that of the magistrate, as despotical exceeds it; andthat absolute dominion, however placed, is so far from being one kind of civilsociety, that it is as inconsistent with it, as slavery is with property.Paternal power is only where minority makes the child incapable to manage hisproperty; political, where men have property in their own disposal; anddespotical, over such as have no property at all.

CHAPTER. XVI.

OF CONQUEST.

Sect. 175. THOUGH governments can originally have no other rise than thatbefore mentioned, nor polities be founded on any thing but the consent of thepeople; yet such have been the disorders ambition has filled the world with,that in the noise of war, which makes so great a part of the history ofmankind, this consent is little taken notice of: and therefore many havemistaken the force of arms for the consent of the people, and reckon conquestas one of the originals of government. But conquest is as far from setting upany government, as demolishing an house is from building a new one in theplace. Indeed, it often makes way for a new frame of a commonwealth, bydestroying the former; but, without the consent of the people, can never erecta new one.

Sect. 176. That the aggressor, who puts himself into the state of war withanother, and unjustly invades another man’s right, can, by such an unjustwar, never come to have a right over the conquered, will be easily agreed byall men, who will not think, that robbers and pyrates have a right of empireover whomsoever they have force enough to master; or that men are bound bypromises, which unlawful force extorts from them. Should a robber break into myhouse, and with a dagger at my throat make me seal deeds to convey my estate tohim, would this give him any title? Just such a title, by his sword, has anunjust conqueror, who forces me into submission. The injury and the crime isequal, whether committed by the wearer of a crown, or some petty villain. Thetitle of the offender, and the number of his followers, make no difference inthe offence, unless it be to aggravate it. The only difference is, greatrobbers punish little ones, to keep them in their obedience; but the great onesare rewarded with laurels and triumphs, because they are too big for the weakhands of justice in this world, and have the power in their own possession,which should punish offenders. What is my remedy against a robber, that sobroke into my house? Appeal to the law for justice. But perhaps justice isdenied, or I am crippled and cannot stir, robbed and have not the means to doit. If God has taken away all means of seeking remedy, there is nothing leftbut patience. But my son, when able, may seek the relief of the law, which I amdenied: he or his son may renew his appeal, till he recover his right. But theconquered, or their children, have no court, no arbitrator on earth to appealto. Then they may appeal, as Jephtha did, to heaven, and repeat their appealtill they have recovered the native right of their ancestors, which was, tohave such a legislative over them, as the majority should approve, and freelyacquiesce in. If it be objected, This would cause endless trouble; I answer, nomore than justice does, where she lies open to all that appeal to her. He thattroubles his neighbour without a cause, is punished for it by the justice ofthe court he appeals to: and he that appeals to heaven must be sure he hasright on his side; and a right too that is worth the trouble and cost of theappeal, as he will answer at a tribunal that cannot be deceived, and will besure to retribute to every one according to the mischiefs he hath created tohis fellow subjects; that is, any part of mankind: from whence it is plain,that he that conquers in an unjust war can thereby have no title to thesubjection and obedience of the conquered.

Sect. 177. But supposing victory favours the right side, let us consider aconqueror in a lawful war, and see what power he gets, and over whom.

First, It is plain he gets no power by his conquest over those that conqueredwith him. They that fought on his side cannot suffer by the conquest, but mustat least be as much freemen as they were before. And most commonly they serveupon terms, and on condition to share with their leader, and enjoy a part ofthe spoil, and other advantages that attend the conquering sword; or at leasthave a part of the subdued country bestowed upon them. And the conqueringpeople are not, I hope, to be slaves by conquest, and wear their laurels onlyto shew they are sacrifices to their leaders triumph. They that found absolutemonarchy upon the title of the sword, make their heroes, who are the foundersof such monarchies, arrant Draw-can-sirs, and forget they had any officers andsoldiers that fought on their side in the battles they won, or assisted them inthe subduing, or shared in possessing, the countries they mastered. We are toldby some, that the English monarchy is founded in the Norman conquest, and thatour princes have thereby a title to absolute dominion: which if it were true,(as by the history it appears otherwise) and that William had a right to makewar on this island; yet his dominion by conquest could reach no farther than tothe Saxons and Britons, that were then inhabitants of this country. The Normansthat came with him, and helped to conquer, and all descended from them, arefreemen, and no subjects by conquest; let that give what dominion it will. Andif I, or any body else, shall claim freedom, as derived from them, it will bevery hard to prove the contrary: and it is plain, the law, that has made nodistinction between the one and the other, intends not there should be anydifference in their freedom or privileges.

Sect. 178. But supposing, which seldom happens, that the conquerors andconquered never incorporate into one people, under the same laws and freedom;let us see next what power a lawful conqueror has over the subdued: and that Isay is purely despotical. He has an absolute power over the lives of those whoby an unjust war have forfeited them; but not over the lives or fortunes ofthose who engaged not in the war, nor over the possessions even of those whowere actually engaged in it.

Sect. 179. Secondly, I say then the conqueror gets no power but only over thosewho have actually assisted, concurred, or consented to that unjust force thatis used against him: for the people having given to their governors no power todo an unjust thing, such as is to make an unjust war, (for they never had sucha power in themselves) they ought not to be charged as guilty of the violenceand unjustice that is committed in an unjust war, any farther than theyactually abet it; no more than they are to be thought guilty of any violence oroppression their governors should use upon the people themselves, or any partof their fellow subjects, they having empowered them no more to the one than tothe other. Conquerors, it is true, seldom trouble themselves to make thedistinction, but they willingly permit the confusion of war to sweep alltogether: but yet this alters not the right; for the conquerors power over thelives of the conquered, being only because they have used force to do, ormaintain an injustice, he can have that power only over those who haveconcurred in that force; all the rest are innocent; and he has no more titleover the people of that country, who have done him no injury, and so have madeno forfeiture of their lives, than he has over any other, who, without anyinjuries or provocations, have lived upon fair terms with him.

Sect. 180. Thirdly, The power a conqueror gets over those he overcomes in ajust war, is perfectly despotical: he has an absolute power over the lives ofthose, who, by putting themselves in a state of war, have forfeited them; buthe has not thereby a right and title to their possessions. This I doubt not,but at first sight will seem a strange doctrine, it being so quite contrary tothe practice of the world; there being nothing more familiar in speaking of thedominion of countries, than to say such an one conquered it; as if conquest,without any more ado, conveyed a right of possession. But when we consider,that the practice of the strong and powerful, how universal soever it may be,is seldom the rule of right, however it be one part of the subjection of theconquered, not to argue against the conditions cut out to them by theconquering sword.

Sect. 181. Though in all war there be usually a complication of force anddamage, and the aggressor seldom fails to harm the estate, when he uses forceagainst the persons of those he makes war upon; yet it is the use of force onlythat puts a man into the state of war: for whether by force he begins theinjury, or else having quietly, and by fraud, done the injury, he refuses tomake reparation, and by force maintains it, (which is the same thing, as atfirst to have done it by force) it is the unjust use of force that makes thewar: for he that breaks open my house, and violently turns me out of doors; orhaving peaceably got in, by force keeps me out, does in effect the same thing;supposing we are in such a state, that we have no common judge on earth, whom Imay appeal to, and to whom we are both obliged to submit: for of such I am nowspeaking. It is the unjust use of force then, that puts a man into the state ofwar with another; and thereby he that is guilty of it makes a forfeiture of hislife: for quitting reason, which is the rule given between man and man, andusing force, the way of beasts, he becomes liable to be destroyed by him heuses force against, as any savage ravenous beast, that is dangerous to hisbeing.

Sect. 182. But because the miscarriages of the father are no faults of thechildren, and they may be rational and peaceable, notwithstanding thebrutishness and injustice of the father; the father, by his miscarriages andviolence, can forfeit but his own life, but involves not his children in hisguilt or destruction. His goods, which nature, that willeth the preservation ofall mankind as much as is possible, hath made to belong to the children to keepthem from perishing, do still continue to belong to his children: for supposingthem not to have joined in the war, either thro’ infancy, absence, orchoice, they have done nothing to forfeit them: nor has the conqueror any rightto take them away, by the bare title of having subdued him that by forceattempted his destruction; though perhaps he may have some right to them, torepair the damages he has sustained by the war, and the defence of his ownright; which how far it reaches to the possessions of the conquered, we shallsee by and by. So that he that by conquest has a right over a man’sperson to destroy him if he pleases, has not thereby a right over his estate topossess and enjoy it: for it is the brutal force the aggressor has used, thatgives his adversary a right to take away his life, and destroy him if hepleases, as a noxious creature; but it is damage sustained that alone gives himtitle to another man’s goods: for though I may kill a thief that sets onme in the highway, yet I may not (which seems less) take away his money, andlet him go: this would be robbery on my side. His force, and the state of warhe put himself in, made him forfeit his life, but gave me no title to hisgoods. The right then of conquest extends only to the lives of those who joinedin the war, not to their estates, but only in order to make reparation for thedamages received, and the charges of the war, and that too with reservation ofthe right of the innocent wife and children.

Sect. 183. Let the conqueror have as much justice on his side, as could besupposed, he has no right to seize more than the vanquished could forfeit: hislife is at the victor’s mercy; and his service and goods he mayappropriate, to make himself reparation; but he cannot take the goods of hiswife and children; they too had a title to the goods he enjoyed, and theirshares in the estate he possessed: for example, I in the state of nature (andall commonwealths are in the state of nature one with another) have injuredanother man, and refusing to give satisfaction, it comes to a state of war,wherein my defending by force what I had gotten unjustly, makes me theaggressor. I am conquered: my life, it is true, as forfeit, is at mercy, butnot my wife’s and children’s. They made not the war, nor assistedin it. I could not forfeit their lives; they were not mine to forfeit. My wifehad a share in my estate; that neither could I forfeit. And my children also,being born of me, had a right to be maintained out of my labour or substance.Here then is the case: the conqueror has a title to reparation for damagesreceived, and the children have a title to their father’s estate fortheir subsistence: for as to the wife’s share, whether her own labour, orcompact, gave her a title to it, it is plain, her husband could not forfeitwhat was her’s. What must be done in the case? I answer; the fundamentallaw of nature being, that all, as much as may be, should be preserved, itfollows, that if there be not enough fully to satisfy both, viz, for theconqueror’s losses, and children’s maintenance, he that hath, andto spare, must remit something of his full satisfaction, and give way to thepressing and preferable title of those who are in danger to perish without it.

Sect. 184. But supposing the charge and damages of the war are to be made up tothe conqueror, to the utmost farthing; and that the children of the vanquished,spoiled of all their father’s goods, are to be left to starve and perish;yet the satisfying of what shall, on this score, be due to the conqueror, willscarce give him a title to any country he shall conquer: for the damages of warcan scarce amount to the value of any considerable tract of land, in any partof the world, where all the land is possessed, and none lies waste. And if Ihave not taken away the conqueror’s land, which, being vanquished, it isimpossible I should; scarce any other spoil I have done him can amount to thevalue of mine, supposing it equally cultivated, and of an extent any way comingnear what I had overrun of his. The destruction of a year’s product ortwo (for it seldom reaches four or five) is the utmost spoil that usually canbe done: for as to money, and such riches and treasure taken away, these arenone of nature’s goods, they have but a fantastical imaginary value:nature has put no such upon them: they are of no more account by her standard,than the wampompeke of the Americans to an European prince, or the silver moneyof Europe would have been formerly to an American. And five years product isnot worth the perpetual inheritance of land, where all is possessed, and noneremains waste, to be taken up by him that is disseized: which will be easilygranted, if one do but take away the imaginary value of money, thedisproportion being more than between five and five hundred; though, at thesame time, half a year’s product is more worth than the inheritance,where there being more land than the inhabitants possess and make use of, anyone has liberty to make use of the waste: but there conquerors take little careto possess themselves of the lands of the vanquished, No damage therefore, thatmen in the state of nature (as all princes and governments are in reference toone another) suffer from one another, can give a conqueror power to dispossessthe posterity of the vanquished, and turn them out of that inheritance, whichought to be the possession of them and their descendants to all generations.The conqueror indeed will be apt to think himself master: and it is the verycondition of the subdued not to be able to dispute their right. But if that beall, it gives no other title than what bare force gives to the stronger overthe weaker: and, by this reason, he that is strongest will have a right towhatever he pleases to seize on.

Sect. 185. Over those then that joined with him in the war, and over those ofthe subdued country that opposed him not, and the posterity even of those thatdid, the conqueror, even in a just war, hath, by his conquest, no right ofdominion: they are free from any subjection to him, and if their formergovernment be dissolved, they are at liberty to begin and erect another tothemselves.

Sect. 186. The conqueror, it is true, usually, by the force he has over them,compels them, with a sword at their breasts, to stoop to his conditions, andsubmit to such a government as he pleases to afford them; but the enquiry is,what right he has to do so? If it be said, they submit by their own consent,then this allows their own consent to be necessary to give the conqueror atitle to rule over them. It remains only to be considered, whether promisesextorted by force, without right, can be thought consent, and how far theybind. To which I shall say, they bind not at all; because whatsoever anothergets from me by force, I still retain the right of, and he is obliged presentlyto restore. He that forces my horse from me, ought presently to restore him,and I have still a right to retake him. By the same reason, he that forced apromise from me, ought presently to restore it, i.e. quit me of the obligationof it; or I may resume it myself, i.e. chuse whether I will perform it: for thelaw of nature laying an obligation on me only by the rules she prescribes,cannot oblige me by the violation of her rules: such is the extorting any thingfrom me by force. Nor does it at all alter the case to say, I gave my promise,no more than it excuses the force, and passes the right, when I put my hand inmy pocket, and deliver my purse myself to a thief, who demands it with a pistolat my breast.

Sect. 187. From all which it follows, that the government of a conqueror,imposed by force on the subdued, against whom he had no right of war, or whojoined not in the war against him, where he had right, has no obligation uponthem.

Sect. 188. But let us suppose, that all the men of that community, being allmembers of the same body politic, may be taken to have joined in that unjustwar wherein they are subdued, and so their lives are at the mercy of theconqueror.

Sect. 189. I say this concerns not their children who are in their minority:for since a father hath not, in himself, a power over the life or liberty ofhis child, no act of his can possibly forfeit it. So that the children,whatever may have happened to the fathers, are freemen, and the absolute powerof the conqueror reaches no farther than the persons of the men that weresubdued by him, and dies with them: and should he govern them as slaves,subjected to his absolute arbitrary power, he has no such right of dominionover their children. He can have no power over them but by their own consent,whatever he may drive them to say or do; and he has no lawfull authority,whilst force, and not choice, compels them to submission.

Sect. 190. Every man is born with a double right: first, a right of freedom tohis person, which no other man has a power over, but the free disposal of itlies in himself. Secondly, a right, before any other man, to inherit with hisbrethren his father’s goods.

Sect. 191. By the first of these, a man is naturally free from subjection toany government, tho’ he be born in a place under its jurisdiction; but ifhe disclaim the lawful government of the country he was born in, he must alsoquit the right that belonged to him by the laws of it, and the possessionsthere descending to him from his ancestors, if it were a government made bytheir consent.

Sect. 192. By the second, the inhabitants of any country, who are descended,and derive a title to their estates from those who are subdued, and had agovernment forced upon them against their free consents, retain a right to thepossession of their ancestors, though they consent not freely to thegovernment, whose hard conditions were by force imposed on the possessors ofthat country: for the first conqueror never having had a title to the land ofthat country, the people who are the descendants of, or claim under those whowere forced to submit to the yoke of a government by constraint, have always aright to shake it off, and free themselves from the usurpation or tyranny whichthe sword hath brought in upon them, till their rulers put them under such aframe of government as they willingly and of choice consent to. Who doubts butthe Grecian Christians, descendants of the ancient possessors of that country,may justly cast off the Turkish yoke, which they have so long groaned under,whenever they have an opportunity to do it? For no government can have a rightto obedience from a people who have not freely consented to it; which they cannever be supposed to do, till either they are put in a full state of liberty tochuse their government and governors, or at least till they have such standinglaws, to which they have by themselves or their representatives given theirfree consent, and also till they are allowed their due property, which is so tobe proprietors of what they have, that no body can take away any part of itwithout their own consent, without which, men under any government are not inthe state of freemen, but are direct slaves under the force of war.

Sect. 193. But granting that the conqueror in a just war has a right to theestates, as well as power over the persons, of the conquered; which, it isplain, he hath not: nothing of absolute power will follow from hence, in thecontinuance of the government; because the descendants of these being allfreemen, if he grants them estates and possessions to inhabit his country,(without which it would be worth nothing) whatsoever he grants them, they have,so far as it is granted, property in. The nature whereof is, that without aman’s own consent it cannot be taken from him.

Sect. 194. Their persons are free by a native right, and their properties, bethey more or less, are their own, and at their own dispose, and not at his; orelse it is no property. Supposing the conqueror gives to one man a thousandacres, to him and his heirs for ever; to another he lets a thousand acres forhis life, under the rent of 50£. or 500£. per ann. has not the one ofthese a right to his thousand acres for ever, and the other, during his life,paying the said rent? and hath not the tenant for life a property in all thathe gets over and above his rent, by his labour and industry during the saidterm, supposing it be double the rent? Can any one say, the king, or conqueror,after his grant, may by his power of conqueror take away all, or part of theland from the heirs of one, or from the other during his life, he paying therent? or can he take away from either the goods or money they have got upon thesaid land, at his pleasure? If he can, then all free and voluntary contractscease, and are void in the world; there needs nothing to dissolve them at anytime, but power enough: and all the grants and promises of men in power are butmockery and collusion: for can there be any thing more ridiculous than to say,I give you and your’s this for ever, and that in the surest and mostsolemn way of conveyance can be devised; and yet it is to be understood, that Ihave right, if I please, to take it away from you again to morrow?

Sect. 195. I will not dispute now whether princes are exempt from the laws oftheir country; but this I am sure, they owe subjection to the laws of God andnature. No body, no power, can exempt them from the obligations of that eternallaw. Those are so great, and so strong, in the case of promises, thatomnipotency itself can be tied by them. Grants, promises, and oaths, are bondsthat hold the Almighty: whatever some flatterers say to princes of the world,who all together, with all their people joined to them, are, in comparison ofthe great God, but as a drop of the bucket, or a dust on the balance,inconsiderable, nothing!

Sect. 196. The short of the case in conquest is this: the conqueror, if he havea just cause, has a despotical right over the persons of all, that actuallyaided, and concurred in the war against him, and a right to make up his damageand cost out of their labour and estates, so he injure not the right of anyother. Over the rest of the people, if there were any that consented not to thewar, and over the children of the captives themselves, or the possessions ofeither, he has no power; and so can have, by virtue of conquest, no lawfultitle himself to dominion over them, or derive it to his posterity; but is anaggressor, if he attempts upon their properties, and thereby puts himself in astate of war against them, and has no better a right of principality, he, norany of his successors, than Hingar, or Hubba, the Danes, had here in England;or Spartacus, had he conquered Italy, would have had; which is to have theiryoke cast off, as soon as God shall give those under their subjection courageand opportunity to do it. Thus, notwithstanding whatever title the kings ofAssyria had over Judah, by the sword, God assisted Hezekiah to throw off thedominion of that conquering empire. And the lord was with Hezekiah, and heprospered; wherefore he went forth, and he rebelled against the king ofAssyria, and served him not, 2 Kings xviii. 7. Whence it is plain, that shakingoff a power, which force, and not right, hath set over any one, though it haththe name of rebellion, yet is no offence before God, but is that which heallows and countenances, though even promises and covenants, when obtained byforce, have intervened: for it is very probable, to any one that reads thestory of Ahaz and Hezekiah attentively, that the Assyrians subdued Ahaz, anddeposed him, and made Hezekiah king in his father’s lifetime; and thatHezekiah by agreement had done him homage, and paid him tribute all this time.

CHAPTER. XVII.

OF USURPATION.

Sect. 197. AS conquest may be called a foreign usurpation, so usurpation is akind of domestic conquest, with this difference, that an usurper can never haveright on his side, it being no usurpation, but where one is got into thepossession of what another has right to. This, so far as it is usurpation, is achange only of persons, but not of the forms and rules of the government: forif the usurper extend his power beyond what of right belonged to the lawfulprinces, or governors of the commonwealth, it is tyranny added to usurpation.

Sect. 198. In all lawful governments, the designation of the persons, who areto bear rule, is as natural and necessary a part as the form of the governmentitself, and is that which had its establishment originally from the people; theanarchy being much alike, to have no form of government at all; or to agree,that it shall be monarchical, but to appoint no way to design the person thatshall have the power, and be the monarch. Hence all commonwealths, with theform of government established, have rules also of appointing those who are tohave any share in the public authority, and settled methods of conveying theright to them: for the anarchy is much alike, to have no form of government atall; or to agree that it shall be monarchical, but to appoint no way to know ordesign the person that shall have the power, and be the monarch. Whoever getsinto the exercise of any part of the power, by other ways than what the laws ofthe community have prescribed, hath no right to be obeyed, though the form ofthe commonwealth be still preserved; since he is not the person the laws haveappointed, and consequently not the person the people have consented to. Norcan such an usurper, or any deriving from him, ever have a title, till thepeople are both at liberty to consent, and have actually consented to allow,and confirm in him the power he hath till then usurped.

CHAPTER. XVIII.

OF TYRANNY.

Sect. 199. AS usurpation is the exercise of power, which another hath a rightto; so tyranny is the exercise of power beyond right, which no body can have aright to. And this is making use of the power any one has in his hands, not forthe good of those who are under it, but for his own private separate advantage.When the governor, however intitled, makes not the law, but his will, the rule;and his commands and actions are not directed to the preservation of theproperties of his people, but the satisfaction of his own ambition, revenge,covetousness, or any other irregular passion.

Sect. 200. If one can doubt this to be truth, or reason, because it comes fromthe obscure hand of a subject, I hope the authority of a king will make it passwith him. King James the first, in his speech to the parliament, 1603, tellsthem thus,

I will ever prefer the weal of the public, and of the whole commonwealth, inmaking of good laws and constitutions, to any particular and private ends ofmine; thinking ever the wealth and weal of the commonwealth to be my greatestweal and worldly felicity; a point wherein a lawful king doth directly differfrom a tyrant: for I do acknowledge, that the special and greatest point ofdifference that is between a rightful king and an usurping tyrant, is this,that whereas the proud and ambitious tyrant doth think his kingdom and peopleare only ordained for satisfaction of his desires and unreasonable appetites,the righteous and just king doth by the contrary acknowledge himself to beordained for the procuring of the wealth and property of his people.

And again, in his speech to the parliament, 1609, he hath these words:

The king binds himself by a double oath, to the observation of the fundamentallaws of his kingdom; tacitly, as by being a king, and so bound to protect aswell the people, as the laws of his kingdom; and expressly, by his oath at hiscoronation, so as every just king, in a settled kingdom, is bound to observethat paction made to his people, by his laws, in framing his governmentagreeable thereunto, according to that paction which God made with Noah afterthe deluge. Hereafter, seed-time and harvest, and cold and heat, and summer andwinter, and day and night, shall not cease while the earth remaineth. Andtherefore a king governing in a settled kingdom, leaves to be a king, anddegenerates into a tyrant, as soon as he leaves off to rule according to hislaws.

And a little after,

Therefore all kings that are not tyrants, or perjured, will be glad to boundthemselves within the limits of their laws; and they that persuade them thecontrary, are vipers, and pests both against them and the commonwealth.

Thus that learned king, who well understood the notion of things, makes thedifference betwixt a king and a tyrant to consist only in this, that one makesthe laws the bounds of his power, and the good of the public, the end of hisgovernment; the other makes all give way to his own will and appetite.

Sect. 201. It is a mistake, to think this fault is proper only to monarchies;other forms of government are liable to it, as well as that: for wherever thepower, that is put in any hands for the government of the people, and thepreservation of their properties, is applied to other ends, and made use of toimpoverish, harass, or subdue them to the arbitrary and irregular commands ofthose that have it; there it presently becomes tyranny, whether those that thususe it are one or many. Thus we read of the thirty tyrants at Athens, as wellas one at Syracuse; and the intolerable dominion of the Decemviri at Rome wasnothing better.

Sect. 202. Where-ever law ends, tyranny begins, if the law be transgressed toanother’s harm; and whosoever in authority exceeds the power given him bythe law, and makes use of the force he has under his command, to compass thatupon the subject, which the law allows not, ceases in that to be a magistrate;and, acting without authority, may be opposed, as any other man, who by forceinvades the right of another. This is acknowledged in subordinate magistrates.He that hath authority to seize my person in the street, may be opposed as athief and a robber, if he endeavours to break into my house to execute a writ,notwithstanding that I know he has such a warrant, and such a legal authority,as will impower him to arrest me abroad. And why this should not hold in thehighest, as well as in the most inferior magistrate, I would gladly beinformed. Is it reasonable, that the eldest brother, because he has thegreatest part of his father’s estate, should thereby have a right to takeaway any of his younger brothers portions? or that a rich man, who possessed awhole country, should from thence have a right to seize, when he pleased, thecottage and garden of his poor neighbour? The being rightfully possessed ofgreat power and riches, exceedingly beyond the greatest part of the sons ofAdam, is so far from being an excuse, much less a reason, for rapine andoppression, which the endamaging another without authority is, that it is agreat aggravation of it: for the exceeding the bounds of authority is no more aright in a great, than in a petty officer; no more justifiable in a king than aconstable; but is so much the worse in him, in that he has more trust put inhim, has already a much greater share than the rest of his brethren, and issupposed, from the advantages of his education, employment, and counsellors, tobe more knowing in the measures of right and wrong.

Sect. 203. May the commands then of a prince be opposed? may he be resisted asoften as any one shall find himself aggrieved, and but imagine he has not rightdone him? This will unhinge and overturn all polities, and, instead ofgovernment and order, leave nothing but anarchy and confusion.

Sect. 204. To this I answer, that force is to be opposed to nothing, but tounjust and unlawful force; whoever makes any opposition in any other case,draws on himself a just condemnation both from God and man; and so no suchdanger or confusion will follow, as is often suggested: for,

Sect. 205. First, As, in some countries, the person of the prince by the law issacred; and so, whatever he commands or does, his person is still free from allquestion or violence, not liable to force, or any judicial censure orcondemnation. But yet opposition may be made to the illegal acts of anyinferior officer, or other commissioned by him; unless he will, by actuallyputting himself into a state of war with his people, dissolve the government,and leave them to that defence which belongs to every one in the state ofnature: for of such things who can tell what the end will be? and a neighbourkingdom has shewed the world an odd example. In all other cases the sacrednessof the person exempts him from all inconveniencies, whereby he is secure,whilst the government stands, from all violence and harm whatsoever; than whichthere cannot be a wiser constitution: for the harm he can do in his own personnot being likely to happen often, nor to extend itself far; nor being able byhis single strength to subvert the laws, nor oppress the body of the people,should any prince have so much weakness, and ill nature as to be willing to doit, the inconveniency of some particular mischiefs, that may happen sometimes,when a heady prince comes to the throne, are well recompensed by the peace ofthe public, and security of the government, in the person of the chiefmagistrate, thus set out of the reach of danger: it being safer for the body,that some few private men should be sometimes in danger to suffer, than thatthe head of the republic should be easily, and upon slight occasions, exposed.

Sect. 206. Secondly, But this privilege, belonging only to the king’sperson, hinders not, but they may be questioned, opposed, and resisted, who useunjust force, though they pretend a commission from him, which the lawauthorizes not; as is plain in the case of him that has the king’s writto arrest a man, which is a full commission from the king; and yet he that hasit cannot break open a man’s house to do it, nor execute this command ofthe king upon certain days, nor in certain places, though this commission haveno such exception in it; but they are the limitations of the law, which if anyone transgress, the king’s commission excuses him not: for theking’s authority being given him only by the law, he cannot impower anyone to act against the law, or justify him, by his commission, in so doing; thecommission, or command of any magistrate, where he has no authority, being asvoid and insignificant, as that of any private man; the difference between theone and the other, being that the magistrate has some authority so far, and tosuch ends, and the private man has none at all: for it is not the commission,but the authority, that gives the right of acting; and against the laws therecan be no authority. But, notwithstanding such resistance, the king’sperson and authority are still both secured, and so no danger to governor orgovernment.

Sect. 207. Thirdly, Supposing a government wherein the person of the chiefmagistrate is not thus sacred; yet this doctrine of the lawfulness of resistingall unlawful exercises of his power, will not upon every slight occasionindanger him, or imbroil the government: for where the injured party may berelieved, and his damages repaired by appeal to the law, there can be nopretence for force, which is only to be used where a man is intercepted fromappealing to the law: for nothing is to be accounted hostile force, but whereit leaves not the remedy of such an appeal; and it is such force alone, thatputs him that uses it into a state of war, and makes it lawful to resist him. Aman with a sword in his hand demands my purse in the high-way, when perhaps Ihave not twelve pence in my pocket: this man I may lawfully kill. To another Ideliver 100 pounds to hold only whilst I alight, which he refuses to restoreme, when I am got up again, but draws his sword to defend the possession of itby force, if I endeavour to retake it. The mischief this man does me is ahundred, or possibly a thousand times more than the other perhaps intended me(whom I killed before he really did me any); and yet I might lawfully kill theone, and cannot so much as hurt the other lawfully. The reason whereof isplain; because the one using force, which threatened my life, I could not havetime to appeal to the law to secure it: and when it was gone, it was too lateto appeal. The law could not restore life to my dead carcass: the loss wasirreparable; which to prevent, the law of nature gave me a right to destroyhim, who had put himself into a state of war with me, and threatened mydestruction. But in the other case, my life not being in danger, I may have thebenefit of appealing to the law, and have reparation for my 100 pounds thatway.

Sect. 208. Fourthly, But if the unlawful acts done by the magistrate bemaintained (by the power he has got), and the remedy which is due by law, be bythe same power obstructed; yet the right of resisting, even in such manifestacts of tyranny, will not suddenly, or on slight occasions, disturb thegovernment: for if it reach no farther than some private men’s cases,though they have a right to defend themselves, and to recover by force what byunlawful force is taken from them; yet the right to do so will not easilyengage them in a contest, wherein they are sure to perish; it being asimpossible for one, or a few oppressed men to disturb the government, where thebody of the people do not think themselves concerned in it, as for a ravingmad-man, or heady malcontent to overturn a well settled state; the people beingas little apt to follow the one, as the other.

Sect. 209. But if either these illegal acts have extended to the majority ofthe people; or if the mischief and oppression has lighted only on some few, butin such cases, as the precedent, and consequences seem to threaten all; andthey are persuaded in their consciences, that their laws, and with them theirestates, liberties, and lives are in danger, and perhaps their religion too;how they will be hindered from resisting illegal force, used against them, Icannot tell. This is an inconvenience, I confess, that attends all governmentswhatsoever, when the governors have brought it to this pass, to be generallysuspected of their people; the most dangerous state which they can possibly putthemselves in, wherein they are the less to be pitied, because it is so easy tobe avoided; it being as impossible for a governor, if he really means the goodof his people, and the preservation of them, and their laws together, not tomake them see and feel it, as it is for the father of a family, not to let hischildren see he loves, and takes care of them.

Sect. 210. But if all the world shall observe pretences of one kind, andactions of another; arts used to elude the law, and the trust of prerogative(which is an arbitrary power in some things left in the prince’s hand todo good, not harm to the people) employed contrary to the end for which it wasgiven: if the people shall find the ministers and subordinate magistrateschosen suitable to such ends, and favoured, or laid by, proportionably as theypromote or oppose them: if they see several experiments made of arbitrarypower, and that religion underhand favoured, (tho’ publicly proclaimedagainst) which is readiest to introduce it; and the operators in it supported,as much as may be; and when that cannot be done, yet approved still, and likedthe better: if a long train of actions shew the councils all tending that way;how can a man any more hinder himself from being persuaded in his own mind,which way things are going; or from casting about how to save himself, than hecould from believing the captain of the ship he was in, was carrying him, andthe rest of the company, to Algiers, when he found him always steering thatcourse, though cross winds, leaks in his ship, and want of men and provisionsdid often force him to turn his course another way for some time, which hesteadily returned to again, as soon as the wind, weather, and othercircumstances would let him?

CHAPTER. XIX.

OF THE DISSOLUTION OF GOVERNMENT.

Sect. 211. HE that will with any clearness speak of the dissolution ofgovernment, ought in the first place to distinguish between the dissolution ofthe society and the dissolution of the government. That which makes thecommunity, and brings men out of the loose state of nature, into one politicsociety, is the agreement which every one has with the rest to incorporate, andact as one body, and so be one distinct commonwealth. The usual, and almostonly way whereby this union is dissolved, is the inroad of foreign force makinga conquest upon them: for in that case, (not being able to maintain and supportthemselves, as one intire and independent body) the union belonging to thatbody which consisted therein, must necessarily cease, and so every one returnto the state he was in before, with a liberty to shift for himself, and providefor his own safety, as he thinks fit, in some other society. Whenever thesociety is dissolved, it is certain the government of that society cannotremain. Thus conquerors swords often cut up governments by the roots, andmangle societies to pieces, separating the subdued or scattered multitude fromthe protection of, and dependence on, that society which ought to havepreserved them from violence. The world is too well instructed in, and tooforward to allow of, this way of dissolving of governments, to need any more tobe said of it; and there wants not much argument to prove, that where thesociety is dissolved, the government cannot remain; that being as impossible,as for the frame of an house to subsist when the materials of it are scatteredand dissipated by a whirl-wind, or jumbled into a confused heap by anearthquake.

Sect. 212. Besides this over-turning from without, governments are dissolvedfrom within.

First, When the legislative is altered. Civil society being a state of peace,amongst those who are of it, from whom the state of war is excluded by theumpirage, which they have provided in their legislative, for the ending alldifferences that may arise amongst any of them, it is in their legislative,that the members of a commonwealth are united, and combined together into onecoherent living body. This is the soul that gives form, life, and unity, to thecommonwealth: from hence the several members have their mutual influence,sympathy, and connexion: and therefore, when the legislative is broken, ordissolved, dissolution and death follows: for the essence and union of thesociety consisting in having one will, the legislative, when once establishedby the majority, has the declaring, and as it were keeping of that will. Theconstitution of the legislative is the first and fundamental act of society,whereby provision is made for the continuation of their union, under thedirection of persons, and bonds of laws, made by persons authorized thereunto,by the consent and appointment of the people, without which no one man, ornumber of men, amongst them, can have authority of making laws that shall bebinding to the rest. When any one, or more, shall take upon them to make laws,whom the people have not appointed so to do, they make laws without authority,which the people are not therefore bound to obey; by which means they comeagain to be out of subjection, and may constitute to themselves a newlegislative, as they think best, being in full liberty to resist the force ofthose, who without authority would impose any thing upon them. Every one is atthe disposure of his own will, when those who had, by the delegation of thesociety, the declaring of the public will, are excluded from it, and othersusurp the place, who have no such authority or delegation.

Sect. 213. This being usually brought about by such in the commonwealth whomisuse the power they have; it is hard to consider it aright, and know at whosedoor to lay it, without knowing the form of government in which it happens. Letus suppose then the legislative placed in the concurrence of three distinctpersons.

(1). A single hereditary person, having the constant, supreme, executivepower, and with it the power of convoking and dissolving the other two withincertain periods of time.

(2). An assembly of hereditary nobility.

(3). An assembly of representatives chosen, pro tempore, by the people.Such a form of government supposed, it is evident,

Sect. 214. First, That when such a single person, or prince, sets up his ownarbitrary will in place of the laws, which are the will of the society,declared by the legislative, then the legislative is changed: for that being ineffect the legislative, whose rules and laws are put in execution, and requiredto be obeyed; when other laws are set up, and other rules pretended, andinforced, than what the legislative, constituted by the society, have enacted,it is plain that the legislative is changed. Whoever introduces new laws, notbeing thereunto authorized by the fundamental appointment of the society, orsubverts the old, disowns and overturns the power by which they were made, andso sets up a new legislative.

Sect. 215. Secondly, When the prince hinders the legislative from assembling inits due time, or from acting freely, pursuant to those ends for which it wasconstituted, the legislative is altered: for it is not a certain number of men,no, nor their meeting, unless they have also freedom of debating, and leisureof perfecting, what is for the good of the society, wherein the legislativeconsists: when these are taken away or altered, so as to deprive the society ofthe due exercise of their power, the legislative is truly altered; for it isnot names that constitute governments, but the use and exercise of those powersthat were intended to accompany them; so that he, who takes away the freedom,or hinders the acting of the legislative in its due seasons, in effect takesaway the legislative, and puts an end to the government.

Sect. 216. Thirdly, When, by the arbitrary power of the prince, the electors,or ways of election, are altered, without the consent, and contrary to thecommon interest of the people, there also the legislative is altered: for, ifothers than those whom the society hath authorized thereunto, do chuse, or inanother way than what the society hath prescribed, those chosen are not thelegislative appointed by the people.

Sect. 217. Fourthly, The delivery also of the people into the subjection of aforeign power, either by the prince, or by the legislative, is certainly achange of the legislative, and so a dissolution of the government: for the endwhy people entered into society being to be preserved one intire, free,independent society, to be governed by its own laws; this is lost, wheneverthey are given up into the power of another.

Sect. 218. Why, in such a constitution as this, the dissolution of thegovernment in these cases is to be imputed to the prince, is evident; becausehe, having the force, treasure and offices of the state to employ, and oftenpersuading himself, or being flattered by others, that as supreme magistrate heis uncapable of controul; he alone is in a condition to make great advancestoward such changes, under pretence of lawful authority, and has it in hishands to terrify or suppress opposers, as factious, seditious, and enemies tothe government: whereas no other part of the legislative, or people, is capableby themselves to attempt any alteration of the legislative, without open andvisible rebellion, apt enough to be taken notice of, which, when it prevails,produces effects very little different from foreign conquest. Besides, theprince in such a form of government, having the power of dissolving the otherparts of the legislative, and thereby rendering them private persons, they cannever in opposition to him, or without his concurrence, alter the legislativeby a law, his consent being necessary to give any of their decrees thatsanction. But yet, so far as the other parts of the legislative any waycontribute to any attempt upon the government, and do either promote, or not,what lies in them, hinder such designs, they are guilty, and partake in this,which is certainly the greatest crime which men can partake of one towardsanother.

Sec. 219.There is one way more whereby such a government may be dissolved, andthat is: When he who has the supreme executive power, neglects and abandonsthat charge, so that the laws already made can no longer be put in execution.This is demonstratively to reduce all to anarchy, and so effectually todissolve the government: for laws not being made for themselves, but to be, bytheir execution, the bonds of the society, to keep every part of the bodypolitic in its due place and function; when that totally ceases, the governmentvisibly ceases, and the people become a confused multitude, without order orconnexion. Where there is no longer the administration of justice, for thesecuring of men’s rights, nor any remaining power within the community todirect the force, or provide for the necessities of the public, there certainlyis no government left. Where the laws cannot be executed, it is all one as ifthere were no laws; and a government without laws is, I suppose, a mystery inpolitics, unconceivable to human capacity, and inconsistent with human society.

Sect. 220. In these and the like cases, when the government is dissolved, thepeople are at liberty to provide for themselves, by erecting a new legislative,differing from the other, by the change of persons, or form, or both, as theyshall find it most for their safety and good: for the society can never, by thefault of another, lose the native and original right it has to preserve itself,which can only be done by a settled legislative, and a fair and impartialexecution of the laws made by it. But the state of mankind is not so miserablethat they are not capable of using this remedy, till it be too late to look forany. To tell people they may provide for themselves, by erecting a newlegislative, when by oppression, artifice, or being delivered over to a foreignpower, their old one is gone, is only to tell them, they may expect relief whenit is too late, and the evil is past cure. This is in effect no more than tobid them first be slaves, and then to take care of their liberty; and whentheir chains are on, tell them, they may act like freemen. This, if barely so,is rather mockery than relief; and men can never be secure from tyranny, ifthere be no means to escape it till they are perfectly under it: and thereforeit is, that they have not only a right to get out of it, but to prevent it.

Sect. 221. There is therefore, secondly, another way whereby governments aredissolved, and that is, when the legislative, or the prince, either of them,act contrary to their trust.

First, The legislative acts against the trust reposed in them, when theyendeavour to invade the property of the subject, and to make themselves, or anypart of the community, masters, or arbitrary disposers of the lives, liberties,or fortunes of the people.

Sect. 222. The reason why men enter into society, is the preservation of theirproperty; and the end why they chuse and authorize a legislative, is, thatthere may be laws made, and rules set, as guards and fences to the propertiesof all the members of the society, to limit the power, and moderate thedominion, of every part and member of the society: for since it can never besupposed to be the will of the society, that the legislative should have apower to destroy that which every one designs to secure, by entering intosociety, and for which the people submitted themselves to legislators of theirown making; whenever the legislators endeavour to take away, and destroy theproperty of the people, or to reduce them to slavery under arbitrary power,they put themselves into a state of war with the people, who are thereuponabsolved from any farther obedience, and are left to the common refuge, whichGod hath provided for all men, against force and violence. Whensoever thereforethe legislative shall transgress this fundamental rule of society; and eitherby ambition, fear, folly or corruption, endeavour to grasp themselves, or putinto the hands of any other, an absolute power over the lives, liberties, andestates of the people; by this breach of trust they forfeit the power thepeople had put into their hands for quite contrary ends, and it devolves to thepeople, who have a right to resume their original liberty, and, by theestablishment of a new legislative, (such as they shall think fit) provide fortheir own safety and security, which is the end for which they are in society.What I have said here, concerning the legislative in general, holds true alsoconcerning the supreme executor, who having a double trust put in him, both tohave a part in the legislative, and the supreme execution of the law, actsagainst both, when he goes about to set up his own arbitrary will as the law ofthe society. He acts also contrary to his trust, when he either employs theforce, treasure, and offices of the society, to corrupt the representatives,and gain them to his purposes; or openly preengages the electors, andprescribes to their choice, such, whom he has, by sollicitations, threats,promises, or otherwise, won to his designs; and employs them to bring in such,who have promised before-hand what to vote, and what to enact. Thus to regulatecandidates and electors, and new-model the ways of election, what is it but tocut up the government by the roots, and poison the very fountain of publicsecurity? for the people having reserved to themselves the choice of theirrepresentatives, as the fence to their properties, could do it for no otherend, but that they might always be freely chosen, and so chosen, freely act,and advise, as the necessity of the commonwealth, and the public good should,upon examination, and mature debate, be judged to require. This, those who givetheir votes before they hear the debate, and have weighed the reasons on allsides, are not capable of doing. To prepare such an assembly as this, andendeavour to set up the declared abettors of his own will, for the truerepresentatives of the people, and the law-makers of the society, is certainlyas great a breach of trust, and as perfect a declaration of a design to subvertthe government, as is possible to be met with. To which, if one shall addrewards and punishments visibly employed to the same end, and all the arts ofperverted law made use of, to take off and destroy all that stand in the way ofsuch a design, and will not comply and consent to betray the liberties of theircountry, it will be past doubt what is doing. What power they ought to have inthe society, who thus employ it contrary to the trust went along with it in itsfirst institution, is easy to determine; and one cannot but see, that he, whohas once attempted any such thing as this, cannot any longer be trusted.

Sect. 223. To this perhaps it will be said, that the people being ignorant, andalways discontented, to lay the foundation of government in the unsteadyopinion and uncertain humour of the people, is to expose it to certain ruin;and no government will be able long to subsist, if the people may set up a newlegislative, whenever they take offence at the old one. To this I answer, Quitethe contrary. People are not so easily got out of their old forms, as some areapt to suggest. They are hardly to be prevailed with to amend the acknowledgedfaults in the frame they have been accustomed to. And if there be any originaldefects, or adventitious ones introduced by time, or corruption; it is not aneasy thing to get them changed, even when all the world sees there is anopportunity for it. This slowness and aversion in the people to quit their oldconstitutions, has, in the many revolutions which have been seen in thiskingdom, in this and former ages, still kept us to, or, after some interval offruitless attempts, still brought us back again to our old legislative of king,lords and commons: and whatever provocations have made the crown be taken fromsome of our princes heads, they never carried the people so far as to place itin another line.

Sect. 224. But it will be said, this hypothesis lays a ferment for frequentrebellion. To which I answer,

First, No more than any other hypothesis: for when the people are mademiserable, and find themselves exposed to the ill usage of arbitrary power, cryup their governors, as much as you will, for sons of Jupiter; let them besacred and divine, descended, or authorized from heaven; give them out for whomor what you please, the same will happen. The people generally ill treated, andcontrary to right, will be ready upon any occasion to ease themselves of aburden that sits heavy upon them. They will wish, and seek for the opportunity,which in the change, weakness and accidents of human affairs, seldom delayslong to offer itself. He must have lived but a little while in the world, whohas not seen examples of this in his time; and he must have read very little,who cannot produce examples of it in all sorts of governments in the world.

Sect. 225. Secondly, I answer, such revolutions happen not upon every littlemismanagement in public affairs. Great mistakes in the ruling part, many wrongand inconvenient laws, and all the slips of human frailty, will be born by thepeople without mutiny or murmur. But if a long train of abuses, prevaricationsand artifices, all tending the same way, make the design visible to the people,and they cannot but feel what they lie under, and see whither they are going;it is not to be wondered, that they should then rouze themselves, and endeavourto put the rule into such hands which may secure to them the ends for whichgovernment was at first erected; and without which, ancient names, and speciousforms, are so far from being better, that they are much worse, than the stateof nature, or pure anarchy; the inconveniencies being all as great and as near,but the remedy farther off and more difficult.

Sect. 226. Thirdly, I answer, that this doctrine of a power in the people ofproviding for their safety a-new, by a new legislative, when their legislatorshave acted contrary to their trust, by invading their property, is the bestfence against rebellion, and the probablest means to hinder it: for rebellionbeing an opposition, not to persons, but authority, which is founded only inthe constitutions and laws of the government; those, whoever they be, who byforce break through, and by force justify their violation of them, are trulyand properly rebels: for when men, by entering into society andcivil-government, have excluded force, and introduced laws for the preservationof property, peace, and unity amongst themselves, those who set up force againin opposition to the laws, do rebellare, that is, bring back again the state ofwar, and are properly rebels: which they who are in power, (by the pretencethey have to authority, the temptation of force they have in their hands, andthe flattery of those about them) being likeliest to do; the properest way toprevent the evil, is to shew them the danger and injustice of it, who are underthe greatest temptation to run into it.

Sect. 227. In both the fore-mentioned cases, when either the legislative ischanged, or the legislators act contrary to the end for which they wereconstituted; those who are guilty are guilty of rebellion: for if any one byforce takes away the established legislative of any society, and the laws bythem made, pursuant to their trust, he thereby takes away the umpirage, whichevery one had consented to, for a peaceable decision of all theircontroversies, and a bar to the state of war amongst them. They, who remove, orchange the legislative, take away this decisive power, which no body can have,but by the appointment and consent of the people; and so destroying theauthority which the people did, and no body else can set up, and introducing apower which the people hath not authorized, they actually introduce a state ofwar, which is that of force without authority: and thus, by removing thelegislative established by the society, (in whose decisions the peopleacquiesced and united, as to that of their own will) they untie the knot, andexpose the people a-new to the state of war, And if those, who by force takeaway the legislative, are rebels, the legislators themselves, as has beenshewn, can be no less esteemed so; when they, who were set up for theprotection, and preservation of the people, their liberties and properties,shall by force invade and endeavour to take them away; and so they puttingthemselves into a state of war with those who made them the protectors andguardians of their peace, are properly, and with the greatest aggravation,rebellantes, rebels.

Sect. 228. But if they, who say it lays a foundation for rebellion, mean thatit may occasion civil wars, or intestine broils, to tell the people they areabsolved from obedience when illegal attempts are made upon their liberties orproperties, and may oppose the unlawful violence of those who were theirmagistrates, when they invade their properties contrary to the trust put inthem; and that therefore this doctrine is not to be allowed, being sodestructive to the peace of the world: they may as well say, upon the sameground, that honest men may not oppose robbers or pirates, because this mayoccasion disorder or bloodshed. If any mischief come in such cases, it is notto be charged upon him who defends his own right, but on him that invades hisneighbours. If the innocent honest man must quietly quit all he has, for peacesake, to him who will lay violent hands upon it, I desire it may be considered,what a kind of peace there will be in the world, which consists only inviolence and rapine; and which is to be maintained only for the benefit ofrobbers and oppressors. Who would not think it an admirable peace betwix themighty and the mean, when the lamb, without resistance, yielded his throat tobe torn by the imperious wolf? Polyphemus’s den gives us a perfectpattern of such a peace, and such a government, wherein Ulysses and hiscompanions had nothing to do, but quietly to suffer themselves to be devoured.And no doubt Ulysses, who was a prudent man, preached up passive obedience, andexhorted them to a quiet submission, by representing to them of whatconcernment peace was to mankind; and by shewing the inconveniences mighthappen, if they should offer to resist Polyphemus, who had now the power overthem.

Sect. 229. The end of government is the good of mankind; and which is best formankind, that the people should be always exposed to the boundless will oftyranny, or that the rulers should be sometimes liable to be opposed, when theygrow exorbitant in the use of their power, and employ it for the destruction,and not the preservation of the properties of their people?

Sect. 230. Nor let any one say, that mischief can arise from hence, as often asit shall please a busy head, or turbulent spirit, to desire the alteration ofthe government. It is true, such men may stir, whenever they please; but itwill be only to their own just ruin and perdition: for till the mischief begrown general, and the ill designs of the rulers become visible, or theirattempts sensible to the greater part, the people, who are more disposed tosuffer than right themselves by resistance, are not apt to stir. The examplesof particular injustice, or oppression of here and there an unfortunate man,moves them not. But if they universally have a persuation, grounded uponmanifest evidence, that designs are carrying on against their liberties, andthe general course and tendency of things cannot but give them strongsuspicions of the evil intention of their governors, who is to be blamed forit? Who can help it, if they, who might avoid it, bring themselves into thissuspicion? Are the people to be blamed, if they have the sense of rationalcreatures, and can think of things no otherwise than as they find and feelthem? And is it not rather their fault, who put things into such a posture,that they would not have them thought to be as they are? I grant, that thepride, ambition, and turbulency of private men have sometimes caused greatdisorders in commonwealths, and factions have been fatal to states andkingdoms. But whether the mischief hath oftener begun in the peopleswantonness, and a desire to cast off the lawful authority of their rulers, orin the rulers insolence, and endeavours to get and exercise an arbitrary powerover their people; whether oppression, or disobedience, gave the first rise tothe disorder, I leave it to impartial history to determine. This I am sure,whoever, either ruler or subject, by force goes about to invade the rights ofeither prince or people, and lays the foundation for overturning theconstitution and frame of any just government, is highly guilty of the greatestcrime, I think, a man is capable of, being to answer for all those mischiefs ofblood, rapine, and desolation, which the breaking to pieces of governmentsbring on a country. And he who does it, is justly to be esteemed the commonenemy and pest of mankind, and is to be treated accordingly.

Sect. 231. That subjects or foreigners, attempting by force on the propertiesof any people, may be resisted with force, is agreed on all hands. But thatmagistrates, doing the same thing, may be resisted, hath of late been denied:as if those who had the greatest privileges and advantages by the law, hadthereby a power to break those laws, by which alone they were set in a betterplace than their brethren: whereas their offence is thereby the greater, bothas being ungrateful for the greater share they have by the law, and breakingalso that trust, which is put into their hands by their brethren.

Sect. 232. Whosoever uses force without right, as every one does in society,who does it without law, puts himself into a state of war with those againstwhom he so uses it; and in that state all former ties are cancelled, all otherrights cease, and every one has a right to defend himself, and to resist theaggressor. This is so evident, that Barclay himself, that great assertor of thepower and sacredness of kings, is forced to confess, That it is lawful for thepeople, in some cases, to resist their king; and that too in a chapter, whereinhe pretends to shew, that the divine law shuts up the people from all manner ofrebellion. Whereby it is evident, even by his own doctrine, that, since theymay in some cases resist, all resisting of princes is not rebellion. His wordsare these. Quod siquis dicat, Ergone populus tyrannicae crudelitati &furori jugulum semper praebebit? Ergone multitude civitates suas fame, ferro,& flamma vastari, seque, conjuges, & liberos fortunae ludibrio &tyranni libidini exponi, inque omnia vitae pericula omnesque miserias &molestias a rege deduci patientur? Num illis quod omni animantium generi est anatura tributum, denegari debet, ut sc. vim vi repellant, seseq; ab injuria,tueantur? Huic breviter responsum sit, Populo universo negari defensionem, quaejuris naturalis est, neque ultionem quae praeter naturam est adversus regemconcedi debere. Quapropter si rex non in singulares tantum personas aliquotprivatum odium exerceat, sed corpus etiam reipublicae, cujus ipse caput est,i.e. totum populum, vel insignem aliquam ejus partem immani & intolerandasaevitia seu tyrannide divexet; populo, quidem hoc casu resistendi ac tuendi seab injuria potestas competit, sed tuendi se tantum, non enim in principeminvadendi: & restituendae injuriae illatae, non recedendi a debitareverentia propter acceptam injuriam. Praesentem denique impetum propulsandinon vim praeteritam ulciscenti jus habet. Horum enim alterum a natura est, utvitam scilicet corpusque tueamur. Alterum vero contra naturam, ut inferior desuperiori supplicium sumat. Quod itaque populus malum, antequam factum sit,impedire potest, ne fiat, id postquam factum est, in regem authorem scelerisvindicare non potest: populus igitur hoc amplius quam privatus quispiam habet:quod huic, vel ipsis adversariis judicibus, excepto Buchanano, nullum nisi inpatientia remedium superest. Cum ille si intolerabilis tyrannus est (modicumenim ferre omnino debet) resistere cum reverentia possit, Barclay contraMonarchom. 1. iii. c. 8.

In English thus:

Sect. 233. But if any one should ask, Must the people then always laythemselves open to the cruelty and rage of tyranny? Must they see their citiespillaged, and laid in ashes, their wives and children exposed to thetyrant’s lust and fury, and themselves and families reduced by their kingto ruin, and all the miseries of want and oppression, and yet sit still? Mustmen alone be debarred the common privilege of opposing force with force, whichnature allows so freely to all other creatures for their preservation frominjury? I answer: Self-defence is a part of the law of nature; nor can it bedenied the community, even against the king himself: but to revenge themselvesupon him, must by no means be allowed them; it being not agreeable to that law.Wherefore if the king shall shew an hatred, not only to some particularpersons, but sets himself against the body of the commonwealth, whereof he isthe head, and shall, with intolerable ill usage, cruelly tyrannize over thewhole, or a considerable part of the people, in this case the people have aright to resist and defend themselves from injury: but it must be with thiscaution, that they only defend themselves, but do not attack their prince: theymay repair the damages received, but must not for any provocation exceed thebounds of due reverence and respect. They may repulse the present attempt, butmust not revenge past violences: for it is natural for us to defend life andlimb, but that an inferior should punish a superior, is against nature. Themischief which is designed them, the people may prevent before it be done; butwhen it is done, they must not revenge it on the king, though author of thevillany. This therefore is the privilege of the people in general, above whatany private person hath; that particular men are allowed by our adversariesthemselves (Buchanan only excepted) to have no other remedy but patience; butthe body of the people may with respect resist intolerable tyranny; for when itis but moderate, they ought to endure it.

Sect. 234. Thus far that great advocate of monarchical power allows ofresistance.

Sect. 235. It is true, he has annexed two limitations to it, to no purpose:

First, He says, it must be with reverence.

Secondly, It must be without retribution, or punishment; and the reason hegives is, because an inferior cannot punish a superior. First, How to resistforce without striking again, or how to strike with reverence, will need someskill to make intelligible. He that shall oppose an assault only with a shieldto receive the blows, or in any more respectful posture, without a sword in hishand, to abate the confidence and force of the assailant, will quickly be at anend of his resistance, and will find such a defence serve only to draw onhimself the worse usage. This is as ridiculous a way of resisting, as juvenalthought it of fighting; ubi tu pulsas, ego vapulo tantum. And the success ofthe combat will be unavoidably the same he there describes it:

This will always be the event of such an imaginary resistance, where men maynot strike again. He therefore who may resist, must be allowed to strike. Andthen let our author, or any body else, join a knock on the head, or a cut onthe face, with as much reverence and respect as he thinks fit. He that canreconcile blows and reverence, may, for aught I know, desire for his pains, acivil, respectful cudgeling where-ever he can meet with it.

Secondly, As to his second, An inferior cannot punish a superior; that is true,generally speaking, whilst he is his superior. But to resist force with force,being the state of war that levels the parties, cancels all former relation ofreverence, respect, and superiority: and then the odds that remains, is, thathe, who opposes the unjust agressor, has this superiority over him, that he hasa right, when he prevails, to punish the offender, both for the breach of thepeace, and all the evils that followed upon it. Barclay therefore, in anotherplace, more coherently to himself, denies it to be lawful to resist a king inany case. But he there assigns two cases, whereby a king may un-king himself.His words are,

Quid ergo, nulline casus incidere possunt quibus populo sese erigere atque inregem impotentius dominantem arma capere & invadere jure suo suaqueauthoritate liceat? Nulli certe quamdiu rex manet. Semper enim ex divinis idobstat, Regem honorificato; & qui potestati resistit, Dei ordinationiresisit: non alias igitur in eum populo potestas est quam si id committatpropter quod ipso jure rex esse desinat. Tunc enim se ipse principatu exuitatque in privatis constituit liber: hoc modo populus & superior efficitur,reverso ad eum sc. jure illo quod ante regem inauguratum in interregno habuit.At sunt paucorum generum commissa ejusmodi quae hunc effectum pariunt. At egocum plurima animo perlustrem, duo tantum invenio, duos, inquam, casus quibusrex ipso facto ex rege non regem se facit & omni honore & dignitateregali atque in subditos potestate destituit; quorum etiam meminit Winzerus.Horum unus est, Si regnum disperdat, quemadmodum de Nerone fertur, quod isnempe senatum populumque Romanum, atque adeo urbem ipsam ferro flammaquevastare, ac novas sibi sedes quaerere decrevisset. Et de Caligula, quod palamdenunciarit se neque civem neque principem senatui amplius fore, inque animohabuerit interempto utriusque ordinis electissimo quoque Alexandriamcommigrare, ac ut populum uno ictu interimeret, unam ei cervicem optavit. Taliacum rex aliquis meditator & molitur serio, omnem regnandi curam &animum ilico abjicit, ac proinde imperium in subditos amittit, ut dominus servipro derelicto habiti dominium.

Sect. 236. Alter casus est, Si rex in alicujus clientelam se contulit, acregnum quod liberum a majoribus & populo traditum accepit, alienae ditionimancipavit. Nam tunc quamvis forte non ea mente id agit populo plane utincommodet: tamen quia quod praecipuum est regiae dignitatis amifit, ut summusscilicet in regno secundum Deum sit, & solo Deo inferior, atque populumetiam totum ignorantem vel invitum, cujus libertatem sartam & tectamconservare debuit, in alterius gentis ditionem & potestatem dedidit; hacvelut quadam regni ab alienatione effecit, ut nec quod ipse in regno imperiumhabuit retineat, nec in eum cui collatum voluit, juris quicquam transferat;atque ita eo facto liberum jam & suae potestatis populum relinquit, cujusrei exemplum unum annales Scotici suppeditant. Barclay contra Monarchom. 1.iii. c. 16.

Which in English runs thus:

Sect. 237. What then, can there no case happen wherein the people may of right,and by their own authority, help themselves, take arms, and set upon theirking, imperiously domineering over them? None at all, whilst he remains a king.Honour the king, and he that resists the power, resists the ordinance of God;are divine oracles that will never permit it, The people therefore can nevercome by a power over him, unless he does something that makes him cease to be aking: for then he divests himself of his crown and dignity, and returns to thestate of a private man, and the people become free and superior, the powerwhich they had in the interregnum, before they crowned him king, devolving tothem again. But there are but few miscarriages which bring the matter to thisstate. After considering it well on all sides, I can find but two. Two casesthere are, I say, whereby a king, ipso facto, becomes no king, and loses allpower and regal authority over his people; which are also taken notice of byWinzerus.

The first is, If he endeavour to overturn the government, that is, if he have apurpose and design to ruin the kingdom and commonwealth, as it is recorded ofNero, that he resolved to cut off the senate and people of Rome, lay the citywaste with fire and sword, and then remove to some other place. And ofCaligula, that he openly declared, that he would be no longer a head to thepeople or senate, and that he had it in his thoughts to cut off the worthiestmen of both ranks, and then retire to Alexandria: and he wisht that the peoplehad but one neck, that he might dispatch them all at a blow, Such designs asthese, when any king harbours in his thoughts, and seriously promotes, heimmediately gives up all care and thought of the commonwealth; and consequentlyforfeits the power of governing his subjects, as a master does the dominionover his slaves whom he hath abandoned.

Sect. 238. The other case is, When a king makes himself the dependent ofanother, and subjects his kingdom which his ancestors left him, and the peopleput free into his hands, to the dominion of another: for however perhaps it maynot be his intention to prejudice the people; yet because he has hereby lostthe principal part of regal dignity, viz. to be next and immediately under God,supreme in his kingdom; and also because he betrayed or forced his people,whose liberty he ought to have carefully preserved, into the power and dominionof a foreign nation. By this, as it were, alienation of his kingdom, he himselfloses the power he had in it before, without transferring any the least rightto those on whom he would have bestowed it; and so by this act sets the peoplefree, and leaves them at their own disposal. One example of this is to be foundin the Scotch Annals.

Sect. 239. In these cases Barclay, the great champion of absolute monarchy, isforced to allow, that a king may be resisted, and ceases to be a king. That is,in short, not to multiply cases, in whatsoever he has no authority, there he isno king, and may be resisted: for wheresoever the authority ceases, the kingceases too, and becomes like other men who have no authority. And these twocases he instances in, differ little from those above mentioned, to bedestructive to governments, only that he has omitted the principle from whichhis doctrine flows: and that is, the breach of trust, in not preserving theform of government agreed on, and in not intending the end of governmentitself, which is the public good and preservation of property. When a king hasdethroned himself, and put himself in a state of war with his people, whatshall hinder them from prosecuting him who is no king, as they would any otherman, who has put himself into a state of war with them, Barclay, and those ofhis opinion, would do well to tell us. This farther I desire may be takennotice of out of Barclay, that he says, The mischief that is designed them, thepeople may prevent before it be done: whereby he allows resistance when tyrannyis but in design. Such designs as these (says he) when any king harbours in histhoughts and seriously promotes, he immediately gives up all care and thoughtof the commonwealth; so that, according to him, the neglect of the public goodis to be taken as an evidence of such design, or at least for a sufficientcause of resistance. And the reason of all, he gives in these words, Because hebetrayed or forced his people, whose liberty he ought carefully to havepreserved. What he adds, into the power and dominion of a foreign nation,signifies nothing, the fault and forfeiture lying in the loss of their liberty,which he ought to have preserved, and not in any distinction of the persons towhose dominion they were subjected. The peoples right is equally invaded, andtheir liberty lost, whether they are made slaves to any of their own, or aforeign nation; and in this lies the injury, and against this only have theythe right of defence. And there are instances to be found in all countries,which shew, that it is not the change of nations in the persons of theirgovernors, but the change of government, that gives the offence. Bilson, abishop of our church, and a great stickler for the power and prerogative ofprinces, does, if I mistake not, in his treatise of Christian subjection,acknowledge, that princes may forfeit their power, and their title to theobedience of their subjects; and if there needed authority in a case wherereason is so plain, I could send my reader to Bracton, Fortescue, and theauthor of the Mirrour, and others, writers that cannot be suspected to beignorant of our government, or enemies to it. But I thought Hooker alone mightbe enough to satisfy those men, who relying on him for their ecclesiasticalpolity, are by a strange fate carried to deny those principles upon which hebuilds it. Whether they are herein made the tools of cunninger workmen, to pulldown their own fabric, they were best look. This I am sure, their civil policyis so new, so dangerous, and so destructive to both rulers and people, that asformer ages never could bear the broaching of it; so it may be hoped, those tocome, redeemed from the impositions of these Egyptian under-task-masters, willabhor the memory of such servile flatterers, who, whilst it seemed to servetheir turn, resolved all government into absolute tyranny, and would have allmen born to, what their mean souls fitted them for, slavery.

Sect. 240. Here, it is like, the common question will be made, Who shall bejudge, whether the prince or legislative act contrary to their trust? This,perhaps, ill-affected and factious men may spread amongst the people, when theprince only makes use of his due prerogative. To this I reply, The people shallbe judge; for who shall be judge whether his trustee or deputy acts well, andaccording to the trust reposed in him, but he who deputes him, and must, byhaving deputed him, have still a power to discard him, when he fails in histrust? If this be reasonable in particular cases of private men, why should itbe otherwise in that of the greatest moment, where the welfare of millions isconcerned, and also where the evil, if not prevented, is greater, and theredress very difficult, dear, and dangerous?

Sect. 241. But farther, this question, (Who shall be judge?) cannot mean, thatthere is no judge at all: for where there is no judicature on earth, to decidecontroversies amongst men, God in heaven is judge. He alone, it is true, isjudge of the right. But every man is judge for himself, as in all other cases,so in this, whether another hath put himself into a state of war with him, andwhether he should appeal to the Supreme Judge, as Jeptha did.

Sect. 242. If a controversy arise betwixt a prince and some of the people, in amatter where the law is silent, or doubtful, and the thing be of greatconsequence, I should think the proper umpire, in such a case, should be thebody of the people: for in cases where the prince hath a trust reposed in him,and is dispensed from the common ordinary rules of the law; there, if any menfind themselves aggrieved, and think the prince acts contrary to, or beyondthat trust, who so proper to judge as the body of the people, (who, at first,lodged that trust in him) how far they meant it should extend? But if theprince, or whoever they be in the administration, decline that way ofdetermination, the appeal then lies no where but to heaven; force betweeneither persons, who have no known superior on earth, or which permits no appealto a judge on earth, being properly a state of war, wherein the appeal liesonly to heaven; and in that state the injured party must judge for himself,when he will think fit to make use of that appeal, and put himself upon it.

Sect. 243. To conclude, The power that every individual gave the society, whenhe entered into it, can never revert to the individuals again, as long as thesociety lasts, but will always remain in the community; because without thisthere can be no community, no commonwealth, which is contrary to the originalagreement: so also when the society hath placed the legislative in any assemblyof men, to continue in them and their successors, with direction and authorityfor providing such successors, the legislative can never revert to the peoplewhilst that government lasts; because having provided a legislative with powerto continue for ever, they have given up their political power to thelegislative, and cannot resume it. But if they have set limits to the durationof their legislative, and made this supreme power in any person, or assembly,only temporary; or else, when by the miscarriages of those in authority, it isforfeited; upon the forfeiture, or at the determination of the time set, itreverts to the society, and the people have a right to act as supreme, andcontinue the legislative in themselves; or erect a new form, or under the oldform place it in new hands, as they think good.

FINIS.

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